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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the political economy of trade between Jordan and the 
United States. In so doing a number of questions are asked regarding the national 
interests which have led to the facilitation of bilateral trade, the nature of 
contemporary trade and market integration as well as the impacts of these on 
inter-state cooperation. Throughout this thesis the role of Jordanian and US 
engagement in international institutions is considered and conclusions formed 
regarding the utility of these in trade relations and inter-state cooperation.  
 
It is found that the Jordanian government’s key interests over the past decade or 
so have been the pursuit of economic growth and stability. It is also found that 
these interests have been pursued through economic reform at the domestic level 
and trade liberalisation through international institutions at the international level. 
It is also concluded that the United States is pursuing a number of key policy 
goals in the Middle East and North Africa. These are, securing sustainable access 
to the region’s resources, gaining greater access to the region’s markets and 
achieving inter-state cooperation with MENA states. It is demonstrated that the 
United States is pursuing these goals by encouraging states in the region to 
engage in international institutions and liberalise trade with each other and with 
the United States to increase economic integration and inter-state cooperation. 
The convergence of the two states’ policy directions has led to inter-state 
cooperation in the facilitation of trade between Jordan and the United States.  
 
In order to assess the current nature of contemporary trade between Jordan and 
the United States and what the impacts of inter-state cooperation have been, trade 
in three economic sectors has been studied. It is demonstrated that trade in 
textiles and clothing, a low value-added manufacturing sector, has significantly 
increased since the process of trade liberalisation began in 1997. However, this 
form of trade almost exclusively consists of exports from Jordan to the United 
States. Trade in pharmaceutical products is also studied. It is found here that, 
while bilateral trade in these goods does exist, this form of economic activity is 
quite limited and has not greatly increased in the post-liberalisation era. Thus 
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economic integration has been limited in these high-value added goods. The 
study is taken further when trade in financial services is considered. The 
conclusion here is that this form of trade is extremely limited and has not been 
impacted upon in any significant way by inter-state cooperation and engagement 
with international institutions.  
 
The overall conclusions are that Jordan and the United States as state actors have 
engaged with international institutions and liberalised bilateral trade in the hope 
of pursuing national policy goals. The impact, however, of international 
institutions and trade liberalisation on economic growth, economic integration, 
interdependence and inter-state cooperation has been limited. Some significant 
growth in trade has occurred, but only in certain sectors, and some economic 
growth in Jordan has been witnessed as a result. However, wide-ranging 
integration between the two markets has not occurred because non-state actors are 
largely not engaging with trade and economic activity between the markets. 
Furthermore, inter-state cooperation has been restricted to specific economic 
issue areas. It is found that the utility of international institutions and trade 
liberalisation in this case is restricted by the agency of non-state actors and their 
roles in trade and market integration.  
 
The originality of this thesis lies in both what is studied and how it is studied. In 
short, this study attempts to address a gap in IPE literature which, broadly 
speaking, discusses Jordan and US-Jordan trade relations. Furthermore, this study 
acknowledges the Trans-Atlantic divide in IPE and the related contemporary 
debates but remains free from advocating one or the other camp. Instead a 
reflective approach is adopted in the use of critical liberal institutionalist theory 
which remains free from these constraints and develops a non-western-centric 
approach. 
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The title of this thesis was developed in order to portray the focus of this thesis as 
well as to indicate the disciplinary framework within which this study takes place. 
In so doing the intention was not to define this research project simply as a 
narrow study of one form of relations between two states. In fact the opposite is 
true. It is the hope of the author that the reader will understand from the initial 
encounter with this thesis through its title that it is a broad assessment and 
analysis of a number of contemporary processes and related actors. Thus this 
thesis assesses and analyses the political economy of trade relations between the 
United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereon referred 
to as the United States and Jordan respectively) within the disciplinary framework 
of International Political Economy (IPE) using a critical liberal institutionalist 
theoretical approach – note that this is not a neoliberal approach and is not based 
upon neoliberal ideology.  
 
The purpose of this study is to understand and offer explanations of contemporary 
change in the relationship between the United States and Jordan.  This is done by 
examining the United States and Jordan as state actors and as markets comprised 
of non-state actors. Furthermore, this is done by studying state relations and the 
subsequent impact upon the framework within which the two markets interact as 
well as studying the actual interaction of the markets through the activity of non-
state actors. This thesis also addresses the significance of these elements of 
change and develops a set of predictions and prescriptions for both state and non-
state actors pertaining to the future of US-Jordan trade and wider political and 
economic relations.  
 
The hypothesis tested is grounded in liberal political and economic thought and 
holds that trade liberalisation between Jordan and the United States has and will 
continue to lead to greater levels of bilateral trade, economic growth, greater 
economic integration and subsequently an increase in inter-state cooperation. In 
this endeavour four core research questions are addressed. The first question 
considers whether or not trade liberalisation through the engagement with 
international institutions in the forms of international organisations (IOs) and 
trade regimes leads to greater levels of trade between Jordan and the United 
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States. The second core question considers if greater levels of trade have led to 
greater levels of bilateral market integration. The third question then asks whether 
increased trade and market integration have resulted in greater state-level 
cooperation between Jordan and the United States. The final research question 
considered in this thesis asks what the interests of the two state actors have been 
with regards to their bilateral relations and if these are met as a result of 
contemporary trade between them.  
 
This thesis is presented in three main sections, the first section of which is 
chapters one and two. Together these chapters establish the disciplinary 
framework within which the study takes place, and the theoretical approach and 
research methods used. The second section then uses the approaches outlined in 
chapter two to examine relations at the state level, assessing relations and policies 
determining how the United States and Jordan (as state actors) have shaped the 
framework within which trade takes place. This section thus contains two 
chapters, one studying Jordanian domestic, foreign and trade policy and one 
studying US foreign and trade policy (the inclusion of domestic policy in the 
former is explained below).  
 
The third section of the thesis uses the theoretical approach and research methods 
established in chapter two to study the actual trade relations between the US and 
Jordanian markets. This is done by studying non-state actors as well as state 
actors and their roles in three economic sectors and the interaction of these 
sectors in the two markets. This section consists of three chapters each addressing 
one economic sector (outlined below). It must be noted here that the three 
chapters in this section each draw upon various components of the conception of 
critical liberal institutionalism which is outlined in chapter two. However, the 
analyses in these chapters in some ways constitute individual elements of the 
overall theoretical analysis. As such they do not necessarily draw upon all of the 
elements of the theory used here. The conclusions to each of these chapters will, 
however, draw the analyses together into an overall theoretical analysis. The 
second and third sections of this thesis are based to a certain extent on primary 
data collected on field research trips to Jordan, the United States and Geneva, 
Switzerland. A conclusion follows this third main section of the thesis.   
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The first chapter critically assesses the disciplinary framework within which the 
remainder of this study takes place. Chapter one is thus entitled ‘Twenty-First 
Century International Political Economy: Towards a New Understanding of US-
Jordan Relations.’ The aim of this chapter is to introduce and engage with the 
debate within IPE regarding the nature of the discipline in the early twenty-first 
century1 and how relations between the United States and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region (including US-Jordan relations) have been 
included2 and review relevant literature. It traces the emergence of the debate 
between the two main schools within IPE (discussed below) from the 1990s and 
highlights the short-comings of a discipline which has to some extent failed to 
keep pace with a changing international political economy and changing US-
Jordan and US-MENA relations. The argument in this chapter is that IPE has 
been dominated by an orthodox or hegemonic version of the discipline which is 
mostly, although not exclusively, rooted in the US academy.3  
 
There have been significant efforts to develop a more heterodox discipline and 
this thesis contributes to what has been termed a ‘new’ IPE.4 However, this is not 
done by defending one of the two main IPE camps and contributing to it. Rather, 
in this thesis the nature of IPE is introduced in order to give an overview of the 
discipline as a whole but this study intentionally remains outside of the Trans-
Atlantic debate (discussed below). This is done to remain free from the 
constraints of this debate and to focus on the topic of study. Furthermore, chapter 
one argues that the study of the MENA region and US-MENA relations have 
been relatively limited in IPE and often state- and conflict-centric. The discussion 
in this chapter then offers suggestions as to how the elements of IPE which are 
problematic are addressed in this thesis.  
 
                                                 
1
 Cohen, B. J., 2008, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
2
 Halliday, F., 2005, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
3
 Murphy, C., and Tooze., R (eds.), 1991, The New International Political Economy, Boulder: 
Lynne Reiner Publishers, p: 4. 
4
 Gills, B., Forum: Perspectives on New Political Economy: Re-orienting the New (International) 
Political Economy, in New Political Economy, 2001, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp: 234-236. 
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Chapter two is simply entitled ‘Theory and Methods’ and develops the 
conclusions in chapter one by defining the theoretical approach and research 
methods used here. The theoretical approach used in this thesis is a critical 
version of liberal institutionalism. This chapter discusses the development of 
liberal institutionalism in IPE demonstrating how the approach addresses the 
weaknesses of traditional IPE and studies of US-MENA relations. The 
development of a critical version of liberal institutionalism is also presented 
outlining the specific theory and key concepts used in this thesis. A key element 
of this project is the study of tangible and non-tangible institutions (discussed in 
detail in chapter two) and the role of these in shaping bilateral trade, market 
integration and cooperation. The focus here is on formal institutions – both state 
and non-state – more than informal institutions. This is for a number of reasons, 
both by design and by necessity. This project is based on a number of 
assumptions within liberal institutionalist theory which places emphasis on both 
types of institutions at certain times and in certain places. However, in order to 
complete a study of this type it is necessary to emphasise formal institutions more 
than informal ones. The hypothesis to be tested in this research project and the 
core research questions asked tend to focus more on formal institutions and their 
impacts. Thus it is not within the remit of this project – which is limited in terms 
of size and scope – to discuss at great length informal institutions in place of 
formal ones. Furthermore, the availability of and access to information on 
informal institutions is limited, in part due to the sensitive nature of the 
constraints and impacts of informal institutions on, for example, decision makers.  
 
The remainder of chapter two then develops a discussion of the advantages and 
weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative methods of research. The combination 
of these two types of methods is rationalised and the methods of research used in 
this thesis to collect, analyse and present data are outlined.  
 
Chapter three examines Jordanian domestic, foreign and trade policy since the 
1990s. The core focus of this chapter is a discussion of how changes in the 
domestic and international economic and political spheres have encouraged dual 
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processes of reform.5 This chapter therefore studies how processes of political 
and economic reform have interacted, resulting in the primacy of the latter over 
the former leading to contemporary Jordanian foreign economic policy aimed at 
facilitating trade through engaging with international institutions. The change in 
Jordanian foreign economic policy and economic reform at home, it is argued 
here, are a result of changes in demands and constraints - largely economic in 
nature - on national interests.  
 
The following chapter presents a discussion of change in US foreign and trade 
policy since the early 1990s and how these are related to political and strategic 
policies and interests. This chapter argues that US foreign and economic policies 
are in fact largely one and the same.6 Furthermore, the United States has, 
throughout its history, used economic and political policies in conjunction with 
each other in order to pursue various interests in the MENA region. Since the 
1990s there has been a change in foreign and economic policy to the region 
exemplified by the drive towards bilateral economic integration through trade 
liberalisation.7 An analysis of the state-facilitation of trade between the US and 
Jordanian markets is then presented outlining how this relates to broader US trade 
facilitation. The analysis in the preceding chapter is complimented by chapter 
four completing the analysis of state involvement in shaping the framework 
within which trade between the two markets takes place.  
 
It must be emphasised at this point that this study, while seeking to discuss the 
political economy of trade between the United States and Jordan by looking at a 
range of state and non-state actors, explores these types of actors in differing 
detail. As is discussed further in chapter two, a plurality of actors is assumed in 
the theoretical framework which is used in this thesis. Furthermore, the 
assumption is made that no single form of actor has universal primacy over all 
                                                 
5
 Abu-Hammour, M., 2005, Jordan’s Economic Reforms, Abu Dhabi: S.n.; Singh, R., 
Liberalisation or Democratisation?: The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan, 
in Joffé, G. (ed.), 2002, Jordan in Transition: 1990-2000, London: MacMillan Press, pp. 66-90. 
6
 Ward, A., US Policy to the Middle East: Utopianism and Realism, IISS Strategic Comments, 
January 2003, Vol. 1, Issue 1, p: 2. 
7
 Rosen, H., Free Trade Agreements as Foreign Policy Tools: The US-Israel and US-Jordan 
FTAs, in Schott, J. J. (ed.), 2004, Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities, 
Washington: Institute for International Economics. 
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others. Thus, within this project it is claimed that in order to understand the 
complex relationship between Jordan and the United States as both state actors 
and markets of non-state actors we must discuss and analyse a range of actor 
types. These non-state actors will include MNCs, trade associations and IGOs. 
However, the roles of the various state and non-state actors in trade between 
Jordan and the United States differ in character and often in significance.  
 
As this study progresses state actors are seen to have an important role in defining 
the framework in which bilateral trade takes place. Non-state actors are discussed 
in detail as a whole. However, no individual non-state actor receives as much 
attention as the individual state actors discussed. The result of the difference in 
levels of discussion between state and non-state actors should not be seen as 
either an assumption of the primacy of the state as actor or a conclusion of state 
actor primacy. This point is taken further in the conclusion. 
 
The final section of the thesis begins with chapter five which is entitled ‘Bilateral 
Trade in Textiles and Clothing.’ The trade relations studied in this chapter are 
situated in a low value-added, labour-intensive manufacturing sector which is 
dominated by non-state actors (corporations and multinational corporations) 
operating in the Jordanian market and exporting their goods to the US market and 
so the classification of the exports as being ‘Jordanian’. This chapter aims to 
study how US-Jordan textiles and clothing trade relations have changed as a 
result of state facilitation of trade and discuss which actors are involved in this 
trade as well as explain the impact of international institutions. The chapter 
demonstrates that the change in state policy has had a significant impact on 
change in non-state actor activity between the two markets in this sector.  
 
Continuing the analysis of trade relations and market integration, chapter six 
examines both the nature and level of trade in pharmaceutical goods between the 
US and Jordanian markets. The discussion develops the examination of how the 
change in regulatory framework within which trade takes place has begun to 
reshape the interaction between the two sectors in the two markets. In doing so, 
the assessment of the political economy of trade relations between the United 
States and Jordan is developed by analysing what can be classed as a second form 
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of trade activity. This form of trade takes place in a high value-added, capital 
intensive and high-technology manufacturing sector. This chapter demonstrates 
that this form of trade is characterised by low but more even levels of trade in 
value terms but dominance by the United States in determining the framework 
within which the bilateral trade takes place. Furthermore, this chapter examines 
how the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiated agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) has shaped both bilateral 
trade in pharmaceutical products as well as the nature of the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical sector. This analysis is developed by examining the significant 
differences between TRIPs regulation of the pharmaceutical sectors and the 
Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA) which embodies so-called 
TRIPs-Plus provisions (which are far more stringent than TRIPs provisions as 
agreed upon at the WTO). 
 
Chapter seven completes the analysis of market interaction and the nature of 
contemporary trade between the United States and Jordan by assessing bilateral 
trade in financial services in the form of banking and insurance services. This 
chapter considers another high value-added and capital intensive sector and 
demonstrates the limits to the trade liberalisation which has been facilitated by 
the US and Jordanian governments. As is the case in chapters five and six this 
chapter is based largely on primary data collected during field research and 
considers the activity of non-state actors and examines the institutional 
framework within which they operate. The general observations and argument of 
this chapter are that despite the increasing interaction and rising trade levels 
between the two economies, the low levels of trade in financial services prevalent 
in the pre-2000 period persist today. The significance of this lack of trade activity 
lies not in contemporary economic opportunities being missed but in the overall 
potential for US-Jordan trade and the limits to the impacts of international 
institutions.   
 
The conclusion to the thesis draws together the analyses of the previous five 
chapters within the framework established in chapters one and two and presents a 
discussion answering the core research questions. A discussion of the hypothesis 
tested in the thesis is also presented and a number of significant conclusions are 
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made with relevance to the political economy of trade between the United States 
and Jordan and what this demonstrates for the future of US-Jordan relations and 
the role of trade liberalisation and economic integration in these relations.    
 
Originality and Relevance 
 
This thesis, while complex and ambitious in some ways, is relatively particular in 
terms of its originality and its relevance. In the first instance there are several 
easily identifiable elements of this thesis which make it original in terms of what 
is being studied and the disciplinary and methodological approaches used. Studies 
of international political economy which have included Jordan as either a state 
actor or market of multiple actors are limited in number (discussed in chapter 
one). Furthermore, no study has considered exclusively the political economy of 
trade relations between the United States and Jordan in the post-2001 era. 
Therefore this study addresses a topic which has not been previously engaged 
with. Work done by academics in IPE and International Relations (IR) as well as 
MENA Studies have discussed relations between the United States and other 
MENA states and have examined the political economy of trade relations 
between these states. However, Jordan has been largely excluded from these 
discussions.8  
 
In one sense, therefore, this project contributes to a body of literature by bringing 
Jordan into the discussion. It is also the case that research done on US-MENA 
relations tends to revolve around the issues of security and conflict - or what in 
traditional language is called high politics.9 Other studies have focused on 
political economy or other issue areas such as development or environmental 
studies - or what is termed low politics in traditional language.10 However, the 
endeavour of combining the study of high and low politics by looking at the 
relationship between the two in US-MENA relations is not a common occurrence. 
                                                 
8
 See Oren, M., 2007, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the 
Present, London: W. Norton and Co Ltd. 
9
 See Hobbes, T., 1996, Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
10
 See Keohane, R., and Nye, J., 1977, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
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This study is also original in this sense as it examines both issues of high and low 
politics and how they relate to each other in the US-Jordan relationship. 
 
A third way in which this study is original is in the way in which it is founded in 
the IPE discipline. Debates over the Trans-Atlantic divide in IPE between what 
are loosely termed the American and British schools are constant and well 
documented.11 Furthermore, IPE as a discipline has harboured a relatively lively 
debate about the nature of orthodox IPE within both schools since the early 
1990s. However, often ignored as a result of these debates are links between what 
constitutes IPE and what is left out. Here, studies of the MENA region have often 
been excluded from what is considered as relevant in IPE unless seen from a 
western-centric perspective. In other words the international political economy of 
the MENA region is often seen as only being important or worthy of discussion if 
it complements a broader discussion on western actors or issues, or if it 
contributes to the defense of one of the two main schools.12 Perhaps too great a 
focus has been given to the American and British schools of IPE and the divide 
between them (and bridging this divide) that other potentially emerging schools 
are ignored.  
 
It is possible that a school of IPE which focuses on issues of relevance to the 
MENA region in its own right and is done from a non-western perspective will 
emerge and have much to offer the discipline in the future. This project thus 
highlights the mainstream debate within IPE regarding the nature of the 
discipline, drawing upon the work of scholars such as Roger Tooze and Craig 
Murphy,13 Benjamin J. Cohen,14 Mark Blyth,15 Susan Strange16 and Barry Gills,17 
but unlike other studies does not choose one side of the argument to reinforce. 
                                                 
11
 Dickens, A., The Evolution of International Political Economy, in International Affairs, 2006, 
Vol. 82, No. 3, p:480. 
12
 See for example, Lawrence, R., 2006, A US-Middle East Trade Agreement: A Circle of 
Opportunity, Washington: Institute for International Economics.  
13
 Murphy, C., and Tooze, R., (eds.), 1991. 
14
 Cohen, B. J., 2008. 
15
 Blyth, M., and Spruyt, H., Our  Past as Prologue: Introduction to the Tenth Anniversary Issue 
of Review of International Political Economy, in Review of International Political Economy, 
2003, Vol. 10, No. 4. 
16
 Strange, S., 1995, Political Economy and International Relations, in Booth, K., and Smith S., 
International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity. 
17
 Gills, B., 2001. 
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Instead, the debate is introduced and described but the disciplinary discussion 
concludes at that point in chapter one. What follows is an IPE study that attempts 
to remain free from the constraints of the Trans-Atlantic divide and pursues an 
original project which is perhaps closer to an emerging MENA school of IPE.  
 
A further realm in which this research project is distinct is in the theoretical 
approach used and the theoretical questions raised and answered. Trade as an 
issue of study in IPE has more often than not entailed a liberal theoretical 
approach. This is because liberalism as a broad school of thought encompasses 
many analytical principles and theories which allow for the study of political 
economy, of which trade is a key issue area.18 Liberal approaches unlike others 
allow for the study of multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis and for the 
study of multidimensional issues and processes.19 The study of trade usually 
necessitates the study of state and non-state actors at the domestic, state and 
international levels and relationships characterised by complex interdependence. 
Thus the explanatory richness of liberal approaches is very well suited to the 
study of trade and other issues in IPE. This thesis does not attempt to break with 
this tradition nor defend it. Rather this thesis employs a slightly amended and 
critical version of a liberal approach - in this case a critical version of liberal 
institutionalism. While it cannot be claimed that the exact conception of theory 
employed in this project (as outlined in chapter two) is entirely unique, it is 
possible to claim that the application of the version of this theory to study the 
political economy of trade between Jordan and the United States is unique.  
 
At a more fundamental level the theoretical questions asked here are at the same 
time concise yet overarching. In this thesis common assumptions made in liberal 
institutionalism regarding the effects of the creation of international institutions 
and the way in which they operate are examined. Thus some of the basic 
principles of the approach are questioned. In the first instance basic principles 
such as the assumption that free trade as guaranteed through the creation and 
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operation of liberal institutions - both IOs and international regimes - leads to 
greater levels of trade are not assumed but instead are questioned. The result of 
this process is that the basic principles of the conception of liberal 
institutionalism used here do not entirely match those in mainstream liberal 
institutionalism. It must be noted, however, that this process is ongoing 
throughout this thesis and while introduced in chapter two is not entirely 
complete until the concluding chapter. In this way this element of the thesis is 
original in two ways. Firstly, in the sense that the basic principles of liberal 
institutionalism are questioned in the way that they are and secondly, in the sense 
that this thesis while answering certain questions about the US-Jordan 
relationship also serves as a test of certain theoretical concepts.  
 
As discussed in more detail in chapter two, the conception of liberal 
institutionalism used in this thesis differs from more traditional institutionalist 
approaches in two main ways. Firstly, while a key assumption here is that actors 
have interests and they take courses of action in order to pursue these interests it 
is argued that these interests and subsequent actions are not necessarily rational 
nor do they necessarily come as a result of rational calculation in conditions of 
perfect information. Secondly, while cooperation in international relations 
through international institutions is a plus-sum game, here it is believed that there 
are multiple levels of relations between multiple actors, some of which are zero-
sum and some of which are positive-sum games. The overall result, however, 
once these levels are combined is a positive-sum game where absolute gains can 
be achieved.   
 
It is perhaps worth highlighting at this stage that the research methods used in this 
thesis and the combination of different types of methods at various moments in 
the project are not necessarily original. Furthermore, there is no claim to 
originality with regards to the research methods used, beyond the unique nature 
of the interviews conducted on the four field research trips. Here, two trips to 
Jordan, one to the United States and one to Geneva, Switzerland were carried out 
in order to gather information from state and non-state actors not readily available 
from elsewhere. The interviews conducted do represent an original element of 
this thesis and the questions designed and the ways in which the interviews were 
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carried out also are unique. However, the other methods used to collect and 
analyse information were not unique but instead based upon a vast body of 
literature pertaining to social science research methods (this literature is reviewed 
and discussed in chapter two). 
 
The relationship between Jordan and the United States is often ignored (perhaps 
for reasons such as the perceived small size of Jordan in terms of population, 
economy, military power and so on) and attention paid to the relationship 
between the United States and larger MENA actors such as Egypt, Iraq or Saudi 
Arabia.20 However, the Jordan-US relationship is extremely important and should 
not be underestimated. In the post-9/11 era the United States has pursued a 
number of more revisionist policies in the MENA region, the 2003 invasion and 
occupation of Iraq being the most obvious example.21 If the aim of a research 
project is to analyse the impacts of forced regime change in a Middle Eastern 
state it would be useful to examine the US-Iraq conflict and relationship. In the 
same manner it is useful, and perhaps essential, to study the political economy of 
trade between Jordan and the United States if the aim is to understand the 
changing nature of US-MENA trade relations and how this impacts upon broader 
relations through processes of interaction and integration. This is because the 
state-level framework established by the JUSFTA for trade and economic 
interaction and integration between Jordan and the United States was the first of 
its kind between the latter and an Arab MENA state. The JUSFTA has acted as a 
model for further regulation of trade and thus market interaction between the 
United States and other MENA states and represents the first step on the path to a 
desired US-MENA FTA.  
 
Understanding the state-level facilitation of trade between Jordan and the United 
States by examining government policy goals and decisions as well as the nature 
of market interaction and integration is essential in understanding the directions 
in which relations between the two are going. An understanding of this 
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relationship and the directions it may take will also be useful in understanding 
changes in US-MENA as well as Jordan-MENA relations.   
 
While this thesis is relatively broad and encompasses a large number of actors, 
issues and processes in the contemporary relationship between Jordan and the 
United States there is much scope for further study. Firstly, this study has focused 
on three different market sectors in order to examine the nature of trade between 
Jordan and the United States. Within these sectors (low value-added 
manufacturing, high value-added manufacturing and high value-added services) 
there is room for the study of other goods and services. This could further 
enhance the understanding of the nature of trade between the two states and 
reinforce (or perhaps even undermine) the conclusions presented in this study. 
Secondly, this study has examined US-Jordan relations over a relatively short 
period of time - mostly since 1999. Thus the conclusions formed are for a 
relatively short period of time in the years immediately after a number of key 
changes in state-level cooperation and interaction between the two states. Further 
studies of the political economy of trade between Jordan and the United States 
would therefore be useful in the future as the bilateral relationship develops.  
 
As discussed above, studying the political economy of trade between Jordan and 
the United States offers useful insights into both contemporary US-MENA and 
Jordan-MENA relations. It would be interesting and useful to study and perhaps 
compare the political economy of trade between Jordan or the United States and 
other MENA states. Furthermore, there are implications of Jordan-US trade 
relations on the endeavour to create a US-MENA FTA. Future studies could 
analyse why and how this broad ranging alteration in the framework of trade 
between the MENA region and the United States could emerge and what its 
impacts could be, based on the analysis in this study. Another element of this 
thesis which could be taken further in future studies is the greater inclusion of 
informal institutions on actor behaviour. This is an element which due to the 
reasons briefly outlined above is not included in this thesis as much as the impact 
of formal institutions. One might note that a discussion of informal institutional 
relations would be more appropriately developed within a constructivist 
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framework. Further analysis of the roles of non-state actors in Jordan-US trade 
relations would also prove useful in future research. 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the development and contemporary nature of the discipline 
of IPE and how the discipline includes the study of contemporary relations 
between the United States and the MENA region, and Jordan in particular. In the 
case of the former, the purpose of the discussion is to highlight the shortcomings 
of a discipline which has struggled, analytically, to keep pace with a changing 
international political economy. Furthermore, following the discussion of the 
problems with IPE, suggestions are made as to how the elements of the discipline 
which are problematic can be managed with respect to this thesis. This forms the 
basis of how this study will be carried out. This discussion is taken further in 
chapter two which forms the second half of the first part of this thesis. In the case 
of the discussion on US-MENA relations, the aim once again is to highlight the 
shortcomings of a number of disciplines, including MENA Studies, Foreign 
Policy Studies and International Relations as well as IPE, in their study of 
contemporary relations. This discussion also offers answers as to how 
problematic issues can be addressed.  
 
In order to complete these tasks, this chapter is structured in to a number of 
sections. The first section introduces the argument that IPE as a discipline is 
incomplete. The core issues to be addressed in the following sections on IPE are 
highlighted and a blueprint as to how to critique IPE is offered. The second 
section then presents an introductory examination of what is here termed 
‘orthodox’ IPE. As is the case throughout this chapter, the work of a range of 
scholars, contributors to both IPE and other disciplines, is considered. The 
following section examines the methodology used by orthodox IPE highlighting 
the problems of common approaches. This discussion is then taken further in 
chapter two which establishes the methodological parameters of this study. The 
fourth section further develops the critique of IPE by questioning the scope of 
issues which are considered to be part of the agenda of IPE studies. A critique of 
the primary position of trade as an issue of study is developed along with a 
defence of the inclusion of trade as an issue of study in this thesis. The final 
section to deal exclusively with IPE assesses attempts that have been made to 
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develop a heterodox or ‘new’ IPE since the mid- to late-1990s. This is done 
because this thesis draws on liberal institutionalism as a whole but also draws 
upon, and in some cases resists, some of the more recent criticisms of it.  
 
The following sections address the issue of contemporary studies of US-MENA 
relations. The insular and often state- and conflict-centric nature of studies of 
these relations is critiqued in section six. Included here is a discussion of how, 
while the range of issues studied in IPE are limited, the agenda of studies 
involving the MENA region are even more narrow, and how this region is largely 
ignored by IPE. The penultimate section offers an analysis of how US foreign and 
trade policy strategies may be re-conceptualised within a ‘new’ IPE. It is worth 
noting that these latter two sections of the chapter are designed to be brief critical 
overviews of these two areas of study as opposed to comprehensive reviews. 
They are thus observably shorter in length than the review of IPE which precedes 
them. This chapter then concludes by presenting a summary of the main points 
and arguments as well as outlining how this thesis can offer new insights to the 
study of US-Jordan relations. 
 
The Problem with International Political Economy 
 
There is no single accepted definition of international political economy. It is, 
however, the position of this author following in the footsteps of such great and 
varied scholars as Adam Smith, Norman Angell, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, 
Susan Strange, Jagdish Baghwati, Robert Cox, and Karl Polanyi that, broadly 
speaking, the purpose of social science is to understand and explain the human 
condition - how we got to where we are and the ways in which human activity is 
shaped and organised - as well as to contribute to the improvement of this 
condition. The author here would like to acknowledge the disciplinary and 
theoretical divergences between the above mentioned scholars as well as to state 
that these differences are inconsequential in the debate about the purpose of 
social science and its contribution to the human condition. This is a debate far too 
great to be engaged with in this thesis although one which should indeed receive 
far more attention in scholarly work. In short though, it is the belief of this author 
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that scholarly work limited to the development of understanding and explaining, 
which makes no attempt to develop predictive and prescriptive ability is the true 
enemy of progressive social science. Many scholars have engaged with 
‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ in IPE through the use and development of 
theoretical approaches.22 However, further development of the analysis 
undertaken to include prediction and/or prescription is not a given. A source of 
this failure is due to what actually constitutes the field of IPE in terms of what 
issues are studied and how they are studied.23  
 
It is largely acknowledged that there are two broadly defined schools within IPE. 
One centred on scholarly institutions in the United States and associated with the 
American journal International Organisation (IO) and the other on British 
academic institutions (although many members of this school are actually 
American or Canadian) which can be labelled the ‘critical’ school (and whose 
main outlets have come in the journals Review of International Political Economy 
(RIPE) and New International Political Economy (NIPE)).24 Amanda Dickens 
efficiently characterises the former as based on positivist methodological 
approaches and as being dominated by the hegemony of rationalist knowledge 
production. 25 On the other hand, as Mark Blyth and Hendrik Spruyt have so 
effectively outlined, the latter has developed more as a critique to the hegemonic 
position of the ‘American’ school in IPE.26A more critical statement regarding 
the British School, which will be developed below, and has been suggested by 
Robert Keohane, is that it can be characterised by problem-highlighting as much 
as if not more than problem-solving.27 However, despite their differences and 
seemingly polarised agendas, a deeper analysis of IPE as a discipline and the 
‘schools’ within it highlights a number of common problems.  
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Roger Tooze identifies IPE as “denoting an area of investigation, a particular 
range of questions, and a series of assumptions about the nature of the 
international ‘system’ and how we understand this ‘system’.”28 This 
characterisation of IPE is accepted by many IPE scholars, although debate exists 
about what should be included in the set of defining questions. Susan Strange, for 
example, entitled her seminal introductory text to international political economy 
States and Markets. In this text she highlights the argument that the questions of 
IPE concern the relationship between the state (as actor) and the market (as 
system) as two ways of organising human activity.29 It must be noted, however, 
that for Strange the core characteristic of this relationship is concerned with the 
socio-political and economic arrangements that affect the global system of 
production and distribution – she is in fact criticising the states and markets 
approach.30 Others such as Robert Gilpin, while also arguing for the focus to be 
placed on the relationship between the state and the market are concerned with a 
different set of broad research questions. Gilpin is more concerned with the 
political and economic causes and effects of the market system and the 
significance of these at the domestic level.31  
 
Underlying the problem of what to study is the problem of how to study it. 
Historically concerned with understanding and explaining the post-Second World 
War world and the international liberal economic order established in that period 
with the aim of strengthening this order, IPE scholars have often failed to achieve 
their goals.32 However, As Roger Tooze asserts, the causes for this failure have 
rarely been the subject of scrutiny as most IPE scholars have been content with 
strengthening IPE as a discipline without examining the foundations on which it 
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is based.33 Importantly, there has been a lack of evaluation of the hierarchy of 
issues that IPE studies and a tendency to continuously attempt to produce “more 
accurate” conclusions about a number of ‘old’ or over-studied issues. These 
tendencies have led to what Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze term the orthodoxy 
of IPE.34 They argue that this orthodoxy consists of a restricted view of what the 
important issues that need to be studied are and what questions need to be asked 
regarding these issues. 
 
Tooze and Murphy were among the first IPE scholars to call for a revision of IPE 
as a response to the embedded nature of orthodoxy in the discipline in their edited 
book The New International Political Economy in 1991. Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey Underhill have also called for a revision of IPE, although their argument 
differs slightly from that presented by Murphy and Tooze. Stubbs and Underhill 
describe IPE in their book Political Economy and the Changing Global Order as 
a discipline which is often in a state of analytical and explanatory paralysis due to 
the internal debates of how to study the international political economy.35 They 
argue that the majority of IPE texts tend to adopt one of the three main paradigms 
(neo-realism, neo-liberalism or historical structuralism/Marxism) or some form of 
synthesis and then embark on defending their choice.36 This focus on competing 
paradigms severs the connection between the material interests of actors and the 
resulting relationships they have with the international system and other actors 
and thus reduces analytical power. 
 
The key to understanding the growth of orthodox IPE is understanding how the 
growth of the discipline through the 1970s until the mid-1990s largely reflected 
an IR agenda and was not shaped by a political economy or economics agenda. 
As a result of this the debates which shaped IR from the late 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s also had an impact on IPE.  
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Despite differences in the discrete aims of critical or ‘revisionist’ scholars, such 
as Karl Polanyi, Peter J. Katzenstein, Stephen Gill, E. Helleiner and P. G. Cerny, 
a core aim is constant: to attend to the problem of orthodox IPE. While most 
revisionist scholars do not argue that they have the answer to what a new IPE 
should look like they do provide valuable directions that can be taken in order to 
further develop the discipline. Tooze and Murphy, for example, outline four key 
areas one should critique. Firstly, one must examine the conceptual foundations 
of IPE bringing them into question. Second, one must use this to construct the 
argument that having a diverse range of approaches to IPE should be welcomed 
and not rejected. This is because, as Stephen Krasner has highlighted, arguing for 
a single new approach to IPE would simply be replacing one form of orthodoxy 
with another.37 Third, one should evaluate the philosophical and conceptual 
framework of IPE in order to increase understanding of the complex global order. 
Finally, it is claimed that it is evident that a high level of understanding of 
international political economy is only achievable by including competing 
analyses within IPE and analyses of other subjects from the social sciences.38 
 
While these four key themes for the revision of IPE are promising it is not 
necessarily the only ‘broad map’ for such a critique. However, Robert Denemark 
and Richard O’Brien warn that any critique of IPE must be done tentatively for 
two reasons. In the first instance any attempt to challenge orthodoxy and current 
thinking will be met with a level of hostility and criticism.39 Second, an essential 
feature of attempting to ‘open-up’ IPE concerns the issues being studied and the 
questions being addressed. One of the core criticisms of orthodox IPE, made by 
Ian Taylor in his work on ‘globalising’ IPE,40 is that it has a narrow and 
replicated issue agenda that continues to ask the same questions.41 It is possible to 
bring this feature into question simply by examining alternative issues and asking 
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different questions. It is essential to note that simply stating that IPE has a narrow 
issue agenda that should be expanded to include other issues in contemporary 
international political economy does not necessitate the expulsion of issues which 
have already been studied. Colin Hay and David Marsh have argued that ‘old’ 
issues that have received much attention from IPE scholars such as bilateral and 
multilateral trade may have been studied at the expense of other issues, but are 
still important nonetheless.42 Any research that primarily aims to study issues 
such as trade but at the same time attempt to move away from orthodox IPE will 
therefore run the risk of being contradictory if existing critiques such as that of 
Murphy and Tooze are precisely followed. Rather it is necessary to build on 
existing critiques to develop new ones. 
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of tasks that must be completed in order to 
critique orthodox IPE and develop heterodox and more effective approaches - 
although the ways in which these tasks can be carried out may vary. Any attempt 
at moving away from orthodox IPE must begin with an evaluation of what 
orthodox IPE actually is. This entails an assessment of its ontological and 
epistemological foundations in order to establish patterns of knowledge and 
knowledge production. Following must be an assessment of the methodological 
dimensions which define the range over which the methodology of orthodoxy 
varies. Thirdly, an assessment and critique of the orthodox issue agenda needs to 
be carried out. A successful critique of these areas of orthodox IPE will not 
necessarily yield precise answers as to how the limitations of the orthodox 
approach can be overcome. However, it will provide some insight as to how to 
develop more complete approaches to understanding and analysing various 
contemporary issues.  
 
An Introductory Examination of Orthodox IPE 
 
The primary aim of theoretical discussion in IPE is to evaluate “the 
appropriateness of the instrumental categories and theories used to ‘make sense’ 
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of the changing ‘reality’ of a Global Political Economy.”43 Many scholars and 
students of IPE have successfully engaged with this discussion, but many others 
have failed.44 But it is relatively easy to test the competing narratives of IPE and 
their varying analyses against a ‘reality’ that is understood through common 
sense.45 It is here that any critique of social understanding and explanation must 
start, for, according to Robert Cox, ‘reality’ as understood by common sense 
exists even before theoretical analysis is undertaken.46 For this reason a degree of 
scepticism is needed about how knowledge that is taken as common sense in IPE 
is attained. Antonio Gramsci went as far as to state that such a critique of 
common sense should be the starting point of all progressive social change.47 
Gramsci suggested that we should examine common sense in order to highlight 
the ways in which ‘theory’ often determines what are taken as facts as well as 
outline the inconsistencies that exist in accepted preconceptions. Furthermore, the 
aim should be to reveal the historic and practical reasons behind the development 
of common sense ideas, and answer the question of who is and who is not served 
by ideas that are believed to be common sense.48 
 
The discipline of IPE itself can initially be seen as one that is deeply contested 
through the existence of a profusion of approaches and research programmes and 
one that therefore has no universally accepted ‘common sense’ knowledge. 
Groom and Light, writing explicitly on IR, and implicitly on IPE, argue that the 
broad range of contradictory approaches and the variations of these approaches 
project the image that IPE research can produce varying results and competing 
analyses.49  Therefore, allowing for differing common sense arguments to 
advocate the most convincing explanation.  
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The view of a dynamic discipline is misleading. Robert Cox argues that there is a 
global political economy of the production of IPE knowledge.50 This has over the 
last two decades evolved into an orthodoxy defined by a clear set of values, 
theories and a “particular mode of production of IPE knowledge that specifies a 
particular relationship between the objective and subjective and uses appropriate 
epistemological and ontological categories to support this relationship.”51 
According to Cox a theory that is divorced from a particular standpoint in time 
and space simply cannot exist. Rather he argues that “theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose.”52 Using this argument as a core principle, 
Richard Higgott suggests that an investigation of who benefits from knowledge 
production and re-production is beneficial in order to ascertain how best to avoid 
claims about the truthfulness of certain types of knowledge.53 
 
The core issue here is that the vast majority of IPE research is done within a 
framework of ‘paradigm production’ that is formed by a number of intellectual 
assumptions and practices. The resultant implication of this is that the divergent 
paradigms that exist within IPE and that contradict each other on one level are in 
fact all created in a single, larger framework of ‘knowledge production’. This 
argument, made by scholars including Cox, Strange, Tooze and Murphy54 has 
been met with the pro-orthodox response, by scholars such as Ernest Haas,55 that 
the competing paradigms within IPE are contradictory and hence must be 
divergent in their origins and their application to studying IPE. This is true to 
some extent in that the competing paradigms do contain differing views on how 
to understand and explain certain features of international political economy and 
can produce contradictory explanations. However, according to Ash Amin and 
Ronen Palan, the epistemological and ontological foundations of orthodox IPE 
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allow for the synthesis of these paradigms (most commonly realist-liberal) to 
allow for the resolution of such incompatibilities.56 In order to understand this 
framework of knowledge production we must first examine the process of 
‘intellectual production’ by assessing the material and theoretical bases of 
knowledge in orthodox IPE.57 
 
It can be argued that identifying a particular range of theories and empirical 
referents does not immediately lead to an identification of what actually 
constitutes orthodox IPE. In order to accomplish this, as Bob Jessop and Ngai-
Ling Sum58 indicated towards in their discussion of IPE, the distinct set of 
ontologies and epistemologies on which orthodox knowledge is produced and 
interpreted must be highlighted. This is because when combined with the existing 
range of theories in IPE, these produce the culture of orthodox IPE. This culture 
has its material bases and theoretical foundations for knowledge production and 
perception.59 Unfortunately, simply being aware that there is a culture of 
knowledge production and interpretation within orthodox IPE that pre-assigns the 
researcher to participate in the processes of orthodox IPE’s reproduction is not 
enough to prevent this from happening. All research that is undertaken will 
contribute in one form or another to orthodox IPE.60 This is because orthodox IPE 
often encourages different positions and views in an attempt to be a contested 
discipline only to either ignore such alternatives or to incorporate them into the 
orthodox mainstream.61 It is certainly not the purpose of this research project to 
break entirely from orthodox IPE. The aim here is merely to critique the 
foundations of IPE research and produce a study which takes some steps towards 
heterodox research which incorporates a level of reflexivity in the analysis 
(discussed further in chapter two). 
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It is difficult to explain what the ontological and epistemological bases of 
orthodox IPE knowledge production are without briefly considering an example 
of how they materialise in research. Robert Gilpin in his text The Political 
Economy of International Relations62 (which is considered by many to be one of 
the seminal IPE texts) offers an explanation of the nature of IPE, what its 
dynamics are and what constitutes the research agenda. Gilpin’s opening remarks 
provide an insight into what he suggests IPE is concerned with:  
 
A significant transformation of the post-war international 
economic order has occurred. The Bretton Woods system of trade 
liberalisation, stable currencies, and expanding global economic 
interdependence no longer exists, and the liberal conception of 
international economic relations has been undermined since the 
mid-1970s. The spread of protectionism, upheavals in monetary 
and financial markets, and the evolution of divergent national 
economic policies among the dominant economies have eroded 
the foundations of the international system…. What has happened 
to the system? What are the implications of the failure of the 
system for the future?63 
 
This introduction to IPE portrays the discipline as having a specific and narrow 
issue agenda. Here it is suggested that trade liberalisation, stable currencies and 
economic interdependence are the key issues that the discipline attempts to study 
and explain. Furthermore, this introductory paragraph exemplifies how IPE has 
often been concerned with understanding and explaining the US-dominated 
liberal economic order with a view of strengthening this order – something which 
Joan Spero highlights in her book The Politics of International Economic 
Relations.64 While each of the seven editions of this book change the focus of IPE 
slightly, Spero is always liberal in her work and she provides little indication that 
IPE can be concerned with processes and events that do not immediately relate to 
the above mentioned issues.  
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Gilpin goes on to attend to the theoretical level of his text. He states that “…this 
work is part of an expanding body of scholarship on the political economy of 
international relations: it assumes that an understanding of the issues of trade, 
monetary affairs and economic development requires the integration of the 
theoretical insights of the disciplines of economics and political science.”65 While 
Gilpin’s work does incorporate economics and politics, the problem remains that 
the issues he regards as being relevant in terms of the ‘common sense’ of IPE are 
still few in number and narrow in scope. 
 
Finally, as the text progresses Gilpin turns his attention to the paradigms used in 
IPE. It is interesting to examine how he refers to, and describes the place of, 
ideology in IPE. The key criticism here is that he refers to “the ideologies of 
liberalism, realism, and Marxism…”66 as being the totality of ideology within 
IPE. There is no mention of, or explanatory space left for, alternative paradigms 
such as feminism, green thought or post-modernism. Furthermore, Gilpin refers 
to the three key paradigms as being unitary and makes no mention of the 
divergences within them and the cross-fertilisation amongst them. He goes on to 
declare that he refers to paradigms as being “systems of thought and belief which 
[individuals and groups use to] explain … how their social system operates and 
what principles it exemplifies.”67 This highlights one of the core problems of 
orthodox IPE research in relation to paradigms.  
 
Orthodox Methodology  
 
From the above example of what orthodox IPE research can look like and the 
results it may produce it is possible to take the examination of orthodox IPE 
further by examining the methodological range employed. According to Louise 
Amoore, Randall Germaine, Richard Dodgson, Paul Langley, Iain Watson and 
Barry Gills there are three main methodological dimensions by which all 
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orthodox research is influenced.68 The first stems from the orthodox perception of 
all IPE research being positivist and scientific. This ‘positivist epistemology’69 
creates what has been termed the most restrictive methodological approach used 
by orthodox IPE. This is because this type of methodology is based on the 
assumption that subject and object can be separated thus creating objective 
knowledge that can be tested using hypotheses against an objective and pre-
existing ‘reality’.  
 
Russell Keat, John Urry,70 Peter Halfpenny71 and Christopher Lloyd72 claim that 
this process produces scientific understanding and explanation that is, in essence, 
‘truth’. However, this kind of approach can easily be brought into question. In the 
first instance, as mentioned above, there is the underlying question of how 
‘reality’ is (pre-)determined. There is also the problem of tautological claims that 
stem from the question of what constitutes the ‘real’ world. Quine argues that the 
framework in which the knowledge that is produced from positivist research is 
founded on assumptions about the presumed real world that are not necessarily as 
solid as they are believed to be.73 The danger of accepting the notion that truth 
and what is ‘real’ can be determined unquestionably is, as E. P. Thompson 
explains, that there is not necessarily a distinction between what is ‘out there’ and 
what is ‘inside here’. “Thought and being inhabit a single space, which is 
ourselves.”74 
 
The advocates of positivist research, such as A.J. Ayer, have claimed that 
positivist knowledge (truth) is generated through infallible scientific research.75 
However, other scholars such as Thomas Kuhn76 and Paul Feyeraband77 argue 
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that research of this kind does not allow for the issue of inter-subjectivity to be 
addressed. In this sense inter-subjectivity relates to the non-material features of 
the international system such as values, ideals and beliefs. Positivist approaches 
disregard the possibility that non-material features can themselves be a part of 
and interact with the international political economy.  
 
Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, while defending the WTO, have in fact taken 
account of such factors in their work on anti-globalisation and anti-WTO 
currents.78 In fact non-material features can be as important as material structures 
and agents such as international organisations. For example, the WTO is an agent 
that affects change within the international political economy in a profound way. 
However, both the actions of the WTO and those agents that respond to its 
actions are often determined by values or goals. John Dobson presents a good 
analysis of how anti-globalisation, anti-capitalist or simply anti-WTO 
organisations and movements, can have a profound impact on international 
affairs.79According to Marjorie Mayo this can take the form of direct action such 
as protests or through the spreading of knowledge and awareness regarding issues 
relating to the WTO.80 These movements are rarely inspired by any rational self-
interest but by certain beliefs and opinions about various issues that they deem as 
being important. A positivist research approach, such as the three volume, three-
thousand page analysis of the WTO by Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton and 
Michael Plummer,81 is unable to account sufficiently for this type of phenomenon 
due to its exclusion of the study of non-material features. Murphy and Tooze also 
argue that positivist IPE produces inadequate explanations because it excludes 
phenomena which are not captured by its ontological foundations.82 Regardless of 
what the explanatory framework is and what issue is being studied, if there are 
phenomena included in the study that are not found in the ontological foundation 
of the positivist IPE approach the explanations produced will be incomplete. 
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The second main methodological dimension of orthodox IPE is a clear and 
unwavering commitment to explaining events and issues as the results of the 
rational actions of unitary individual actors.83 This commitment is not necessarily 
overtly advocated but is in fact often un-stated. The dedication to this form of 
methodological individualism can lead to misunderstandings of IPE research that 
attempts to break away from mainstream approaches. As a result such research is 
often discredited by orthodox scholars. Therefore there is the need to address the 
shortcomings of using a methodology that advocates the analysis of the 
(supposed) rational actions of (supposed) unitary actors. As stated elsewhere, and 
as emphasised by Claire Sjolander and Wayne Cox, the problem is not rooted in 
orthodoxy’s commitment to methodological individualism as opposed to the fact 
that there is a lack of openness to other types of explanation.84  
 
Orthodox IPE tends to exemplify the argument that combining explanations of 
events and issues that are based on either the individual or on historical and 
contextual social structures is ineffective. Part of this is due to what is taken as 
common sense about explanation within orthodox IPE. For example, Stephen 
Krasner in his seminal essay on regimes85 summarises a number of explanatory 
approaches that have been suggested by IPE scholars. In this essay Krasner 
suggests that regimes can be explained as a result of the interactions of rational 
individuals.86 However, what Krasner does not suggest is the possibility that 
individuals and their ‘rational’ actions may be explained as being constituted by 
broad historical and social institutions.87 In contrast consider the work of other 
scholars such as Bernard Lewis.88  In his work on the causes and patterns of the 
relative economic and social decline of the MENA region over the last three 
centuries, Lewis highlights the effectiveness of explanations that are based on the 
study of individual rational action. However, Lewis grounds his analysis within 
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the framework of broader historical and contextual structures that determine what 
are considered to be rational actions and how the actions are constructed.  
 
Alternatively consider some of the later work of Karl Marx such as Das Kapital89 
which can be taken as more obviously linked to the contemporary discipline of 
IPE as it deals with an analysis of capitalism and related economic theories. Here, 
Marx constructs conclusions about the social consequences of the combined 
actions of a number of rational individual actors, namely capitalists, within the 
context of historical social institutions. In short, his was a theory of action which 
linked issues of structure and agency (social causation and actions of the 
individual) into a single explanatory framework. Orthodox IPE lacks the ability to 
do this due to the explanatory boundaries created by its enduring reliance on and 
commitment to explanations which focus on rational individual actors.  
 
Orthodox IPE scholars, such as Rogowski, Frieden, and Helen Milner, may argue 
that what are interpreted as rational actions and what constitutes an individual 
actor are not affected by historical social institutions to any great extent.90 Such 
arguments do have their merits. However, if this were the case and common sense 
dictates what the rational actions that can be taken in any given situation are and 
individual actors are unitary due to their very existence there are still reasons to 
combine the study of rational individuals and over-riding structures. Chris 
Farrands and Owen Worth claim questions must be asked about the impacts that 
broad systemic structures may have on the options rational individual actors may 
take.91 In this sense actors may have a set of rational choices but the number and 
scope of these choices may be bounded by broader structures.92  
 
The final methodological dimension of orthodox IPE regards the three dominant 
paradigms of liberalism, realism and Marxism. According to Geoffrey Underhill, 
at the heart of orthodox IPE explanation and theoretical analysis is the contest 
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between these paradigms, each of which offers a particular view of the world and 
contemporary political and economic life.93 The place of paradigms within 
orthodox IPE research and the impact this has on the explanations produced 
needs to be examined. The incorporation of ideology into IPE study is equivalent 
to the evolutions seen in the social sciences as a result of the exposure to the 
“problems of enquiry and explanation.”94 However, as Y. Lapid noted as early as 
1989, unlike other social sciences, orthodox IPE has not allowed the 
incorporation of ideology to undermine the positivist epistemology and 
methodology that orthodox research is based upon.95  
 
During the 1970s the social sciences underwent a period of change in the way 
social forms were understood. Increasing scepticism about the possibility and 
utility of purely scientific research emerged during this period within both IPE 
and IR. Scholars (largely western), such as Frances Cairncross96 and Tadeusz 
Rybczynski,97 began to adapt their approaches to accommodate ideologies and 
values into studies of social phenomena. An example of this is the attempt to 
understand the seemingly irrational support given by the vast majority of 
developing states to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in the policies of raising oil prices and periodically reducing supply - which 
proved difficult. In this case non-material features such as values had to be taken 
into account in order to explain this situation. Simply relying on a positivist 
epistemology and a methodology that studies the rational actions of unitary 
agents did not produce sufficient answers.  
 
The incorporation of ideologies into orthodox IPE was therefore necessary but 
often unwelcome. They were embraced as a part of international political 
economy as explanatory tools. However, the extent of and ways in which 
factoring in ideology as a reality of international political economy in theoretical 
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understanding and explanation has been used has varied and is often 
contradictory. Firstly, ideologies are not used to explain fundamental actions. 
They have generally only been used to explain the differences between the 
communities that examine real events and issues.98 Therefore, ideology is only 
assigned a limited role in orthodox IPE, the role of interpretation. But it is not 
seen as a material reality and orthodox scholars do not use ideology in an attempt 
to explain existing material reality.99  
 
While the contradictory use of ideology in orthodox IPE’s explanatory 
framework is the most important aspect of the use (or lack of use) of ideology it 
is not the only point of contestation. As mentioned above the position of 
liberalism, realism and Marxism in analytical discussion means that the content 
of these paradigms is privileged. There are, however, a range of paradigms 
beyond these three that have much to offer the field of IPE especially when 
expanding the issue agenda. Sandra Whitworth argues that it is often the case that 
if other paradigms are considered in IPE research they are viewed from the 
standpoint of one of the three core paradigms and are discredited or at best 
incorporated into the traditional approach being used.100 Furthermore, the 
consideration of paradigms generally necessitates the inclusion of the debate over 
which one is most appropriate. The distraction of focusing on the competing 
paradigms immediately reduces the analytical power of any investigation.101  
 
The Orthodox IPE Issue Agenda 
 
Having highlighted to some extent the ways in which orthodox IPE studies and 
offers explanations of events and issues it is worth addressing the problem of 
what to study. For scholars calling for a revision of IPE there is a distinct problem 
with orthodox IPE relating to how the discipline is constructed and how this 
reflects the issues that it deals with.  Ben Rosamund claims that the way in which 
the framework of knowledge production within IPE is organised results not only 
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in the restrictive patterns of how to study international political economy but also 
in certain issues being privileged.102 This prevents the inclusion of ‘new’ or 
different issues on the IPE agenda. As Hay and Watson assert, orthodox IPE 
“renders specific views of the world ‘correct’ by reducing them to the status of 
common sense.”103 The problem of a relatively narrow and exclusive issue 
agenda has its roots also in the social realm in which IPE was established. 
Matthew Watson argues that the social sciences in general, including IPE, have 
developed largely as a reflection of the policy concerns of the main powers 
(traditionally state powers) within the western world and in particular, the United 
States.104 These policy concerns include US supremacy, the spread of democracy, 
capitalism, economic growth, and international trade. In addition to the 
dominance of western interests and concerns, IPE has tended not to give credence 
to potential changes in the interests and concerns of peripheral states and regions. 
Ian Taylor has argued that “the global division of wealth and power is taken, if 
not as natural, then certainly as something seemingly normal and not to be 
interrogated too deeply.”105  
 
This is the case in practically all research undertaken with regards to the 
economic and political relationships between Jordanian and US state and non-
state actors. For example, William Lovett, Alfred Eckes Jr. and Richard 
Brinkman use the 2001 FTA between the two states, as a case study in US foreign 
trade policy.106 Robert Lawrence also studies the FTA as an element in US 
foreign trade policy: surprisingly little is mentioned of Jordan in his study.107 
Equally as selective is Howard Rosen who suggests by way of ignoring Jordanian 
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involvement in the process leading to the FTA that the JUSFTA was only signed 
by the US and forced upon Jordan.108  
 
When the FTA is considered as an issue in Jordanian foreign trade policy it is 
done in a manner which prioritises western or US interests. Bashar Malkawi, a 
leading Jordanian academic studying trade law and policy in Jordan, for example, 
largely concentrates on what is better for the global economic system – bilateral 
FTAs or the pursuit of multilateral agreements. Malkawi makes limited reference 
to why the Jordanian government pursued the FTA and how Jordanian state and 
non-state actors have been impacted by it from a Jordanian perspective.109 This is 
a question which is at the core of the purpose of this thesis. 
 
The issues, values and methods of interpretation that IPE is founded on exist 
within a broader framework of post-1945 industrial society. For Deborah 
Johnston this translates into (largely) American values and issues of interest being 
presented in a privileged and materialistic manner as well as determining what 
constitutes the questions of IPE.110 The core problem with this form of agenda 
creation is that, as Peter Vale has stated the system of states and the majority of 
issues seen as important by the core of this system is often of little relevance to 
large parts of the world’s population.111 For example, the issue of development 
has been seen as important and requires addressing in one form or another and 
currently appears to be gaining increasing attention. The fact that development 
has been determined as an issue that IPE should address is welcomed by both 
orthodox and heterodox IPE scholars. However, as stated by Bjorne Hettne, 
Development Studies has evolved into a discipline of relatively low academic 
standing.112 The core problem with development studies in IPE is the underlying 
question of what it is that we should be studying when we say ‘development’. 
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The answers to this question may vary greatly. Of most importance is that the key 
prescriptions as to what to do in order to ‘develop’ alter significantly depending 
on the basic assumptions about what development is. According to B. Dasgupta, 
in practice, it has been western conceptions of development and prescriptions 
which have been focused on and generated with little real understanding of the 
processes and concerns of the very people under consideration.113 
 
A further key assumption often made within orthodox IPE research that helps to 
determine the issue agenda, relates to the extent to which economics and politics 
are (still) held as separate. This distinction is based on the definition of economics 
as the scientific area of investigation that deals with the production and 
distribution of wealth, while politics is defined as the area of scientific research 
that investigates the organisation of (non-economic) human activity.114 The study 
of politics and economics as related but separate spheres is an inherent trait of 
traditional IR. IPE exists as a separate discipline115 from IR in part due to the lack 
of analytical and explanatory power that this separation produces. However, 
while IPE research does not always (at least overtly) express this separation of 
politics and economics, the interaction between the two is founded upon an 
ahistorical conception of the relationship between them. This conception derives 
from the political and ideological influences of early liberalism. The result is a 
“value-based political economy utilizing a closed set of economic techniques and 
analytical schemes.”116 
 
Orthodox IPE has largely inherited the agenda of traditional IR. For Gerard 
Strange, orthodox IPE claims to study the politics of international economic 
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relations but often it does little more than simply study the issues of international 
economics.117 At the same time Alison Watson agues that the adoption of a 
largely economic issue agenda is inherently restrictive and produces a hierarchy 
of issues of importance with some more privileged than others.118 There are a 
number of ways in which this manifests itself. First, the issues which are 
privileged are assumed to be more important in both theory and policy terms than 
those issues that are not, which are subsequently marginalised. Stephan Haggard 
and Sylvia Maxfield’s analysis of financial internationalisation in the developing 
world offers a good example of this form of hierarchy.119 Second, the issues 
which are privileged are not only seen as being more important but also act as the 
basis of assessment and evaluation for all the marginalised issues. For example, 
an issue such as the importance of nepotism in low-ranking regional government 
decision making entities in the less prosperous states of the MENA region only 
becomes an important issue when evaluating its impacts on international trade.120 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the most privileged issue within orthodox IPE is 
international trade (and perhaps finance). Barry Gills claims that the fact that 
international trade is so privileged is an example of the incorporation of the 
agenda of international economics into mainstream IPE as well as the impact of 
liberal economic thought on the formation of the discipline.121 At its fundamental 
level liberal international economics is founded on the perception of the 
international political economy as an international economy of trading states 
where the totality of economic interaction is trade. Thus for liberal economists the 
international economy is the principle structure of human activity and therefore 
all other issues and forms of human interaction are understood as being 
determined by this structure. Orthodox IPE adopts this perception in large part. 
However, this limited view can be easily discredited by the study of the 
phenomenon of ‘international production’ and the global division of labour and 
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their implications for the belief that the international economy merely is trade 
between states.122 
 
In order to understand fully the pre-eminence of the issue of international trade it 
is necessary to refer back to the claim that orthodox IPE largely reflects the issues 
and policy interests of the United States. Following the end of the Second World 
War and the beginning of the era of US supremacy, international trade emerged 
as an area of significance in US domestic politics.123 In the post-1945 
international political economy the United States dominated global economic 
activity, producing a vast majority of goods and having the largest share of 
international trade. Thus the issue of trade became increasingly important to 
certain classes, sectors and firms within the United States.124 The interest of these 
groups translated into political pressure on the way the US government acted with 
regards to the interaction between the international and US economies.125 Also, 
the emergence of the United States as the most significant power in world affairs 
after 1945 meant that it was at the forefront of managing the restructuring of the 
world economy.126 In part due to the status of the issue of international trade 
within US decision making circles along with basic economic principles, the task 
of restructuring the world economy was undertaken with structures of trade as the 
focal point.  
 
It must be conceded that in contemporary world affairs the issue of international 
trade remains highly significant both to the United States and the majority of 
other states and actors. This is for a number of reasons. In the first instance, in the 
decades since the rise of US supremacy there has been a reversal of the nature of 
the patterns of US trade. As the French historian and anthropologist Emmanuel 
Todd in his book After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order has 
pointed out, the United States currently imports far more than it exports. Growing 
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reliance on the world’s true productive centres,127 Japan, Western Europe and 
now arguably China, for goods and services have led to record trade deficits in 
recent years. Second, the ability of the United States to ‘manage’ the world 
economy and global trade has been under question since the late 1970s. For these 
reasons, among others, Daniel T. Griswold is quite accurate in his 
acknowledgement that trade is one of the more important features of the study of 
international political economy.128 Even a critic of the orthodox IPE issue agenda 
must concede this point.   
 
The hegemony of ‘trade’ in orthodox IPE began to be challenged in earnest in the 
early 1990s, not least of all by Susan Strange whose favourite and chosen area of 
study became money and international finance. Unfortunately the result has been 
a further polarisation within the discipline. Here orthodox scholars who remain 
intent on analysing trade on one side and so-called heterodox scholars who focus 
on money and finance on the other, and yet others still who focus largely on other 
issues such as development. Rather than leading to a diversified ‘new’ IPE, these 
processes have given rise to competing hegemonies within an increasingly 
indecisive discipline.  
 
There exist other confrontations over the range of issues within IPE. Orthodox 
IPE seems to have largely ignored security as an area of study, for example. 
Susan Strange had gone some way in addressing this issue by developing ideas 
pertaining to the international political economy of security in her work on the 
‘security structure’ and technology in her work on knowledge structures.129 
However, this work along with similar research has too often been excluded from 
orthodox IPE research. Other issues such as resource scarcity and depletion, by 
scholars such as Thomas Homer-Dixon;130 technological developments, by 
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scholars such as Michael Talalay;131 demographic change, and culture also hold a 
subordinate status to the issue of international trade in orthodox IPE. However, 
within heterodox IPE the problem of hierarchy in the issue agenda has resurfaced. 
In short, the issues mentioned above as subordinate to international trade in 
orthodox IPE have, individually, become the primary focus in the ‘new’ IPE.  
 
Realisation that IPE can be perhaps above all other social sciences, the most 
diverse discipline in terms of scope and methodological approaches and capacity 
for change is essential. Adopting a hierarchical issue agenda which has as a core 
formative element the principle of selectivity is perhaps the most serious 
hindrance to the development and generation of IPE research. Barry Gills for 
example, warns against the ‘colonisation’ of IPE by specific issues such as 
identity, stating that this will not prove ‘fruitful’ and lead to unwanted conflict 
within the discipline. 132 As with theoretical and methodological approach, the 
issue agenda should be permanently opened to practically all possible issues of 
study. If it is not, the result will be the continued stagnation of IPE and the 
continued fracture of the invisible college of academics and scholars.  
 
Beyond Orthodox IPE 
 
Following the above assessments of what constitutes orthodox IPE, what 
methodological range orthodoxy employs and the issue agenda to which attention 
is paid, it is now important to return to the question of how to transcend the limits 
of orthodox IPE. There are four important steps that should be taken in order to 
develop an IPE approach to the study of US-Jordan trade relations. The first step 
is required in order to overcome the restrictions on the range of issues that can be 
studied and the hierarchy of issues that are studied. It is necessary here to reject 
the existing orthodox hierarchy, thus refusing to place international trade as the 
primary issue of study. This does not necessitate the refusal of the study of 
international trade. Rather it simply means rejecting “the means of constructing 
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the universe of (orthodox) IPE.”133 As Diana Tussie states, this means 
questioning the ahistorical distinction between politics and economics and 
recognising the impacts that western, largely American, cultural values have had 
on orthodox IPE.134 This constitutes the second step. It is often the case that this 
step will need to be taken simply because the issue that is being brought into 
question may not be located within the realm of US policy interests.  
 
The third step, and something that Owen Worth and Carmen Kuhling have 
highlighted, is to be self-conscious of the research that is being undertaken.135 
While it is easy to criticise orthodox scholars for only studying issues that are of 
significance when viewed in the sense of US policy interests or western values, 
the same criticism must be exacted on most IPE research. As stated above, this 
research project represents a set of specific interests which include the issue of 
US-Jordan relations from both a dual perspective. It is also important to realise 
the connection between the research project and the interests and values of the 
author. Carrying out this research project thus may be construed as being 
contradictory, exchanging one set of values and interests in IPE research for 
another. However, the difference is that the connection between the researcher 
and the research here is explicitly made and reflected upon, therefore 
acknowledging the subjective relationship.  
 
Incorporating such self-consciousness and reflexivity into the research process 
allows for the IPE researcher to take a further step towards producing a heterodox 
piece of work. This is the step of addressing the epistemological inadequacies of 
the methodology that orthodox IPE uses.136 The three main methodological 
dimensions as explained above have specific problems which must be addressed 
and resolved in order to produce a more complete IPE study. Initially there is the 
problem of the reliance on positivism’s awkward distinction between subject and 
object in an attempt to achieve objectivity. Orthodox scholars attempt to produce 
scientific understanding of the world and its events, processes and structures and 
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present this understanding as ‘truth’ through truth-seeking research. Heterodox 
IPE scholars on the other hand offer an alternative version of research and truth-
seeking. This being the self-conscious identification with a certain set of values, 
interests and perhaps group(s) of people. As Murphy and Tooze state, “The 
scholar…needs to understand the world in order to change it.”137 By taking this 
fourth step it is possible to present a solution to the problem of objectivity by 
reflecting multiple sources of objectivity or even multiple sources of subjectivity.  
 
The second problematic methodological dimension of orthodox IPE is the 
commitment to explaining events and issues in terms of the rational actions of 
individual actors. Attempts to study and explain the actions of individual actors 
should be included in IPE research in most instances depending on the area of 
study. However, in order to fully understand these actions it is important to also 
study the historical construction of these actors and the broader structures that 
they operate within.138 This does not necessarily mean agreeing on specific 
explanations of historical and contextual structures and events. For example, 
there are varying explanations on the historical evolution of the post-Second 
World War international economy as well as varying interpretations on the 
impacts that the different processes of globalisation may have on the economies 
of the MENA region.  
 
One final criticism of the epistemological difficulties of orthodox IPE relates to 
the use of theory. Acknowledging the diverse range of theories that exist and not 
simply labelling or approaching research using one of the three main paradigms 
(realism, liberalism or Marxism) has two main results. First, this allows the 
researcher to understand the arguments, theories, explanations and interpretations 
offered by other social scientists. Second, the problem of communication between 
different research programmes139 can be resolved which in turn can lead to the 
understanding that heterodox scholars do not necessarily claim their research 
agendas should be everyone else’s140 as orthodox scholars do. The following 
chapter expands on this brief map of how to produce more effective and 
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heterodox IPE work by presenting the methodological foundations of this thesis 
in detail.  
 
State-Centric and Conflict-Centric MENA Studies 
 
According to F. Gregory Gause, the majority of research and scholarly work 
focusing on the MENA region has traditionally been carried out by western 
academics or western-educated academics.141 For Fred Halliday this has led to the 
majority of work on the international relations or international political economy 
of the MENA region being dominated by a narrow range of approaches and a 
limited range of issues being considered.142 In short, the study of the MENA 
region in IPE, IR, Foreign Policy Analysis and MENA Studies among other 
disciplines has been dominated by western conceptions of the region and western 
interests. Thus there is a distinct problem of when and how IPE takes into 
consideration the actors, issues and processes of the MENA region. In the case of 
the actors of the region, the vast majority of scholarly work concentrates on a 
system of states. L. Carl Brown’s International Politics and the Middle East is a 
prime example of the state-centric approach.143 With regards to the issues and 
processes of relevance, Edward Said has argued that mainstream approaches 
focus on inter- and intra-state conflict and natural resources.144 The result is that a 
range of issues of importance, such as the integration of legal frameworks 
governing various international economic activities, are not studied. 
 
With regards to the dominant state-centric approach there are two main critiques. 
The first, according to Tariq Ali, is that the MENA region has not historically 
been constituted by states.145 The modern state in the MENA region is a relatively 
new type of actor. The second critique is, as Peter Mansfield argues, that human 
forms of social organisation in the region have historically taken the form of a 
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number of hierarchical entities very much unlike the modern state.146 At the top 
of this hierarchy of actors is the Dar al-Islam, or House of Islam, the singular yet 
not unitary empire of Islamic peoples.147 Progressing down the hierarchical 
structure, Fernand Braudel claims that sub-regional entities with some of the 
characteristics of modern states can be found, although these entities were 
organised around geographical, ethnic and tribal lines.148 The most discrete form 
of organisation in the region has been and still is the tribe – which this author 
likens to contemporary non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in other regions.  
 
An old and resurgent form of actor also exists parallel to the tribe. This is the 
corporation or multinational corporation (MNC). Thus in the first instance, 
simply analysing the state as the dominant form of actor in the region risks 
producing inaccurate conclusions due to the historically ‘foreign’ nature of and 
relatively recent arrival of the state as actor in the region. In the second instance, 
as Kenichi Ohmae has highlighted,149 failing to incorporate other forms of actors 
such as the MNC in any study of international political economy produces 
incomplete analyses. This is because the agency and impact of a large number of 
actors is not understood or considered, thus producing false or incomplete 
conclusions.  
 
In relation to the range of dominant issues which are studied, Andrea Teti and 
Claire Heristchi claim that conflict has more often than not been the focus.150 
Tariq Ismael meanwhile argues that the study of the region’s natural resources 
and their importance to extra-regional actors and systems comes second on the 
hierarchical issue agenda.151 Studies of the international political economy of the 
MENA region have focused on other issues such as trade, poverty alleviation, 
education, environmental protection and so on, however, these issues and the 
research done on them, are consistently excluded from the ‘core intellectual 
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discourse’ on MENA studies. For Larbi Sadiki this is a disciplinary weakness 
which must be rectified by ‘bringing in’ to mainstream discourse previously 
excluded and under-studied issues and research topics.152 It is the belief of this 
author that while the study of the politics, economics, international relations and 
international political economy of the MENA region in the social sciences in 
general has been limited, the most extreme case of exclusion and selectivity is 
within IPE. This is for the reasons highlighted above regarding what is studied 
and also for how these issues are studied.  
 
The unfortunate truth is that the majority of issues pertaining to the international 
political economy of the MENA region that are studied are examined from a non-
MENA perspective. Edward Said’s work on Orientalism has led to the emergence 
of a new paradigmatic approach to studying the MENA region which does not 
reduce the actors - and most importantly the people - of the region to mere 
subjects of study by ‘others’.153 Despite this, however, as mentioned above, 
scholars such as Rashid Khalidi and Bashar Malkawi, originating from the 
MENA region have often produced studies which use a western approach in the 
sense that the study does not take account sufficiently of MENA actors and 
interests. Worthy of mention here is a recently established academic journal 
entitled Arab Insight published by the World Security Institute, whose remit is to 
provide a platform for research on international relations done by MENA-based 
academics with a non-western approach. It is the aim of this study to break with 
the mainstream tradition and use a more holistic approach to the study of US-
Jordan trade relations. Thus, this study will not focus solely on any one type of 
actor such as the state, nor will it focus on conflict as a central theme. 
Furthermore, the actors, interests and processes of the Jordanian element of this 
study will not be ignored. This does not, however, equate to this study being 
Jordanian or non-western focused – this would simply be replacing one 
incomplete approach with another.  
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Re-interpreting US Strategies and Interests 
 
Of the three areas of academic enquiry reviewed in this chapter, the study of US 
foreign and trade policy is perhaps the most complete. However, there are still 
issues and processes which have not been fully considered or analysed. As 
Eugene Wittkopf, Charles Kegley and James Scott claim, attention has generally 
tended to be directed towards either the United States’ strategic interests and the 
use of foreign and trade policy as a mechanism to achieve these interests or on 
the economic impacts of such policies.154 In short, there has too often been a 
divide between research focusing on the political aspects of US foreign and trade 
policy on the one hand and economic aspects on the other. John Rothgeb Jr. 
argues that consideration of the political economy of US interests and policies has 
not tended to be the traditional route of analysis.155 With regards to US-MENA 
relations this has historically been the case.  
 
With regards to US-MENA relations, there are a number of key political, 
economic and social issues within the MENA region which have been seen as the 
root causes of the major problems the region has faced. As Peter Hahn156 has 
highlighted, the attention to what is essentially the domestic structure of a foreign 
region stems from the vested political and economic interests that the United 
Sates has in this region.157 Douglas Little argues that for the United States, the 
threat of instability and conflict in the MENA region is the primary challenge to 
these key strategic interests.158 For example, the threat of military action in the 
region can easily disrupt the flow of oil to the world market. The second major 
concern for the United States since the end of the Cold War has been 
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international terrorism.159 Prior to September 11 2001, terrorism emanating from 
the MENA region was seen mostly as a threat faced by the ruling elites of the 
region and US interests abroad. However, the phenomenon has since become a 
direct threat to the territory of the United States. Furthermore, slow economic 
growth, impassable barriers to trade and relatively isolated economies in the 
MENA region have become key obstacles not only to regional stability but also to 
US access to the region’s markets. 
 
According to Michael Oren any study of US- governmental and non-state actor 
policy towards the MENA region, whether foreign or trade policy, must take 
these broad interests into account.160 However, as Richard Feinberg argues,161 this 
must be done in a manner which allows for the synthesis of political and 
economic interests and policies to enable a study of the political economy of such 
policies. For Tom Hanahoe this entails moving away from focusing solely on one 
key interest at a time and critically assessing how US governmental interests 
interact with the interests of US non-state actors such as MNCs.162 In the post-
9/11 era, it has too often been assumed that the US government desires above all 
else a restructuring of the state system of the MENA region through forced 
regime change in order to secure its main interests in the region. Thus attention 
has been drawn mostly towards security issues and military conflict. Geoff 
Simons’ book entitled Future Iraq: US Policy in Reshaping the Middle East is a 
prime example of this type of approach.163  
 
This study aims to demonstrate how it is possible to develop more comprehensive 
and eclectic analyses of US foreign and trade policy towards the MENA region. 
However, the approach taken in order to accomplish this does not necessitate 
ignoring the traditional key interests of the US government and non-state actors. 
Instead, what is necessary is a re-interpretation of these interests and what the 
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political economy of US- governmental and non-state actor policy is and how it 
remains oriented towards securing these interests.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has critically assessed the nature of contemporary IPE and the short-
comings of orthodox research. Within the discipline there are prevalent 
characteristics which limit the effectiveness of research carried out. In the first 
instance there are limitations to the range of methodological tools employed 
which often result in research which has more in common with the natural 
sciences than the social sciences. These are the commitment to positivism, 
rationalism and only three main paradigms. Second, the issue agenda included in 
IPE has been constructed and perpetuated in a manner which excludes certain 
types of issues as well as alternative interests and competing analyses. Within 
these limitations, the areas of MENA studies and US foreign and trade policy 
studies present even greater problems. Studies of the international political 
economy of the MENA region have been dominated by a hegemony of state- and 
conflict-centricism. In the case of US foreign and economic policy, studies have 
focused on state actor interests and conflictual relationships as the means of 
pursuing these interests. Furthermore, politics and economics have either been 
separated or studied in a dominant-less dominant manner favouring the former.  
 
It has been argued that the first step in order to undertake a heterodox IPE 
research project is to establish the framework within which the issue(s) to be 
studied can be assessed and analysed. Initially this means determining how the 
issue(s) will be studied. There are a number of problems that must be resolved 
relating to the paradigmatic choices the project makes and the methodology 
employed. As explained above a main shortfall of much IPE research is the 
unnecessary amount of attention paid to engaging with the debate surrounding the 
three main paradigms of IPE. This is a debate which will not be engaged with in 
more detail here than it already has been. It is important, however, to outline the 
paradigmatic approach that will be used. The following chapter thus addresses in 
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detail the theoretical foundations of this research project and the methods used to 
collect, analyse and present information.  
 
A brief summary of the main points is, however, useful at this stage. This study 
utilises an approach which rejects the totalitarianism of positivism and the fallacy 
of objectivism. However, this is not an entirely post-positivist and subjective 
study. Rather, the possibility of objective and positivist research is acknowledged 
and the benefits of empirical observation and data collection are also utilised in 
chapters three through seven. Furthermore, an ontological position is 
acknowledged which allows for the analysis of varying types of actors including 
non-state actors such as MNCs as well as the varying forms these types of actors 
may take between different regions.  
 
The second key feature of the research framework that must be decided upon and 
highlighted before a heterodox research project can be undertaken is to produce 
an outline of what the issue agenda of the project is going to be. As stated above 
the traditional issue of most concern to orthodox IPE scholars has been 
international trade. The lack of ability of orthodox scholars to incorporate other 
issues into the issue agenda has been their most important failure. However, there 
exists an equally important problem with the commitment to preserving the issue 
of international trade as the primary issue on the agenda. When a ‘secondary’ 
issue is the focus of a research project the result has tended to be that the project 
is undertaken with the purpose of assessing the issue and analysing its impacts on 
primary issues such as trade. The reader could be forgiven here for assuming that 
this research project is therefore in contradiction with the aims of diversifying 
and developing IPE as this is a study about international trade. However, there 
exists a key difference between this research project and other such studies that 
are orthodox in their approach and their findings.  
 
While this project aims to assess the political economy of international trade 
between the United States and Jordan, there are a number of more subtle issues 
that are engaged with. As highlighted above, a common misunderstanding is that 
international trade is the primary issue and all other issues are always understood 
as part of its processes. While this is sometimes the case, this study does not aim 
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to simply assess the impacts of international institutions on trade levels. Likewise 
this project does not aim to assess perceived ‘secondary’ issues of US-Jordan 
relations such as cultural animosity, forms of governance and so on, on current 
and future levels of bilateral trade. However, this study also does not ignore trade 
as an issue simply because it has received much attention in IPE. In fact the study 
of trade in IPE has often ignored the MENA region and Jordan in particular. 
Furthermore, US-Jordan relations and US-MENA relations in general have 
focused largely on issues of conflict and resources.  
 
The intention of this study is therefore to offer alternatives to both the orthodox 
approach of studying trade and the critical approach of ignoring trade. This study 
thus assesses the relationship between state and non-state actors in both the 
United States and Jordan in forming patterns of trade in order to evaluate current 
and future patterns of political and economic cooperation and integration between 
the two states. In this sense the primary issue of this study is international 
cooperation and interdependence while the secondary issue is international trade.  
 
The following chapter develops the arguments in this chapter relating to the 
nature of IPE research and how best to study the political economy of US-Jordan 
trade. Thus chapter two establishes the theoretical parameters and the 
methodological tools of the liberal institutionalist approach used in this study. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory and Methods 
 62 
Introduction 
 
After establishing the aims, focus and disciplinary relevance of this study in the 
introduction and chapter one it is necessary to now establish how this project will 
be approached theoretically. Furthermore, it is imperative at this point to establish 
the research methods used to collect, analyse and present information.  
 
In order to coherently achieve these aims it is necessary to establish a structural 
framework to the chapter that identifies and addresses four main areas pertaining 
to the research process. The first two sections of the chapter will therefore 
address the related questions of ontology and epistemology respectively. David 
Marsh and Gerry Stoker summarise the importance of these two issues to the 
research process and the final work presented as follows: “…ontological and 
epistemological positions are crucial because they shape what we think we are 
doing as [Social] scientists, how we do it and what we think we can claim about 
the results we find.”164 Here it is important to refer back to the critique of 
orthodox IPE and the common ontological and epistemological foundations it is 
largely based upon presented in chapter one. Directly linked to and founded upon 
where one finds oneself in terms of ontological and epistemological positions is 
the conception of theory, implicitly or explicitly, employed in any research 
project.165 The third section will thus outline liberal institutionalism as the 
theoretical approach this study takes (albeit as a critical liberal institutionalist 
approach). Here, some of the criticisms of this approach will be taken into 
consideration.  
 
The fourth section introduces the research methods used to collect, analyse and 
present data in this study. It has historically been the case that the majority of 
social science research, IPE research included, has been based either on 
qualitative or quantitative research methods.166 However, this type of 
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exclusionary methodology does not always allow for the most effective research. 
Rather, if done correctly, the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in social science research can be beneficial and can provide the research findings 
with an added legitimacy. This position has been advocated by scholars such as 
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln,167 Martyn Hammersley, 168 John 
Creswell,169 Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie,170 and Melvyn Read and 
David Marsh.171 This section of this chapter will thus draw upon some of this 
work to solidify the arguments presented. A brief conclusion will summarise the 
main points providing an outline of the research undertaken and presented in the 
following five chapters.  
 
Ontological Foundations  
 
David Marsh and Paul Furlong argue that in order to outline how any study will 
be carried out it is important first to outline what the project is fundamentally 
about.172 Chapter one established the disciplinary framework within which this 
study takes place while the introduction to this thesis established the core 
research questions regarding the political economy of US-Jordan trade relations. 
It is essential also, however, to introduce the ontological orientation of this 
research project.  According to Martin Hollis there are two main forms of social 
science study. The first being a study which seeks to understand and explain the 
nature of social phenomena, relations, structures and/or processes in international 
political economy, such as the causal factors and prospects for trade relations 
between the United States and Jordan. The second type of study is one that seeks 
to offer interpretations of these phenomena.173 Therefore, as Frank Bechhofer 
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and Lindsay Paterson have argued, defining whether a research project seeks 
either to offer a tautological claim or to offer an interpretation is where one must 
begin in order to establish how the project will be carried out.174 One of the 
problems with IPE outlined in the previous chapter is that the majority of 
orthodox research firstly is based upon a foundationalist ontology restraining any 
enquiry to seeking merely to understand and explain the ‘truth’ of the 
phenomenon studied. Secondly, the common sense acceptance of this type of 
position is not questioned and so a conscious decision as to whether or not the 
project seeks to understand, explain, predict or prescribe (or a combination of 
these) is not engaged with. 
 
If a research project seeks to present a tautological understanding and explanation 
of social phenomena, the project will be based upon an ontology that is 
foundationalist rather than interpretivist or anti-foundationalist.175 Foundationalist 
ontology holds that there is a ‘real’ world which exists regardless of whether or 
not the researcher exists and whether or not the researcher is aware of this 
world.176 Furthermore, foundationalist research perceives this ‘real’ world to be 
observable. Scholars such as Michael DePaul argue that this ‘real’ world can be 
understood and, more importantly, explained through scientific research.177 
However, if the research project seeks to provide an interpretation of social 
phenomena without claiming to provide a universally true and accurate 
description of such phenomena, then the project is anti-foundationalist or 
interpretivist. This means that one would believe or view that there is no single 
real world, or absolute truth in existence. Instead the world is socially constructed 
and can only be interpreted in different ways.178  
 
This project is based upon a number of basic principles relevant to the discussion 
of ontological foundations, which are as follows: the social world contains a 
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range of constitutive elements which exist regardless of the cognitive awareness 
or interpretation of the researcher but any understanding of these elements is 
subject to subjective interpretation. Furthermore, analysis of these elements and 
many tautological claims developed remain to a certain extent influenced by 
opinions or interpretation. In the first instance there exists a global economy or 
international political economic system which has observable elements. However, 
this global economy is dynamic and in a constant state of change as opposed to 
being static and un-changing. That is not to say that there is general progress in 
the nature of this system and the well-being it provides for those involved in it. 
Instead there is constant ‘horizontal’ change in the structures, and processes, as 
well as the constituent social phenomena (which include actors at the individual, 
national and international levels) and the relations between them.  
 
The global economy is dynamic because it is constituted of and by individual 
humans and collectives of humans. The global economy is therefore subject to 
alteration by the actions of its constituent parts but at the same time influences 
and constrains the actions that agents can take. The issue of structure and agency 
is therefore one of great importance to this study. Furthermore, features of this 
global economy can be observed and descriptions and analyses produced. It is 
important to note then that this project shares some common ground with 
foundationalist approaches. However, this thesis does not seek to offer a 
tautological claim regarding the nature of the political economy of trade between 
the United States and Jordan. Instead this project seeks to provide an 
interpretation of the political economy of these relations and offers the best 
analysis possible within the remit of this study. 
 
There are also agents within international political economy that exist separate 
from the study and understanding of them. While the exact nature and functional 
characteristics of these actors are subject to varying interpretations and 
explanations, this is not simply because the only way in which they exist is as 
social constructs through discourse. Rather, any study of these actors is subject to 
both practical and intellectual limitations. In short, there are limitations on the 
depth and scope of research into social phenomena such as time available for the 
study, physical access to relevant data, material, or people and so on. There are 
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also limitations on the ability of the researcher to process the mass of data and 
material garnered in research carried out. This second point directly relates to the 
ontological position of the researcher. How the world is viewed and how 
knowledge is acquired from this view is unique to the observer and as such 
understanding of the world is bounded by intellect.  
 
Actors, therefore, exist and are observable, and it is possible to identify patterns 
of behaviour, processes and relationships between and among these actors. 
However, as with the global economy, these actors are subject to constant change 
and dynamic movement and subjective limitations are unavoidably placed on the 
study of them. The actors in international political economy considered in this 
study are the individual, the NGO, MNC, the International Governmental 
Organisation (IGO), the International Financial Institution (IFI) and the state.  
 
Epistemological Foundations 
 
While ontology has been discussed first, ontological foundations do not form the 
basis of epistemological positions. Rather the two are intertwined, neither being 
of primary importance.179 However, for the purpose of developing the approach 
taken in this study it is perhaps necessary to consider epistemology second. 
Epistemology, crudely defined is how one understands and explains or how one 
‘knows’. Of most importance here is the question of whether or not one can 
tautologically understand and explain phenomena and the relations between them. 
Are these relationships all directly observable or are there some which cannot be 
directly observed? How one answers this question defines one’s epistemological 
position.180  There are in broad terms two ways of classifying the answers to this 
question. The first broad classification is ‘scientific’, that is that the answer is yes 
there are relations between social phenomena and we can observe these and 
understand a singular truth and offer tautological explanations about them. The 
second classification is ‘hermeneutic’, this being that there are no real relations 
between social phenomena that can be observed and identified, only 
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interpreted.181 It is important for the purpose of undertaking social science 
research to first be aware of one’s own epistemological position by addressing 
this issue and ascertaining one’s answer. Again with much IPE research as 
outlined in chapter one, these questions are not addressed. This often leads to not 
only the maintenance of the political economy of knowledge production as 
defined by Robert Cox but also reinforces the western-centric and hierarchical 
nature of orthodox IPE.  
 
Scientific epistemology is generally positivist and foundationalist in ontology, 
arguing that there is a real world out there and we can observe, understand and 
explain it through vigorous research.182 There are in fact two types of scientific 
epistemology: positivist and realist. A point to note is that the realist strand of 
scientific epistemology is not to be mistaken with the paradigm of realism. Where 
it differs from positivist scientific epistemology is that it also entails the belief 
that there are some structural relations and processes which cannot be observed 
but which are important parts of the social world.183 These structures and 
processes determine and constrain the social phenomena which we can observe. 
Furthermore, this type of approach allows for an acknowledgment of subjectivity 
to a certain extent and a synthesis with the interpretivist conception of 
understanding. In a sense, realist scientific epistemology is more desirable than 
positivist scientific epistemology in a heterodox research project as there is the 
admittance of the fact that we may only be able to offer the best explanation and 
description of social phenomena as opposed to the ‘scientifically proven’ 
explanations and descriptions of positivism.184  
 
The hermeneutic or interpretivist epistemological position is the polar opposite of 
positivism but shares some similarities with realist scientific approaches.185 As 
mentioned above the hermeneutic approach sees the world not as existing 
separate from us but as socially or discursively constructed. It is therefore anti-
                                                 
181
 Cardinal, D., Hayward, J., and Jones, G., 2004, Epistemology: The Theory of Knowledge, 
London: Holder Murray.  
182
 Ibid. 
183
 Benton, T., and Craib, I., 2001, Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations 
of Social Thought, London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
184
 Giddens, A. (ed.), 1974, Positivism and Sociology, London: Ashgate. 
185
 Bevir, M., and Rhodes, R., in Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (eds.), 2002. 
 68 
foundationalist. In this view social phenomena do not exist independently of our 
understanding of them, instead it is our awareness and understanding of them that 
directly affects outcomes and the way in which the world exists.186 It is therefore, 
the interpretations and meanings attached to social phenomena which we should 
be trying to identify and understand. As the social realm exists only as a social 
construct it is therefore not possible to study and explain social phenomena, 
structures and processes and claim ‘truths’ about these.187 It must also be 
acknowledged that it is not possible to carry out objective research as the 
researcher is part of the traditions and discourses which are being studied. This 
position therefore acknowledges the double hermeneutic.188  
 
In addition to the ontological foundations introduced above, all research projects, 
this one included, are approached with a set of epistemological foundations. For 
this study these are as follows: there are observable social phenomena which can 
be understood and explained, however, there are also many other phenomena 
which cannot be directly observed, understood and explained. Furthermore, there 
are deterministic structures and processes which are unobservable. Some of these 
phenomena, structures and processes can be analysed, understood and 
explanations produced within the framework of the research project. In contrast 
to the hermeneutic position, interpretation is not identified as the only element of 
research, social existence or international relations as a whole. However, 
objective research is not believed to be possible here as the researcher will always 
have individual interpretations, biases, values and so on which interfere with the 
understanding and explaining of social phenomena. This project is therefore 
approached by acknowledging to an extent foundationalist elements in the 
theoretical approach but is anti-foundationalist in ontological position and uses a 
synthesis of a realist-scientific and interpretivist epistemological position. 
 
Conception of Theory 
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As discussed in the previous chapter there are a number of demands and 
constraints regarding the theoretical approach to be used in this study. The 
critique of the discipline of IPE and the pursuit of a more heterodox approach to 
studying international political economy accounts for much of these. Analysing 
the political economy of trade between the United States and Jordan at the 
domestic, state and international levels also places yet more demands and 
constraints on the theoretical tools to be used. A third set of demands and 
constraints are generated by the need for a theoretical approach which allows for 
the inclusion in this study of multiple types of actors. On account of these 
demands and constraints chapter one briefly introduced liberal institutionalism as 
the theoretical approach to be used in this study.  
 
It is not necessary, here, to outline and write in depth on other theoretical 
approaches in IPE. Rather it is necessary, for the purpose of this research project, 
to introduce and discuss liberal institutionalism, considering some of the main 
developments in the history of the approach, its ontological and epistemological 
foundations and how these relate to those of this study in order to introduce the 
exact variant of the liberal institutionalist approach to be used here. In defence of 
this position it will also be necessary to briefly relate this approach to others. A 
final look at the use of liberal institutionalism in IPE will be followed by a 
summary of how exactly it will be employed in this project as a critical liberal 
institutionalist approach.  
 
The Development of the Institutionalist Approach 
 
Within political science and the broader social sciences there exists a relatively 
broad school of theory which is labelled by many scholars of IPE and IR as 
liberal institutionalism.189 It must be noted however, that there is no single 
institutional approach. Instead, there are a number of approaches which are 
related but which are occasionally contradictory which are classed as 
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institutionalist.190 It is this variety and the way this has come to be that constitutes 
one of the strengths of this approach and thus one of the reasons why it has been 
chosen for this research project. The variety of institutionalist approaches stems 
in part as a result of the ever changing nature of social science theory and the 
debates that continue, seemingly endlessly, about how best to do social science 
research.191 Institutionalism has gained much from reacting to this debate after 
coming under criticism in the early post-war era. As Vivien Lowndes points out 
“[u]ntil the 1950s the dominance of the institutional approach within political 
science was such that its assumptions and practices were rarely specified, let 
alone subject to sustained critique.”192 This would soon change. 
 
The study of the role of international institutions in international political 
economy has been central since the end of the Second World War and 
admittedly has been a focus of orthodox IPE research.193 In the first decades 
following the war a highly practical organisational analysis emerged that 
focused on the issue of how well the newly formed international institutions 
addressed the problems for which they were created.194 A central assumption in 
this debate was that post-war institutions would be shaped and limited by the 
international politics of the time. As a result few scholars held the view that 
such organisations would be able to significantly impact international relations 
and live up to the tasks they were assigned.195 The United Nations (UN),196 the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)197 and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
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and Trade (GATT)198 were the subject of a large number of studies - a large 
proportion of which were highly critical. 
 
A number of these early studies assessed the impacts that international 
institutions could have on the policies of the major powers in Europe and North 
America as well as the military relations between them. Howard C. Johnson and 
Gerhart Niemeyer, for example, investigated the impacts and roles that 
international norms and the organisations to implement them had on state 
behaviour.199 They asked the important question of whether states would be 
willing and able to use force in order to preserve public law and order rather than 
for the sake of gaining relative advantages over other states.200 Johnson and 
Niemeyer ultimately saw more value in the balance of power approach. 
Nevertheless, they called for a specific mechanism that could explain the effects 
of institutions on actor behaviour.201 
 
Following this call for such a mechanism was a large number of studies 
throughout the 1950s focusing on answering the question of institutional impact 
on state behaviour. Understandably the majority of these studies focused on 
international institutions and the role of the United States in world affairs. For 
example, the United States’ role in decolonisation was seen as being influenced 
by a range of institutions that were believed to be raising US consciousness about 
pressing issues that affected American interests.202 One of the results of this surge 
of research was the conclusion that the UN had in fact had an impact on some of 
the most important international issues of the time (although this impact was seen 
as being marginal). 
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Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons argue that “though lacking the elaborate 
theoretical apparatus of current research, early studies of post-war organizations 
had many of the same insights that have informed ‘modern’ institutionalism.”203 
However, it is worth noting that much of the research carried out in the 1950s on 
institutions would be abandoned for the following two decades and only re-
emerged in the late 1970s. Of the most significant ‘re-discoveries’ of early 
institutionalist research, and one that is instrumental to this research project, was 
the idea that international institutions can have a significant impact on state 
behaviour by acting through political channels at the domestic level. B.E. 
Matecki, writing in 1956, even went so far as to say that international institutions 
had the ability to encourage national forces that could directly influence the 
making of national policy.204 Other key findings of the early institutionalist 
research included: that the nature of international political economy impacts upon 
the effectiveness of international institutions; that it is worth studying this 
effectiveness in order to understand and predict actor behaviour; and that 
elaborate organisational structures are not always the best way to ensure 
international cooperation.  
 
More importantly, scholars writing on international institutions in the 1950s and 
1960s were concerned not only with whether international institutions have an 
impact but also how they have an impact. However, a lack of a theoretical 
framework within which to understand and answer these questions meant that the 
insights developed were simply replaced by other methodological tools borrowed 
from the broader social sciences. Attention was subsequently paid to the internal 
politics of international institutions as opposed to their external characteristics 
and ‘actions’ in order to explain their impacts on international political economy. 
This was largely encouraged by issues such as the use of the veto in the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) which in many ways resulted in the paralysis of this 
organisation. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) too was scrutinized as it 
increasingly became a workshop for East-West confrontation throughout the Cold 
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War. Furthermore, following the influx of newly independent states in the 1960s, 
the UNGA developed also into an arena for North-South conflicts.205  
 
Regardless of the advancements in institutionalist theory, its dominance in social 
science research would be challenged and discredited by the behavioural 
revolution of the 1960s. Behaviouralist scholars were insistent upon dismissing 
the formalisms of social science and political science in particular, such as 
institutions, organisational charts, legal assumptions and so on.206 Over the next 
three decades theorists sought to find a more comprehensive way of doing social 
science research. Rational choice theorists such as Anthony Downs sought to 
explain international relations in terms of the independent individual unit’s 
rational self-interests.207 At the same time theorists of a neo-Marxist orientation 
attempted to understand and explain the human world via the roles of structures 
and systemic power.208  
 
The influence of behaviouralism and the study of US domestic politics have been 
highly significant in developments in institutionalist research. This is not least of 
all because the many scholars in IPE have traditionally been western (often 
American) in origin or in education. The majority of the emerging literature on 
the internal politics of the UNGA throughout the 1960s, for example, could be 
traced back to developments and literature in the study of US domestic politics. 
Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett’s study International Politics in the General 
Assembly, for example, acknowledged “that studies of the American political 
process by Robert Dahl, Duncan Macrae, and David Truman were theoretically 
and methodologically suggestive of ways in which roll-call data could be used to 
test for the existence of a pluralistic political process in a quasi-legislative 
international organization.”209 
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By the 1970s a new research path in understanding international institutions had 
been taken. Rather than focus on the formal character of international institutions, 
Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson’s study of eight specialised UN agencies in an 
edited volume focused on the structure and processes of influence of these 
institutions and their outcomes.210 Their underlying assumption was that IOs 
could be analysed as though they are unitary political systems which had evident 
patterns of influence. This research path led to an inter-governmental model of 
the influences of IOs. The core assumption of which was that there exist intimate 
inter-governmental and transnational relationships between different government 
bureaucracies as well as between domestic pressure groups.211 
 
A final strand of institutionalist research during the 1970s emerged from Ernst 
Haas’ neo-functional work. According to Haas “political integration is the 
process whereby actors shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities 
toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-
existing national states.”212 Building on this assumption, the roles of interest 
groups and individuals in the processes of integration and institutionalisation 
were emphasised. The involvement in the national policy-making process of 
individuals and groups was seen as being highly significant. Furthermore, these 
actors were hypothesised to perceive benefits in involvement in international 
institutions and thus view them as favourable.213 In this study a range of actors 
are considered and it is the interaction of this plurality of actors which is 
examined rather than processes of integration brought about by consensus 
building. 
 
The developments within institutionalist research since the end of the Second 
World War were rapidly disrupted during the early 1970s. The two decades of 
predictable and relatively stable monetary relations under the Bretton Woods 
institutions were shattered by the unilateral US decision made in 1971 to abandon 
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dollar-gold convertibility and later to float the dollar.214 The sudden emergence of 
OPEC and its power with respect to oil pricing and supply further shook the 
foundations of the liberal economic order. The 1973 oil embargoes of the United 
States and the Netherlands exemplified the new found power and influence that 
OPEC had in international political economy.215 As a result a multitude of 
responses to the series of events that undermined the international order during 
the 1970s were presented. The most advocated one of which was to strengthen 
IOs in order to combat the problems of an increasingly interdependent world.216 
The majority of the responses suggested were often contradictory, however, one 
similarity was evident. The focus on formal structures and agreements based on 
multilateral treaties such as the UN was no longer sufficient in understanding and 
explaining international issues and events.217  
 
Confronted by a world characterised by complex interdependence, scholars began 
to expand the study of international institutionalism by including international 
regimes - where an international regime is defined as a set of rules, norms, 
principles and procedures, or in other words a set of non-tangible institutions.218 
By encompassing international regimes in institutionalist research it then became 
possible to study how international rules and norms as well as IOs affect actor 
behaviour. This allowed for the substitution of an understanding of the workings 
of IOs for a more thorough understanding of international governance.219 
Through the late 1970s and early 1980s the study of international regimes 
developed in order to analyse in more detail the circumstances and ways in which 
states cooperate with each other. A key component to these questions is the 
inquiry into how international institutions affect the potential for cooperation.  
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The study of international regimes developed in three main directions. First, 
distributive consequences of actor behaviour were replaced by consideration of 
how international regimes are created in the first place and how they change over 
time and what role norms and values have in this process.220 Second, specific 
attention has been paid to the subjective meaning of the norms and values which 
influence the nature of international regimes.221 Third, explanations began to 
emerge by the mid-1980s that overtly connected international regimes with 
broader international cooperation. Here the realist-based critique that states’ 
relative power, national-interests and relative gains222 are key features of 
international politics has been adopted and built upon. Robert Keohane, for 
example, developed research in the 1980s regarding how international institutions 
provide ways for states to overcome the problems of high transaction costs (an 
economist’s term which means the cost of making and enforcing agreements), 
collective action, and information deficits or asymmetries.223 It must be noted that 
Keohane’s work, while developing the institutionalist approach in one direction, 
also reneged on some institutionalist work by viewing states as unitary rational 
actors and ignoring transnational coalitions. Furthermore, the strength of 
Keohane’s work lies in the value of explaining how institutions are created and 
maintained as opposed to how they affect state behaviour.224  
 
So, despite the tide of new approaches to social science there remained many 
scholars who saw the institutionalist approach as the most complete way of doing 
research. Scholars such as R.A.W. Rhodes225 have argued that the institutional 
approach is still useful and claims that adapting the approach to meet the 
criticisms of others has been successful. The result is a range of new 
institutionalisms which specify and defend the assumptions and practices found 
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there within. These approaches have six core characteristics which as a whole 
make new institutionalisms much more complete. First, there has been a shift 
from focusing on organisations, and other tangible institutions to include non-
tangible institutions such as rules, norms, values, and procedures. Second, 
institutions are no longer held to be exclusively formal, but including informal 
conceptions too. Third, the view of IOs has therefore become increasingly 
dynamic as opposed to fixed. Fourth, the values embedded in institutionalism 
which have come under scrutiny, have explicitly been defended and included in 
institutionalist research. Furthermore, the conception of institutions has become 
disaggregated whereas traditionally it has been holistic. And finally there has 
been an over-bearing move from the view of institutions as independent actors to 
one where they are embedded in particular contexts.226  
 
James March and Johan Olsen, who coined the term ‘new institutionalism’,227 
have helped to redefine what the term institution means for social science. Thus:  
 
The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, the appellate 
court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also 
collections of standard operating procedures and structures that 
define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own 
right.228  
 
This argument prompts a number of important questions for this study which 
must be answered. Such as: what actually constitutes an institution; how do 
institutions operate; what is the capacity for individuals to influence the functions 
and nature of institutions; and in turn how do institutions shape and influence the 
functions and nature of individuals and other actors? There seems to be no single 
answer to any of these questions, instead, institutionalist theorists offer differing, 
but sometimes similar and over-lapping answers.229 The result of these differing 
                                                 
226
 See Pierson, P., The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, in 
Comparative Political Studies, 1996, Vol.  29, No. 2, pp: 122-163. 
227
 March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P, 1984, p: 747. 
228
 Ibid, p: 738.  
229
 Jessop, B., 18-19 December 2000, Institutional (Re)turns and the Strategic-Relational 
Approach, paper presented at the Institutional Theory in Political Science Conference, Ross 
Priory, Loch Lomond.  
 78 
answers is the range of institutional approaches, which Peters identifies as the 
following: normative institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; historical 
institutionalism; empirical institutionalism; sociological institutionalism; and 
network institutionalism.230  
 
Forms of Institutionalism  
 
The differences in institutionalist approaches arise from the answers given to the 
questions mentioned above. These answers are based on slightly differing 
epistemological positions. All institutionalist approaches seek to understand and 
explain social phenomena and relationships and as such are largely 
foundationalist in ontology. However, they vary in the manner in which the 
world is understood and explained. On the one hand there are the normative 
institutionalist approaches (normative institutionalism; sociological 
institutionalism; network institutionalism) and on the other, approaches which are 
rational choice variants (rational choice institutionalism; historical 
institutionalism; empirical institutionalism and international institutionalism).231 
The normative strand views institutions as organisations, sets of rules and values 
that determine appropriate behaviour.232 In international political economy this 
could mean institutions such as international copyright laws which determine 
when, where and by whom certain goods and services are eligible for production 
and sale. A further example could be the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle 
of the WTO. The rational choice strand views institutions as organisations, rules, 
values, norms, and procedures as determinants of interactions between utility-
maximising actors.233  
 
Referring back to the epistemological foundations and the core aims of this study 
provides some clarity to the utility of the institutionalist approach in this case. 
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The general theme of this research project is to study the nature and 
characteristics of trade relations between states on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis. The aim is to understand these relations in the context of the international 
institutions that have helped to determine them. This is in order to explain the 
nature and characteristics of these relations and provide some insight into the 
future prospects of cooperation and integration between these states and others. It 
is not therefore a normative project but one that is interested in the inherent 
interests of actors and how these are pursued in the context of international 
institutions. These themes and aims are best exemplified in the institutionalist 
approach which aims to assess how the behaviour of actors determines the nature 
of and is in turn steered by the formal and informal structural constraints of 
international political economy.234  
 
However, this approach does not leave much room in terms of analytical power 
for the inclusion of the impacts of international institutions on actor behaviour in 
the normative sense. In short, an implicit assumption of this project is that 
international trade can in certain circumstances lead to increased cooperation 
between actors and thus increased stability at both the domestic and international 
levels. With this consideration, it seems most appropriate to conceptualise the 
theoretical approach to this project as one which allows for a synthesis of both 
rational choice and normative elements. This can best be accomplished by using 
the liberal institutionalist approach used largely, but not exclusively in IPE and 
IR by theorists such as Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Daniel Griswold and Brink 
Lyndsey.  
 
Liberal Institutionalism  
 
IPE theorists often point to the importance of certain types of actors and 
relationships for the management of international relations. The most often cited 
are international institutions and hegemony.235 As mentioned above there have 
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traditionally been two types of international institutions that are of significant 
interest to IPE scholars:236 first IOs and second international regimes. 
International regimes often attempt to promote an international system of 
cooperation in the areas of monetary relations and international trade.237 In more 
recent institutionalist work as outlined above there has been the expansion of 
what is classed as an institution to include abstract and non-tangible elements of 
the social world. These include: values, norms, beliefs, procedures, structures and 
processes. At the same time many IOs attempt to promote both economic and 
political cooperation in a system which is characterised by a high level of 
interdependence between actors. 
 
Liberal institutionalism focuses on the use of international institutions and a 
liberal international economic order to promote peace and prosperity among 
states through greater interdependence.238 Achieving cooperation239 in a system 
of states and other actors is highly problematic as there is no centralised authority 
which can establish and enforce rules of behaviour. Nevertheless, the liberal 
institutionalist contends that a strong set of IOs provides the framework upon 
which states can settle their disputes peacefully without resorting to violent 
conflict.240  
 
Liberal institutionalists further contend that a liberal international economic order 
created and maintained by international regimes leads to greater economic 
interdependence between states.241 This economic interdependence helps to 
prevent conflict by increasing the profits of peaceful coexistence while at the 
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same time increasing the costs of conflict.242 According to liberal institutionalism, 
power is primarily economic in nature, and therefore much competition between 
actors takes place in the economic sphere. Hence, by increasing economic 
interdependence and thus economic cooperation, competition between actors is 
reduced. Furthermore, liberal institutionalists argue that two conditions are 
required in order to sustain a state of peace: interdependence and liberal 
democracies.243  
 
One way in which interdependence is fostered is through inter-state cooperation 
and economic integration by greater international trade. In a globalising world 
system these trends are ever-increasing. However, greater levels of international 
trade between states do not only affect relations at the international level. Rather, 
there is also a significant impact at the domestic level.244 Daniel T. Griswold has 
argued that increased trade can have significant socio-political and socio-
economic impacts within states. In the first instance trade can help to influence 
the political system of a state through increasing interaction between that state’s 
citizens and those of other (perhaps freer) societies.245 This interaction can take 
the form of face to face meetings as well as via electronic communications such 
as phone, fax or email. Furthermore, increased communication between groups of 
people who are involved with the processes of trade can bring a sharing of ideas 
along with exposure to alternative ways of thinking and organising civil society 
and business. The flow of books, magazines and other forms of media can often 
have a political and social context, helping to further spread different ways of 
thinking. By exploiting the opportunities for foreign travel and study that come 
with foreign investment and trade, citizens can experience the political and civil 
liberties of others thus further influencing the direction of domestic political 
demands.246  
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For liberals a key constraint on individual political freedom is the extent of 
governmental power. Economic freedom and trade can provide a counterweight 
to this. This is because the free market diffuses economic decision-making from 
the control of a small number of governmental actors and into the hands of a 
broader range of actors. This reduces the power of the centralised actors who 
often use the power gained by monopoly over decision-making to marginalise 
other actors. David Held claims that the subsequent dispersion of economic 
control creates space for non-governmental actors and private sector alternatives 
to central political control and authority, such as civil society.247 The presence of 
private sector corporations creates an alternative source of wealth, influence and 
leadership. Furthermore, non-state institutions can be funded by the private 
economy. According to March and Olsen, these institutions can provide new 
ideas, influence and leadership outside the control of the government.248  
 
Anthony Downs claims that increased international trade is often accompanied by 
faster growth and greater levels of wealth.249 These in turn promote democratic 
practices by creating an economically independent and politically aware middle 
class. A larger middle class means a larger number of people who can afford to 
be educated and take an interest in political affairs. Authoritarian systems of 
governance can be prone to acute shifts in economic policy. As citizens gain 
more assets and establish businesses and careers in the private sector they will be 
more likely to desire continuity.250 At the same time that increased international 
trade and integration at the international level can lead to impacts at the domestic 
level, actors, institutions, and processes at the domestic level can impact upon the 
emergence, nature and success of international integration.251  
 
Liberal institutionalism like other theoretical approaches, as mentioned above, is 
very broad, complex and encompasses a large number of key principles. 
Furthermore, how these key principles relate to each other often deviates from 
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one version of the theory to another. It is, however, possible to identify and 
present the key principles used in any particular approach and how these relate to 
each other. The exact nature of these principles and their relationship to each 
other determine the unique nature of any theoretical analysis. In this thesis a 
critical version of liberal institutionalism is used which shares much in common 
with the institutionalisms used by scholars such as Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, 
Ernest Haas and Robert Axelrod as highlighted above. Some amendments and re-
interpretations are made, however, which while limited in scope are significant in 
terms of impact on what is studied here and how.  
 
With regards to the similar key principles and assumptions adopted in the 
theoretical approach to this project are a number of common elements within 
broader institutionalist approaches. In the first instance is the assumption of a 
global system which is characterised by limited global governance and regulation 
of state and non-state behaviour. Here, while some elements of global governance 
can be seen with regards to some issues and processes in particular regions, the 
belief in the existence of a global system which is closer to the conception of 
anarchy is adopted. Furthermore international institutions are aimed at addressing 
the anarchic system and allow for greater interaction which helps reduce anarchy. 
Secondly, institutions are seen here as being IOs and regimes. Thirdly, a plurality 
of actors is assumed. No single type of actor, be that a state or MNC and so on, 
can ultimately be defined as universally dominant over time and space. Rather, all 
types of actors can be relevant and can have differing levels of importance with 
regards to different issues, processes, relationships in different places and at 
different times.  
 
A fourth key principle which forms the version of liberal institutionalism used in 
this thesis is the belief that all actors have aims and objectives which they pursue 
– whether through cooperation or conflict. However, a rationalist approach is not 
fully adopted here. Instead, while actors have interests which they pursue these 
interests and the actions taken to achieve them may not come as a result of wholly 
rational calculation under circumstances of perfect information. The belief here is 
that often interests and subsequent policies are based upon imperfect information 
and imperfect calculation. In short we can only go so far as to claim that actors 
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have interests which they pursue but we cannot assume rationality. We must 
therefore include a deeper discussion of the formation of actor interests and 
policies.  
 
Issue linkage or issue interdependence is also a key principle discussed in this 
project. This point is linked directly to a sixth principle which is that international 
relations are a plus-sum game – this point is discussed below. The assumption of 
issue linkage and interdependence is pivotal to this study as it allows for a 
complex analysis of the political economy of trade between Jordan and the 
United States in a heterodox manner. The issue of bilateral trade facilitation at the 
state level, for example, is directly linked with other issues such as state level 
cooperation on foreign policy matters, non-state actor activity in domestic 
markets as well as societal interaction and so on. Furthermore, international 
relations and domestic relations are intricately linked and often inseparable. Thus 
the Jordanian government’s decision to facilitate trade with the United States 
should be discussed not only by examining Jordanian foreign policy but domestic 
policy and interests as well. Also, repercussions of processes and relationships at 
one level of analysis can be extremely important in leading to repercussions at 
another level – such as the arguments put forward by Brink Lyndsey and Daniel 
Griswold regarding the link between trade and democratic processes at the 
domestic level.  
 
The critical version of liberal institutionalism used in this thesis is original in a 
number of ways. A first way, as mentioned above, is the denial of the inherent 
rationality of interests and actions. A second, and perhaps the most significant 
element of originality, is the belief that international cooperation through 
international institutions is a plus-sum game where the actors involved are all 
able to pursue their interests in order to maximise their gains. However, these 
relations are characterised by multiple linkages between different issue areas at 
different levels of analysis which can be defined as either plus-sum or zero-sum 
games but when combined result in an accumulation of gains leading to a plus-
sum situation.  
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These principles and the relationship between them form the theoretical 
framework within which the remainder of this study takes place. Throughout 
chapters three through seven these theoretical signposts will be used to guide the 
discussion and analysis that follows. Having now defined the conception of 
theory used in this project it is possible to discuss and define the methods used to 
collect and analyse information. 
 
Methods 
 
Ontological and epistemological foundations have a direct impact on the methods 
employed in any research project. It is thus useful to briefly consider the 
ontological and epistemological foundations of the different strands of social 
science methods – the qualitative and quantitative approaches. The possibility of 
combining these two types of methods will then be assessed and an outline of the 
methods used in this project presented. 
 
There are two broad methodological directions this project can take. First the 
research can be either quantitative or qualitative and second, the approach could 
be to combine the two methods in a manner which allows for the coherent 
application of both.252 Historically, most social science research has taken the 
first route.253 However, it is becoming increasingly the case that researchers are 
aware of the utility of combining the different types of methods.254 Doing this is, 
however, more difficult and needs to be carefully attempted in order not to 
produce a piece of work which is incoherent and ineffective in its findings. This 
is because both qualitative and quantitative methods are based upon different and 
occasionally contradictory ontological and epistemological positions.  
 
The quantitative approach has in the past been seen as closely linked to a 
foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology. In other words, 
quantitative methods are employed to study the ‘real world’, which is observed, 
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and presented in the form of figures, tables, graphs and so on.255 There is little if 
any room for interpretation in the ‘presentation’ of the ‘real world’. Instead this 
presentation is intended to be taken as the accurate and true portrayal of the social 
world. On the other hand qualitative methods have traditionally been seen as 
having an anti-foundationalist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology.256 In 
other words, methods which are qualitative in nature are employed to understand 
the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of the social world, not to unearth 
and explain observable ‘truths’ – of which, to the qualitative researcher, there 
simply are non.  
 
It would seem therefore, from this very basic outlining of traditional assumptions 
of the ontological and epistemological foundations of these two types of methods 
that a research project such as this one, which is based on an anti-foundationalist 
ontology and a realist scientific epistemology, that methods to be used pose a 
problem. However, this thankfully is not the case. While the divide between 
quantitative and qualitative research remains highly pronounced in academic 
circles and some researchers do still reject certain methods out-right because 
these methods do not correspond with their epistemological position (whether 
implicitly or explicitly),257  this is increasingly not the case for many researchers. 
Social science researchers have realised that both qualitative and quantitative 
methods are of some use and that there is in fact benefits to combining them.258 
This is the approach that is adopted in this project. 
 
While these two research traditions do have their own characteristics and in some 
ways are very different and have traditionally been used to study different things, 
the academic discussion surrounding them has led to a false dichotomy.259 It is 
worth briefly discussing the positive aspects as well as the criticisms of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in order to ascertain how this is the case and 
how the two methods can be combined.  
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Quantitative Methods 
 
Quantitative methods have largely held primacy in social science research, 
including IPE research as discussed in chapter one.260 This strand of method 
relies on the observation and measurement of repeated incidences of social 
phenomena,261 such as the value of imports and exports or levels of trade. 
Advocates of quantitative methods argue that by observing social phenomena 
over a period of time it is possible to understand, explain, predict and prescribe. 
The methods employed include the collection of data and the construction of 
tables, graphs, charts and models. This management of the data is used to display 
‘facts’ as well as to deduce causal relationships and produce predictive 
information.  
 
There are, however, a number of limitations of these methods. First and foremost 
there is the question of where does the data that has been collected and managed 
originate from?262 It is argued that the use of secondary data from existing 
sources raises the possibility that the data used is biased, exclusionary and 
potentially false. For example, the use of data on the dollar value of annual trade 
between the United States and its trading partners in this study is taken from the 
US Government Census Bureau. While it is believed that this is a reliable source 
there is no immediate proof that these figures are in fact correct. A second, 
critique regards the quest of quantitative researchers to turn social phenomena 
into a series of repeated and identical events.263 IPE is a vast, dynamic and 
complex field and as a result, any project that seeks to produce explanations of 
one set of social phenomena and relate them to others must provide a mass of 
evidence to support the claims it makes. Furthermore, providing evidence will 
often not suffice to silence critics as this evidence will generally claim to be 
objective, a claim that is rejected by many scholars. This is because objective 
research is seen by most qualitative and some quantitative researchers as simply 
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not possible.264 Quantitative research, therefore, must in some way take into 
account these criticisms and provide the most convincing arguments possible 
while conceding that all parties will not be satisfied with the research findings. 
This thesis uses some quantitative methods but the logic of this enquiry rests on 
qualitative argument and methodology. 
 
Qualitative Methods 
 
Qualitative methods often involve the researcher immersing him or herself in the 
social setting which is being studied, observing and participating in social 
phenomena. The aim is to interpret the socially constructed phenomena being 
studied.265 During the research phase of the qualitative research project, the 
researcher will take extensive notes, construct questionnaires and conduct in-
depth interviews as well as using various forms of text. The interviews may be 
individual or group interviews and use a range of open-ended questions or guided 
‘yes/no’ questions. The use of the open-ended question in such interviews is to 
allow the interviewee to talk at length about a topic, this enables the researcher to 
explore the phenomena being studied in more depth. Qualitative research using 
interviews will usually only include a relatively small number of interviewees but 
a large number of interviews can be carried out.266  
 
The qualitative methods mentioned here are not without their criticisms. Using 
only a small number of interviewees, for example, entails the problem of 
representation. In order to collect data of most use to the research project it may 
be necessary to select a range of sources that one would anticipate would provide 
a wide range of opinions, information and so on. Conducting interviews of only a 
small number of individuals risks alienating some while favouring others as is the 
case when snow-balling interviews (the practice of asking interviewees to 
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nominate others for interview). This must be taken into account and justification 
of one’s sampling strategies must be made to resolve this issue.267  
 
A second area where qualitative researchers have been criticised is in terms of 
objectivity and bias. Critics argue that there is a lack of objectivity in the research 
process and there exists a bias in the research due to the relatively close 
relationship between the researcher and, say the interviewees.268 However, as 
information revealed in the research process may be relatively personal or when 
topics that are of a sensitive nature are discussed there is often an inherent need 
for such a close relationship and it may be unavoidable.269 As a result qualitative 
researchers do not seek objective research and in fact perceive this as not being 
possible even if it was desired. In terms of the charge of bias, qualitative 
researchers tend not to deny this but rather tend to consider its impacts on the 
research findings. Bias, it is believed is not entirely avoidable.270 
 
A further concern with qualitative research is that there is a lack of legitimacy in 
the research findings when generalisations are attempted.271 With only studying a 
small sample of individuals it is not likely that one could make broad conclusions 
about social phenomena that enable the understanding of other situations. Any 
comparisons that could be made between different phenomena would act only as 
guides and have limited confirmatory use.272 When employing qualitative 
research, therefore, one may have to be careful that the aim of the research 
project is not to produce understandings and explanations of causal relationships. 
A final weakness of qualitative research to note is that one can never be certain as 
to whether such research findings are simply the interpretations of the researcher 
and therefore not necessarily of great use.273 As such, qualitative research must 
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emphasise the plausibility of the interpretation of the research findings in detail in 
order to add legitimacy. 
 
Combining Methods 
 
It is clear from the brief overview above that both quantitative and qualitative 
methods have their merits and their weaknesses. However, the criticisms of 
these approaches are somewhat answered by combining the two in some form. 
This is for two reasons: first, there are often too many aspects of any research 
question addressed to be dealt with comprehensively by just one approach, 
which provides the basis for criticism; and second, the use of two types of 
methods produces increased validity through the one acting as a check on the 
other and also addresses most if not all of the aspects of the study.274  
 
Creswell argues that there are three basic forms of combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods.275 The first is a two-phase design which entails the study 
conducting separate qualitative and quantitative phases. The benefit is that the 
researcher can use both methods and operate within the corresponding 
epistemological paradigm thus silencing critics. The second approach Creswell 
labels as a dominant/less dominant design. This entails the researcher selecting a 
dominant approach with elements of the other included in the overall study. The 
strength of this approach is that it allows coherency while at the same time 
selecting data from either a larger or smaller population (depending on the 
dominant approach). Finally, Creswell suggests a mixed-methodology design 
could be employed in social science research. This means that either type of 
method approach can be used at any stage of the project. This adds to the 
complexity of the project but allows the researcher the chance to take advantage 
of all the methodological tools available.276  
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Attempting to combine the two types of methods is not without its complexities. 
Returning to Marsh and Furlong’s argument, ontology and epistemology 
constitute a ‘skin not a sweater’. In the above sections the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this study have been outlined. It is important to 
note that these have not been chosen for this project, but have been identified as 
an inherent part of the research process. This is important for the potential of 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Unlike some scholars, such as, 
Hamersley,277 Padgett,278 and even Creswell,279 this author does not believe that 
the issue of ontology and epistemology and their effects on the coherence of 
research methods employed can be down-played. It is difficult to envisage a 
situation where an interpretivist could collect and analyse hard, quantitative 
data, such as facts, figures and so on. However, it is possible to envisage a 
situation where the collecting and analysing of hard data and the attempt to 
explain the social phenomena which are being studied can be done by using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. This is what is termed ‘triangulation’ 
in the data and is most similar to Creswell’s second position, that of a 
dominant/less dominant approach. 
 
It would be false and highly incoherent solely to employ qualitative research 
methods in a study such as this one which seeks to study phenomena in the 
‘real’ world and explain them. For this, quantitative methods must be employed. 
In more detail, it would be unrealistic to study trade relations by neglecting or 
refusing to use quantitative methods to collect and analyse figures on levels of 
trade between states, the goods and services which are being traded and so on. 
Therefore, quantitative tools will form a major part of the methods employed 
here. It is important to note however, that the use of quantitative methods to 
collect, analyse and present information on international trade does not equate to 
the orthodox methodology of separating subject from object. Rather, measuring 
the supply and movement of goods and services from one market to another 
(trade) can be easily differentiated from the subjective nature of the individual 
and is thus in most cases readily quantifiable.  
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It is essential in any study which discusses international trade to include the 
collection, analysis and presentation of empirical evidence on the nature and 
levels of trade. However, sourcing this data is not necessarily without problems. 
In the first instance reliable sources must be found which have used reliable and 
accurate methods of data collection and presentation. It is worth noting that in a 
project of this kind it is not entirely possible (although potentially desirable) to 
gain first-hand primary data on trade. However, if gaining this data first-hand is 
not possible then gaining the relevant information from sources which have 
reliably gained the data first-hand is essential.  
 
Here quantitative research on trade is gained from a number of sources. The US 
Census Bureau’s Department of Foreign Trade Statistics, the Jordanian Ministry 
of Industry and Trade’s Trade and Investment Information Database, the UN’s 
Comtrade Database, the EU’s Eurostat Database and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Department of Statistics are 
all utilised as means of gathering primary quantitative data. It must be conceded 
that while these sources are all very reliable and the methods used to collect 
information are in line with common good practices, there is an issue with 
timing. All of these sources in their collection and presentation of information 
on trade have a time-lag between the period being represented and the actual 
release of information. The US Census Bureau and Jordanian Ministry of 
Industry and Trade each only release information several months later. In other 
words data on trade between say Jordan and the United States for January to 
June 2008 will only be available in (approximately) September 2008.  
 
Due to the nature and level of attention given to US-Jordan relations in IPE 
literature as outlined in chapter one there are only limited sources of information 
and analysis which are relevant to this project that deal with US-Jordan trade 
relations. In order to collect information for this thesis which is both reliable and 
essential to the analysis presented here primary research is essential as a means 
of gaining a deeper insight in to and collecting information on trade between 
Jordan and the United States and actor involvement in this relationship. Thus 
four field research trips were planned in 2006 and carried out in December 
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2006, April 2007, August 2007 and March 2008. In the case of the former a ten 
day field research trip to Amman, Jordan was carried out while a second week 
long trip was conducted in August 2007. Prior to the second trip to Jordan a 
week-long trip to Geneva, Switzerland was undertaken. A final research trip for 
this project was completed with a week-long trip to Washington, DC in the 
United States.  
 
During the field research trips a number of intensive individual interviews were 
carried out. In total some thirty interviews were held. Some of these interviews 
were designed to contain guided discussions with set questions (usually between 
ten and twenty questions) pertaining to the relevant issues and some were 
designed to be rolling discussions with open-ended questions to allow for the 
interviewees to talk in detail about the issue in question. The purpose of this 
latter method was to gain more information regarding issues being discussed 
that were to some extent not covered in previous research. It is important to note 
that simply selecting the questions to ask and the sources to address in search of 
answers risks neglecting other areas of questioning and other sources that have 
not yet been considered.280  
 
Using qualitative interviewing techniques thus gained further information on the 
questions that should be addressed and the sources exploited in the later stages 
of the research process. This is a method that has been suggested and employed 
by other scholars.281 It is often difficult to approach and gain access to relevant 
individuals, especially within government organisations. This problem was to a 
certain extent addressed by ‘snow-balling’ on the field research trips in order to 
utilise networks of relevant individuals. As a result of this technique a number 
of additional interviews to those that had been planned were conducted and 
further information sourced. The interviews conducted can be categorised in to 
four main groups: firstly, information about state-actor agency sourced from 
individual agents of state actors; secondly, information about private sector 
actor agency sourced from individual agents of private sector actors; thirdly, 
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information about IGO agency sourced from individual agents of IGOs; and 
finally, commentary on the above three.  
 
In terms of the analysis and presentation of information in this research project 
there are two overlapping phases. In the first instance quantitative analysis and 
presentation of international trade between Jordan and the United States is 
utilised in chapters three though seven. Here the use of numerical data such as 
levels of trade between actors in a set time period and the graphical 
representation of comparisons of these levels are used. While the arguments 
against foundational, positivist, and quantitative methodology have been 
highlighted above the use of such a methodology is the most effective way to 
study international trade. This is because trade is and should be a quantifiable 
issue area to a certain extent and to fully discuss this issue a valid and concise 
representation of multiple relationships at multiple levels of analysis is needed. 
On the other hand, however, the second phase of analysis and presentation in 
this thesis utilises qualitative methodology based more on an awareness of 
subjectivity and interpretation and comparative study.  
 
Both of the two phases of research can be found in chapters three through seven 
which, while to a certain extent are independent analyses of relationships 
between multiple actors, are also utilised as comparative case studies. 
Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative methods are used in the collection 
and analysis of information from primary and secondary literature sources. As 
reviewed in chapter one there is ample literature on IPE as a discipline, the 
debates within it and so on which can be drawn upon. Literature on US-Jordan 
relations and trade relations in particular is relatively limited and so sources of 
broader US-MENA relations and Jordan-international relations as well as 
broader literature on the United States and on Jordan are drawn upon. As this 
study includes the analysis of non-state actors as well as state actors, primary 
literature on and by the relevant actors is utilised in order to offer as 
comprehensive a discussion as possible. For example, in chapters five, six and 
seven material such as the annual reports of MNCs are used to a relatively large 
extent. 
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Conclusions  
 
This chapter has considered the questions of which theory and methods are to be 
employed in this research project. Any discussion of theory and methods must 
first begin with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological positions of 
the researcher carrying out the work. Presented above is a brief assessment of 
these as a ‘skin not a sweater’. The initial aims and objectives of this research 
project at the most basic level have been identified, as have the methodological 
approaches used. In summary, these include the position that the world consists 
of ‘real’ and existing elements, and that social phenomena, relationships between 
these phenomena and some but not all structures and processes can be observed. 
Thus this project is approached with an anti-foundationalist ontology and a realist 
scientific epistemology but the foundationalist roots of institutionalist approaches 
are acknowledged. However, it is worth highlighting again that there is an 
admission of interpretation in all social science research as well as the importance 
of subjectivity. Thus it is more accurate to label the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this study as critical anti-foundationalism and 
critical realist scientific.  This in part has led to the adoption of a critical version 
of liberal institutionalist theory as the theoretical approach to this project. 
 
While the developments in institutionalist study over the past several decades 
have been significant in relation to the broader fields of study encompassed in 
IPE and IR, they have often been ignored by mainstream research. However, in 
relation to assessing and evaluating the political economy of trade relations 
between the United States and Jordan a critical liberal institutionalist approach 
will prove highly effective. This is for a number of reasons: first, current trends in 
these trade relations suggest a greater move towards political and economic 
reform. Second, there is an emerging broad-ranging adoption of liberal trade 
policies by Jordan and other states in the MENA region coupled with a 
strengthening impetus within the United States to encourage this adoption. The 
move to liberal policies could precede a move to greater integration with the 
global economic system and to greater integration with the United States in 
particular.  
 96 
 
At a more basic level employing a critical liberal institutionalist approach allows 
for the reconciliation of a number of basic components essential to this study. In 
the first instance this approach allows for the study of a range of different actors 
without giving primacy to any single one. In this study this is important as states, 
MNCs, IGOs, NGOs and individuals as actors are all studied. At the core of the 
approach used here is the assumption that all of these actors may have agency, 
however, no single one may have ultimate primacy. Furthermore, while some of 
these actors are studied as tangible institutions in the form of IOs, this study also 
examines non-tangible institutions such as trade liberalisation agreements and 
regimes. Finally, this theoretical approach allows for the fusion of an anti-
foundationalist and realist scientific approach with an interpretativist approach to 
a certain extent and does not require exclusively positivist research to be carried 
out.  
 
During the research phase of this project a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods is employed in a dominant/less dominant approach. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods are both used in the collection, analysis and 
presentation of data. Furthermore, the combination of both types of methods 
allows for the resolution of some of the main criticisms of social science research 
and IPE research in particular that is foundationalist and scientific in nature.  
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State-Facilitation of Trade: Jordanian Interests 
and Domestic and Foreign Policy  
 98 
Introduction 
 
In the endeavour to study the political economy of trade between Jordan and the 
United States it is necessary to address a number of questions regarding how state 
actors have created and engaged with international institutions. This chapter thus 
begins the assessment of state level facilitation of trade by discussing Jordanian 
state interests at the domestic and international levels and the links between them 
through issue interdependence. This is done in order to determine what the state’s 
main interests are, the policies taken to pursue these interests and how these are 
both formed. By analysing the demands and constraints on government decision-
making within the context of an anarchic international system with limited 
international governance, the main state interests can be identified. It is then 
possible to offer a description and an explanation of how Jordan has engaged with 
international institutions in the form of both IOs and regimes pertaining to trade 
in order to achieve its main aims through cooperative relations. The main premise 
is that dual processes of reform in both the political and economic spheres at the 
domestic level have been encouraged by changes in the domestic and 
international environments. Furthermore, these processes of reform have 
interacted resulting in a reinforcement of change in the domestic and international 
interests of the Jordanian government.  
 
Under the rule of King Hussein Jordanian interests had largely been determined 
by external actors and processes, much the same as today.282 However, the 
international relations of the Middle East and the broader international system 
coupled with the level of socio-economic development within Jordan historically 
resulted in a security oriented set of government interests.283 While socio-
economic interests were evident, they were constantly subservient to the greater 
interests of national security, regime survival and regional stability.284 In the 
twenty-first century the accelerating processes of globalisation, economic and 
strategic regional transformation and the changing socio-economic characteristics 
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of Jordanian society have produced a far different environment. In short there has 
been a shift from the focus on security interests and a set of security-oriented 
domestic and foreign policies to a focus on socio-economic interests and a 
political economy-oriented set of domestic and foreign policies. This new policy 
focus has led to state level facilitation of international trade through the 
engagement with international institutions. 
 
In the endeavour to explore the current set of national interests it will be 
necessary to first briefly explore the transformation of Jordanian domestic and 
foreign policies over the past decade and a half or so. The first section briefly 
explores changes in government decision-making in the 1990s and the early King 
Abdullah II era. Changes through the 1990s provided the basis from which 
government interests have been redefined since 1999. Gil Feiler argues that in 
part a result of the re-orientation of national interests and in part a cause of it a 
vast range of interdependent issues are now having a significant impact upon the 
decision-making process.285 Subsequent sections of this chapter address these 
issues. Two broad categories of interests can be identified at both the domestic 
and international levels: socio-economic and security. As will be shown through 
this chapter, the majority of contemporary interests fall within the former 
category. At the same time some interests and policy responses fall within the 
latter category and continue to impact decision-making. For the purposes of this 
chapter and in order to allow for a cohesive argument to be made socio-economic 
interests will be explored in detail.  
 
Philip Dew and Anthony Shoult claim that policy making under King Abdullah II 
can best be described as reformist.286 Political and economic liberal reform has 
been the calling card of the various governments and main institutions since 
1999. The second section of this chapter outlines efforts towards political 
liberalisation and the processes of democratisation supported by the government 
since 2000. Economic liberalisation is dealt with in the following sections. There 
are three elements to economic reform pursued by the Jordanian government over 
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the past two decades. The first element is macro-economic structural adjustment. 
Section three addresses the relevant adjustment policies taken by the government 
through the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The following section examines 
the second element of the government’s economic reform: privatisation. The fifth 
section develops the previous discussions by assessing the government’s move 
towards facilitating external trade through FTAs. With all of the areas of 
economic reform the Jordanian government has engaged with existing or 
constructed in partnership with other state actors liberal economic international 
institutions. 
 
A conclusion will re-emphasise the main points of the evolution of governmental 
domestic and foreign policy in the twenty-first century. A summary of the 
framework within which current political economy-orientated policy is made will 
also be provided.  
 
Initial Political and Economic Reform: 1989-1999  
 
In 1989 the Jordanian government announced the temporary suspension of 
external debt repayments. A financial crisis had befallen the kingdom that 
evolved into the worst economic crisis in the short history of the country. One of 
King Hussein’s responses was to implement an adjustment and austerity 
agreement which had been made with the IMF in return for assistance.287 It must 
be noted, however, that this agreement (and indeed economic reform in general) 
was disrupted in 1990 and did not re-start until 1992. The agreement’s main 
recommendation was the cutback of government subsidies on food and other 
basic goods.288 The result was a gradual easing of budgetary demands on the 
government and resumption of debt servicing. Such moves were not welcomed at 
home, however, as a large part of the population was heavily reliant on 
government subsidies and in particular the subsidy for bread. Riots broke out 
across Jordan from Amman to Ma’an, Karak and Salt. In response to calls for 
greater governmental accountability and transparency the government announced 
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that parliamentary elections would be held in November 1989. A national charter 
to guide the democratisation process was adopted in June 1991. The following 
year martial law was lifted, political parties were legalised and restrictions on 
freedom of expression were relaxed.289  
 
The pace of change drastically slowed following the August 2 1991 Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait. Once again security concerns seemed to negate all other interests and 
the Jordanian government reverted back to advocating a strict security state with 
a slow and tightly controlled programme of political reform.290 With the 
economic situation still in crisis and the likely prospect of the Iraq-Kuwait 
conflict evolving into a broader international conflict involving regional and 
extra-regional states the prospect for domestic political change seemed 
extinguished. King Hussein, weary of domestic sentiment which strongly 
favoured Saddam Hussein, officially adopted a neutral stance in the Gulf Crisis 
and subsequent war.291 This neutrality was seen as being pro-Iraq both at home 
and abroad.  
 
With regards to the international relations of the region and broader international 
system, this stance proved to be extremely costly. Members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) feared an Iraqi invasion further south down the 
Persian Gulf as well as domestic rebellions by ‘foreigners’ from neighbouring 
Arab states who resided within their borders.292 Their response was to side with 
the US led coalition against Iraq, to expel large numbers of expatriate workers 
(most of who were of Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian and Sudanese origin) and 
to reduce or cease aid to those states seen to be siding with Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.293 The cost to the Jordanian economy verged on catastrophic. 
Approximately three hundred thousand expatriate workers ‘returned’ to the 
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kingdom adding to the demand for housing, services, jobs and government 
subsidies.294 The halt in discounted oil coupled with the drop in financial aid from 
the GCC states and the West (most notably the United States) further negatively 
impacted the economy.295  
 
At home the result of the government’s position was far different. According to 
Ranjit Singh, King Hussein’s popularity in 1991was as high as it had ever been 
and popular sentiment towards the government was extremely accommodating.296 
Riding this wave of popular support and satisfaction further slowed the pace of 
change at home. Parliament was postponed in the fall of 1991 (seen by most as an 
attempt to prevent a no-confidence vote on the government of then Prime 
Minister Tahir Masri). Changes to the electoral law were made in November 
1993, which subsequently enhanced the electoral chances of pro-regime 
candidates.297 The government then seized on the opportunity to conclude the 
1994 peace treaty with Israel which was assured to be unpopular at home among 
both the approximately 60 percent population of Palestinian decent and the 
remaining ‘East Bankers’.  
 
The following five years saw a decline in support for the government and a rise in 
the expression of anti-government sentiments through independent media, 
political associations and popular movements.298 The government’s response was 
to re-introduce restrictions on the media. The final reversal of the hard-won 
political liberalisation which had taken place through the late 1980s and early 
1990s came when in 1997 “the opposition parties, professional associations and 
prominent independent figures boycotted the elections.”299 With only pro-regime 
candidates, parliament was solidified as an adjunct to the regime.  
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By February 1999 and the passing of King Hussein, the democratic gains made in 
the 1989-1993 period had been reversed and the kingdom had once again become 
a state where security apparatus were omnipresent, and security interests and 
concerns defined government policy. However, the seeds had been sewn and for 
the first time in its history the Jordanian government had seriously considered 
reform over a significant period of time. The preponderance of high politics in the 
making of policy had for a time been interrupted by issues of low politics. With 
the death of King Hussein and the ascension to power of a young, inexperienced 
and relatively unknown head of state the opportunity for change once again 
presented itself.  
 
Political Liberalisation and Democratisation 
 
While 1999 brought potential for change with a new head of state with arguably a 
more ‘contemporary’ outlook, the ascension of King Abdullah II did not translate 
into immediate political change. It was hoped, although not expected, that 
Abdullah would instantly initiate a broad ranging programme of political 
liberalisation that would open-up the political system in Jordan and usher in more 
democratic practices. As the initial months of his reign passed it became clear 
that the analysts who had suggested the transition from one ruler to another would 
mean tighter controls were in fact correct. The actual succession had in the first 
instance been ‘rocky’ as the ailing King Hussein removed the designation of 
Crown Prince and heir to the throne from his brother Hassan Bin Talal in favour 
of his eldest son, Abdullah. Hassan had been Crown Prince for almost the entirety 
of King Hussein’s rule and was widely expected to take power once his elder 
brother had passed away.300 It came as a relative shock therefore that this would 
not be the case and that Abdullah, a figure of unknown political capabilities, 
would lead the kingdom into the twenty-first century. With a plethora of 
destabilising forces (economic, political and regional) against him King Abdullah 
II cautiously retained the role of the security services. Security issues became 
ever more important and the Mukhabarat increased in importance.301 Over the 
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first year and a half of King Abdullah II’s reign press freedoms receded further, 
there was a general crackdown on protests and academics, journalists and others 
were dismissed for perceived political offences.302  
 
As has become a hallmark of Abdullah’s leadership, he managed to escape the 
following negative response from the masses. Instead it was the Director of the 
General Intelligence Department (GID), Samih Batikhi that was the target of 
blame for the worsening political environment.303 Critics scorned Batikhi for his 
dual role as Director of the GID and Royal Advisor and laid the blame for the 
tightening of the political system on him. In November 2000 Batikhi was 
replaced by Major General Saad Kheir who remained out of the public eye and as 
such also escaped blame, although the prospects for political liberalisation still 
remained small.304 The following November King Abdullah II postponed 
parliamentary elections under the guise that more time was needed to implement 
procedures that had been mandated by a newly drafted electoral law. This 
postponement evolved into an indefinite suspension of parliament signalling that 
there were still no intentions of loosening the government’s grip over the political 
sphere.305  
 
Regardless of who became the target of condemnation further government 
controls on the political system continued through the following years. In 2001 an 
amended Article of the Penal Code, article 150, was passed by royal decree 
establishing severe penalties for those that published news that could damage 
national unity, incite crimes and hatred or jeopardise stability. The amendment to 
article 150 further built upon the 1999 Press and Publications Law – a law which 
in itself was seen as harsh. A range of other laws were passed that same year 
including the Public Gatherings Law,306 the State Security Court Law307 and the 
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Municipalities Law.308 It must be noted however, that while the introduction of 
these new or amended laws was unwelcome, the suspension of parliament was 
seen by some as a blessing in disguise. One opinion was that parliamentarians, 
who were conservative and deprived of any real power, were corrupt and 
inefficient. Others (generally within the government) viewed parliament as a 
liability which would offer only criticism of the government’s foreign policy and 
would act as a hindrance to economic reform. Former Finance Minister Michel 
Marto claimed that “the absence of parliament was essential for the introduction 
of legislative reform, because in the past gaining parliamentary approval proved 
very difficult.”309 
 
Throughout this period of consolidation of control the government was split in to 
two camps. On the one hand were those who advocated strict controls and further 
roll-back of the processes of political reform begun in 1989. According to 
Bouillon, the rationale for such a position was two-fold: first that security in the 
kingdom was under increasing threat as a result of the destabilising impact of the 
transition in leadership and the more worrying march to war by the international 
community against Iraq.310 Second was the recognition that the vast majority of 
the population were more interested in economic issues such as increased 
employment and income as opposed to democratic freedoms.311 On the other side 
were those who called for greater liberalisation and reform such as entrepreneur 
and former Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb. However, within this camp there 
was a general consensus that economic liberalisation and reform was of greater 
immediate importance. Furthermore, it was believed that this would be more 
readily accomplished under a more closed political system.312 Then Minister of 
the Royal Court, Faisal Al-Fayez, argued that once economic reform was well 
underway then democratic forces could emerge.313 Despite their different 
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objectives, both camps shared the belief that political liberalisation should be 
slow and managed.  
 
It was the advocates of the latter camp that eventually gained more influence 
within government by 2002 and in October of that year the ‘Jordan First’ 
campaign was launched.314 The launch of this reformist campaign was not solely 
as a result of the disposition of those in the government. External factors coupled 
with economic processes within Jordan also contributed. Jordan has the 
misfortune of being located in what has been termed the rough neighbourhood of 
the Middle East, sandwiched between two conflict zones. On the east lies 
embattled Iraq which by October 2002 was on the verge of being invaded for the 
second time in just over a decade. To the west lies Palestine and Israel, between 
whom the Second Intifada was raging at that time. With economic woes 
remaining largely unchanged since the late 1980s and early 1990s and with large 
parts of the population living below the poverty line (see later discussion) 
pressure on the government was mounting. As Faisal Al-Fayez had argued, 
ordinary Jordanians were more interested in their own economic well-being than 
in political freedoms. However, by 2002 neither economic nor political 
expectations were being met thus putting more pressure on the government to act 
in some manner.    
 
Throughout the build up to the third Gulf War King Abdullah II had managed 
successful brinkmanship by satisfying popular pressures at home and 
international (largely US) pressure abroad.315 At home the vast majority of the 
population was overwhelmingly against any further confrontation between Iraq 
and the international community. Abroad, Washington was applying immense 
pressure to its regional allies in the attempt to drum up political and military 
support. For Jordan this meant use of Jordanian territory in the eastern desert 
region bordering Iraq for use by Special Forces – deployed by the United States 
and United Kingdom in an effort to seek out and destroy Iraqi Scud missile 
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units.316 With these dual pressures increasing the government was aware that a 
way for the general public to express their feelings was needed. Coming away 
from a meeting with President Bush at The White House in the summer of 2002 
King Abdullah II knew that the United States would invade Iraq in the coming 
winter or spring. According to Alan George he also knew he would have to offer 
some support to this endeavour.317  
 
In order to win support from his western allies and at the same time keep the 
Jordanian street quiet Abdullah embarked on an active period of diplomacy. 
Following his meeting at the White House in 2002 Abdullah shuttled across the 
globe in an effort to drum up support for a peaceful solution to the crisis. This 
was done carefully to show his people at home that every effort was being made 
to avert war and help the Iraqi brethren (not necessarily the regime) while not 
annoying Washington. He also ensured that his government denied that there 
were US and UK troops stationed in his country beyond the acknowledged 
several hundred troops there for the defence of the kingdom – manning Patriot 
Anti-Ballistic Missile units and so on. Other measures included assuring the 
public that oil would continue to be subsidised in the event of a loss of Iraqi 
supply (which was guaranteed when war started); issuing stern warnings that 
while the public was allowed to express displeasure with events they were not 
allowed to disrupt the stability of the kingdom; and to continue to issue 
condemnations of the conflict once it had gotten underway.318  
 
As was expected, the initial military-engagement period of the conflict was over 
in a relatively short period of time. Coming as a great relief to many regimes in 
the region and especially to the Jordanian government, this meant that the storm 
had so far been weathered successfully. However, public opinion was wreathing 
and condemnation over the king’s international decisions was common.319 
Furthermore, the economy had suffered in the months leading up to the invasion 
with continuing problems in the early ‘post-war’ period. Most badly hit were 
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sectors which affected the people more directly than others. Tourism for example 
had seen a serious plunge in revenues earned leading to lower incomes and loss 
of jobs. The result was the decision made by the government, led by those who 
supported political reform first followed by economic reform, to once again 
attempt to open up the political system.320 In order to defuse the pressures 
emanating from the public parliamentary elections were announced for June 17 
2003 (less than two weeks after the official end of combat operations in Iraq). 
This was followed by the repeal of the temporary amendments to Article 150 of 
the Penal Code that were implemented in 2001.321  
 
By late summer 2003 it appeared that there were calls for further democratisation 
and political liberalisation for the years ahead. Then Foreign Minister Marwan 
Muasher in an interview conducted by the Brussels-based think tank International 
Crisis Group (ICG) claimed that the way to greater security and stability was 
through political liberalisation.322 One reason given was that Jordan needed to 
pre-empt calls for democratisation from Washington which, he claimed were 
counter-productive. The majority of the Jordanian population are untrusting of the 
Washington administration and have viewed President Bush’s insistence on 
democratisation, in the same way as other US prescriptions, as part of an 
imperialist plot.323 According to Muasher those Arab regimes which heed such 
calls are therefore seen as US stooges. Furthermore, Muasher argued that those 
who advocate true reform have subsequently been marginalised by this 
interpretation. He went on to describe Jordan’s strength as lying “in the fact that 
we are more open – politically and economically – than the rest of the region. 
This is how we managed to capture the attention of the West in the first place.”324 
It was the belief of many in the government that in order to maintain Jordan’s 
position as a reliable and competitive partner and to continue to receive economic 
support, the government must pursue greater political liberalisation.  
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Others have agreed with Muasher’s call for greater liberalisation but for differing 
reasons. The common fear seems to be that as a result of economic stagnation and 
in the absence of legitimate political means of expression Jordanians will pursue 
undemocratic means to express their frustration.325 With conflicts on two of its 
borders and with a population which is highly sensitive to these conflicts the risk 
of extremism taking root in the kingdom is very real. Some realise this including 
Ahmad Obeidat who has acted as Prime Minister, Head of the GID and director 
of the National Centre for Human Rights. Obeidat has argued that total 
democracy as well as absolute political closure would harm national security. 
Rather he argues that:  
 
The government needs to balance between risks and needs – 
between security, human rights and democracy. It is all a matter of 
wise state management – you need a vision, a strategy, a system 
and regulations. Jordan is not a new state, it has been in existence 
for more than seventy years. It should not be that worried about 
opening up politically. Regional problems are bound to be felt here 
but this should not mean that the government must place a limit on 
political openness.326 
  
Since 2003 the call by those in government such as Muasher and Obeidat has 
been heeded and greater political freedoms have been implemented. With 
economic reform well under way prior to 2003 and continuing liberalisation in 
this sphere taking place it seems that the short to medium term future holds 
further reform.  
 
Economic Reform: Structural Adjustment  
 
Following the 1989 financial crisis and economic slowdown in Jordan, 
epitomized by the 1989 default on debt repayments by the government, poverty 
and unemployment rose dramatically to unofficial figures as high as 70 percent of 
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the total population327 and 40 percent of the active labour force.328 Macro-
economic restructuring throughout the 1990s was difficult and detrimental to 
large parts of Jordanian society but was largely accomplished by the time King 
Abdullah II took the throne.329 The process of economic reform in Jordan dates 
back to the 1989 financial crisis. Through the 1980s the drop in oil prices on the 
international market led to a general slowing down of the region’s economy as a 
whole. The effect on Jordan was relatively severe with lower remittances coming 
from expatriate workers living and working in GCC states and lower demand for 
export goods and services.330 The government responded by increasing public 
spending which was financed by external borrowing in order to stimulate the 
economy. The result was counter to the set intentions, however, as external debt 
quickly expanded but the economy remained weak with high inflation and an 
increasing budget deficit.331  
 
Following the economic difficulties faced by the kingdom in 1989 came a series 
of tough economic reform measures aimed at stabilising the government’s budget 
in order to re-instate the servicing of external debt. Initially these reforms were 
prescribed by external actors such as the IMF, World Bank (WB) and various 
donor states such as the United States. As such they were not domestically 
constructed plans implemented with the sovereign intent of improving the 
economic standing of the nation’s citizens.332  
 
The reforms were centred on restoring growth and reducing economic 
imbalances. In mid-1989 the WB and IMF both supported the process. The 
former with a $150 million Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Loan 
(approved in December 1989 and closed in 1992).333 The latter through a macro-
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economic stabilization programme in the form of a Standby Arrangement. A WB 
report on the reform process initiated in 1989 states that the Jordanian 
government’s response to the crisis included three elements: 
 
1) Macroeconomic policy adjustment to reduce internal and 
external imbalances, mainly by reducing the fiscal deficit and 
maintaining a flexible and competitive exchange rate.  
 
2) Trade liberalization and industrial policy reforms to induce a 
strong supply response.  
 
3) Protection of the poor through restructuring of public 
expenditures and provision of targeted safety nets. The policy 
changes were to be accompanied by reforms of the legal and 
regulatory regimes to stimulate investment.334 
 
Reforms were directed towards four main areas of the economy. These were: 
obtaining macro-economic balance by fiscal adjustment, reducing inflation 
through tightening the monetary policy, liberalisation of the trade regime and 
protecting the poor (according to Carlos Silva-Jauregui, a task manager in the 
WB’s Social and Economic Development Sector MENA Region department, this 
latter aim was more popular within the Jordanian government than with external 
actors such as the IMF and WB).335 
 
The main problem faced by the government in 1989 was the fiscal deficit which 
had grown to record levels. The IMF supported a programme to reform the tax 
system while the WB supported programmes to cut public expenditures, 
including food subsidies. In 1988 the government’s total expenditures had topped 
49 percent of GDP.336 This figure was reduced to 39 percent by 1992 after the 
government implemented the IMF and WB backed programmes.337 Efforts 
included cutting military spending, implementing a targeting mechanism for the 
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poorest segments of society to replace food subsidies and in 1992 oil prices were 
increased, practically eliminating oil subsidies. Higher tax revenues due to 
increased trade levels and a conversion from quantitative restrictions into tariffs 
(doubling revenue from trade between 1990 and 1992) along with reduced budget 
expenditures led to a decline in the deficit. Between 1989 and 1993 the deficit 
had dropped from 18 percent of GDP to 6 percent.338  
 
With the account deficit declining, inflation rates within Jordan also declined. In 
1989 inflation had stood at approximately 26 percent.339 By 1993 following the 
implementation of broad economic reforms this figure had dropped to the 
relatively low figure of just over 4 percent. At the same time the government 
adopted a policy of tightening monetary policy which included liberalizing the 
financial sector. By decontrolling deposit and lending rates the government was 
able to avoid higher inflation and encourage short term capital inflows due to 
domestic interest rates climbing. This process was briefly interrupted by the Gulf 
Crisis and War in late 1990 and early 1991.340 However, while the crisis had 
negative effects on the Jordanian economy including the return of three hundred 
thousand expatriate workers the return of these citizens also meant the 
repatriation of savings. Coupled with the increase in capital inflows this resulted 
in foreign reserves within Jordan increasing ten-fold between 1989 and 1993.341  
 
This was significant in no small part due to the fact that the Jordanian economy 
was burdened with a large external debt. By the middle of 1990 total external 
debt accounted for 180 percent of the kingdom’s GDP. The government managed 
to reduce this figure to 132 percent of GDP by the end of 1993. 342 This was 
initially achieved mostly by pursuing policies of debt restructuring, which leads 
only to the short term relief of some of the pressure caused by debt servicing. 
However, following success in reducing the budgetary expenditures and 
increasing capital inflows and currency reserves the government was able to 
pursue more aggressive debt reduction policies by 1992. Supplementing the 
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policy of debt restructuring the government pursued market-based operations 
such as debt buybacks and debt swaps. While these policies led to a greater 
reduction of external debt they were nevertheless still limited as was realised 
towards the late 1990s.343 An increase in the ability to service external debt and 
to repay it was needed.  
 
Due to the perceived limitations on the structural adjustments discussed above 
the Jordanian government was encouraged by the IMF and WB to embark on a 
process of trade liberalisation in the mid-1990s in the hope of further stabilising 
the economy and increasing revenues through exports. In order to do this a broad 
ranging liberalisation programme was initiated. This programme had a number of 
elements, both demanded by external actors and devised by domestic policy 
planners. Before the WB would release its $150 million loan it requested that the 
majority of quantitative restrictions and import bans be removed and replaced 
with import tariffs.344 As a response to this condition of the loan the Jordanian 
government was instructed to rationalise the tariff structure in order to conform 
to the WB’s standards but at the same time to not undermine the increase in 
revenues sought after. In 1990 the vast majority of domestic price controls were 
lifted, including on food although essential commodities such as bread remained 
under a tight monetary policy to ensure that the most vital commodities remained 
available to the population. Like many other countries, Jordan at the start of the 
1990s had a fixed exchange rate which prevented depreciation of the Jordanian 
Dinar (JD). However, this policy acted as a brake on international trade levels 
and so was adjusted and a policy of a ‘managed’ floating of the JD was adopted – 
the result was an almost immediate depreciation of the JD by 50 percent. This 
policy remained until October 23 1995 when the JD was pegged to the US 
Dollar.  
 
To compliment these international trade reforms domestic adjustments were 
made. In 1991 the investment law was revised to allow for the licensing of 
domestic investment to become more efficient and less discretionary. According 
to Sabri Al-Khassib, the Head of the Research and International Agreements Unit 
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at the Amman Chamber of Commerce, this streamlining of the process led to a 
two-fold increase in the number of privately owned enterprises operating in the 
kingdom between 1989 and 1992.345 In the same year Jordan’s primary 
mechanism for financing exports, the Export Discount Facility (EDF), was 
reformed to become more accessible to exporters. However, this policy had little 
effect on increasing exports. Commercial banks were not attracted to the EDF’s 
low interest margins and rigid administrative procedures. Again, further policies 
had to be taken to improve domestic conditions for export-oriented economic 
activities and increase overall international trade.  
 
It is worth noting that while the macro-economic structural adjustments 
implemented in the first half of the 1990s extensive measures were taken to 
protect the most vulnerable segments of the kingdom’s population from any 
detrimental effects. During the period of adjustment the government employed 
two main policies aimed at meeting this end. The first policy was aimed at 
restructuring public spending so that the reduced amount of resources directed to 
the public sphere was targeted at those who needed it the most. For example, 
while military and fiscal spending for general price subsidies were reduced, 
spending on key sectors such as health and education were not.346 General food 
subsidies and price controls were removed and replaced with a rationing system 
which supplied those households with the lowest income to receive subsidies and 
other financial support.347  
 
The second policy aimed at protecting the poor from the economic shocks of the 
adjustment process was to improve the efficiency of the kingdom’s networks 
which supported the poor. The main component of this policy was the 
establishment in 1990 of the Development and Employment Fund (DEF) which 
coordinated the activities of the government and NGOs involved in poverty 
alleviation.348 However, while the policy of targeted support was relatively 
successful, the DEF was not. Initially the creation of the fund helped to win 
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support for the adjustment process and was relatively active. Over time the role 
of the fund evolved and the DEF became involved more in direct lending as 
opposed to coordinating poverty alleviation activities.  
 
In short the kingdom’s first major encounter with economic reform had been 
significant. Some successes had been seen, such as the decline in the fiscal 
budget and subsequent decline in the budgetary deficit, decreasing levels of debt 
and the resumption of debt servicing. However, overall macro-economic 
adjustment in the 1990s did not translate into high levels of economic growth or a 
general strengthening of the economy. Rather the process of structural adjustment 
allowed the Jordanian economy to recover from the immediate effects of the 
1989 financial crisis and resume servicing of its external financial obligations.349 
Efforts to strengthen the economy and press forward into the twenty-first century 
with strong economic growth were in large part missing. This was partly due to 
the fact that policies that would have led to greater economic growth were not 
pursued until the royal succession of 1999.  
 
Economic Reform: Privatisation  
 
Although macro-economic restructuring and subsequent economic policy has 
allowed the Jordanian government to resume relatively healthy external debt 
servicing overall debt remains at approximately 30 percent of GDP and stood at 
almost 50 percent at the end of 2007.350 One medium term goal professed by the 
Jordanian government is to reduce this figure. In this endeavour further economic 
restructuring is likely. According to the Jordan Investment Trust Corporation, in 
the government’s pursuit to achieve the above mentioned socio-economic goals 
as well as the pursuit of overall economic growth, attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is of prime importance.351  
 
The structural adjustment programme and macro-economic reforms employed 
through the first half of the 1990s as mentioned above were aimed at economic 
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recovery and stabilisation and not growth. In order to pursue sustained economic 
growth the Jordanian government embarked upon a process of wide ranging 
policy reforms in late 1996.352 A linchpin of this drive for economic development 
was the privatisation of government-owned enterprises and service industries. 
Implementation of this programme had been slow through the 1990s353 but began 
in earnest in 1998 with the general aim of rebalancing the role and scale of the 
public sector in the economy by reducing the government’s stake in industrial 
sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises.354 According to The Executive 
Privatisation Commission (EPC) - established in 1996 and which was initially 
called The Executive Privatisation Unit (EPU), to spearhead the privatisation 
process - the goals of the programme are: 
 
To increase the efficiency and hence production levels of privatised 
firms, creating a competitive market where demand and supply can 
freely interplay, attracting FDI, allowing the private sector to 
participate in infrastructure investments, deepening and developing 
the Jordanian financial market, and most importantly, limiting the 
government’s role to that of the regulator rather than that of the 
inefficient producer of goods and services.355 
 
Prior to 1996 the government had founded and managed most of the kingdom’s 
infrastructure, including power generation, telecommunications services, 
transport services and water supply. The government also had a major role in 
other industries such as mining and manufacturing, for example, majority shares 
in Jordan Phosphate Mines Corporation (JPMC), Arab Potash Corporation (APC) 
and Jordan Cement Factories (JCFC). The possibility of embarking on a 
privatisation programme had been discussed as early as 1989 however, the 
ongoing structural adjustment programmes along with worker resistance, 
bureaucratic red tape and an overall lack of government support prevented any 
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serious attempt at privatisation being made.356 With the structural adjustment 
programmes implemented and largely accomplished by the mid-1990s the 
Jordanian government was able to address the issue of reducing the level of 
public sector involvement in the economy.  
 
According to Taroob Al-Zu’bi, the Chief Communications Officer of the EPC, 
there have been five main methods of privatisation. The first and most common 
method has been the sale of government shares in public share holding 
companies, or Capital Privatisation.357 This has been relatively effective and the 
government has to date sold the majority of its stake holdings. A second approach 
has been to sign Management Contracts with private sector actors.358 These 
contracts usually have a relatively short initial timeframe allowing for assessment 
of the management and possible extension of the contract, as happened with the 
water and sewage systems management in the Greater Amman area. The third 
main method employed so far has been to sign Concession Agreements, or 
Exclusivity Agreements, where the private sector is given the responsibility to 
build a particular enterprise, exploit and operate it pursuant to the concession, as 
in the case of the Public Transportation Corporation (PTC) which was privatised 
in 1998.359 This latter example signifies the initial completion of the privatisation 
of a major company.  
 
Another method employed has been to sign Lease Agreements where the 
operation of a facility is leased out to a private sector actor but where the 
government remains the sole owner.360 The private sector actor will operate the 
enterprise and reap the profits in exchange for a fee paid to the government. 
Private Infrastructure Development and Operation contracts constitute the final 
approach. Of these there are four types, it is worth quoting the EPC directly here;  
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1) Build-Operate-Transfer: The private sector designs, finances, 
builds, and operates the facility over the life of the contract at the 
end of which, ownership reverts to the government. 
 
2) Build-Transfer-Operate: The private sector designs, finances and 
builds the facility then transfers it to the government while 
retaining the right to operate it for a specific period of time. 
 
3) Build-Own-Operate: The private sector designs, finances and 
builds the facility, retains ownership and operates it. 
 
4) Build-Operate-Own-Transfer: The private sector builds the 
project, owns it for a specific period, operates it and then 
relinquishes it to the public sector.361  
 
In order to successfully carry out the privatisation of inefficient and 
uncompetitive government owned enterprises and to open up public sector-
dominated industries but at the same time to utilise the revenues from such a 
programme the Jordanian government has created a legal and institutional 
framework. This framework was not drafted until 1999 after King Abdullah II 
took power and consists of three elements. An organisational structure was 
needed in order to oversee the privatisation programme and so the Higher 
Committee for Privatisation (HCP), the EPC and the Privatisation Steering 
Committees (PSC) were created. According to the WB “this form of institutional 
structure provided the right balance of effectiveness and transparency.”362 
 
A National Privatisation Strategy (NPS) was also created and ratified by 
parliament in 1999. This document acts as a general guide for the government on 
privatisation and also addresses the use of the proceeds from such a programme. 
The NPS specifies three general uses for the proceeds: “resolving the employees’ 
issues of the privatised enterprises; paying back foreign debts; and financing 
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infrastructure projects.”363 The following year the Privatisation Law (No. 25) was 
passed. It provides the procedural, legislative and institutional basis for the 
programme and allows the government to decide on the main issues of 
privatisation including the allocation of proceeds.  
 
As of the end of 2007 over sixty transactions had been completed including the 
sale of the government’s shares in fifty-four companies under the Jordan 
Investment Corporation (JIC) portfolio. The total proceeds of the privatisation 
programme equal approximately $1.3 billion (see table 4.1) while total 
investment – both domestic and FDI – have surpassed $850 million – mostly in 
the water, telecommunications, transport and power sectors.364  
 
Table 4.1: Privatisation Transactions During the Period 1998 - 2007 365 
 
The issue of how to use these proceeds has been perhaps the area of most concern 
and the legal and institutional framework briefly detailed above is focused largely 
on resolving this matter. The NPS stipulated that the proceeds should not be 
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Enterprise 
Millions of US 
Dollars 
Completion 
Date  
Cement JCFC 112 1998, 2002 
Telecom. JTC 691.5 2000, 2002 
Public Transport/Amman 0.7 1999 
Airport Duty Free Shops 60.1 
August 
2000 
Aircraft Catering Centre 20.02 
August 
2001 
Royal Jordanian Air Academy 5.8 
January 
2003 
Arab Potash Company 173 
October 
2003 
Jordan Aircraft Maintenance Company 
JorAMCo 
55.1 
January 
2005 
Total 1118.1 
  
JIC Portfolio 152 
  
Grand Total 1270.1 1998-2007 
 120 
allocated to cover the contemporary expenditures of the Treasury.366 Article 13 of 
the Privatisation Law sets out the allocation of proceeds from the privatisation 
programme. The initial step was the creation of a Privatisation Proceeds Fund 
(PPF) where all the revenues are deposited. This fund is supervised by the 
Privatisation Council (PC) and regulated and administered by the EPC. Once the 
proceeds have been deposited in the PPF they are allocated for seven different 
purposes, once again it is worth referring to the EPC directly:  
 
1) Settlement of government debts accumulated by the 
institutions or enterprises undergoing a restructuring or 
privatisation process and covering the expenses resulting from 
such a process. 
 
2) Purchase of government debts to benefit from deductions on 
these debts or to settle such debts through debt-swap deals or 
by any other method approved by the Council and consented to 
by the Council of Ministers. 
 
3) Investments in financial assets. 
 
4) Financing economic activities and new investments in 
infrastructure sectors with feasible economic and social returns 
and which will assist in achieving sustainable development, 
provided that such financing is included in the government’s 
budget. 
 
5) Re-qualifying and training employees working at institutions 
and organisations undergoing a restructuring or privatisation 
process and settlement of their ensuing financial rights. 
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6) Retrospective subscription with the Social Security 
Corporation on behalf of employees of privatised institutions 
who will become subjected to the Social Security Law. 
 
7) Proceeds of investments of the Privatisation Proceeds Fund 
shall be considered revenues for the Treasury.367 
 
At the time of writing the Jordanian government has largely followed these 
guidelines and used proceeds in six main areas. The area of most importance 
appears to have been external debt settlement with proceeds used to the sum of 
$111.827 million.368 Approximately 66 percent of the proceeds generated by the 
JICP totalling $91.1 million have been spent on recurrent expenditures of the 
general budget.369 This constitutes the second largest area of expenditure from the 
PPF. The government has also spent $64.134 million on the settlement of 
domestic banking loans including $21.449 million to the Housing Bank for Trade 
and Finance (discussed in chapter seven) and $18.721 million to the Savings 
Fund and Social Security Corporation.370 Development projects have also been a 
key area of concern for the government and have been focused upon in the course 
of the latest round of economic reform. Using PPF revenues, $63.973 million has 
been spent on projects such as the construction and maintenance of rural and 
agricultural roads ($11.63 million), the Lejoun and Corridor Water Projects 
($21.6 million) and sewerage projects ($2 million).371  
 
In terms of the rate of the privatisation of government-owned or affiliated 
corporations as well as the relative number of such entities being privatised, the 
programme as a whole has been quite successful, to the point where the WB has 
stated that it ranks as “one of, if not the most, successful in the Middle East 
region.”372 It is worth briefly highlighting some of the projects undertaken as part 
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of this programme in order to identify how the government’s policy has been 
implemented. On January 23 2000 40 percent of the government’s shares in the 
Jordan Telecommunications Company (JTC) were sold to an international 
consortium, which included France Telecom and The Arab Bank for $508 
million.373 The transaction was a fee-based management contract. A further 1 
percent of shares were allocated to the JTC employees' Provident Fund that same 
month. The following month a further 8 percent of the government’s shares were 
sold to the Jordan-based Social Security Corporation for $102 million. The 
remaining 51 percent of total shares still owned by the government were endorsed 
for sale through Initial Public Offering in 2002 with JPMorgan and the Jordan 
Investment Bank as the lead managers for the transaction. The “IPO was 
completed on October 29 2000 with the sale of 10.5 percent of JTC total shares 
whereby 3.5 percent were acquired by retail investors and 7 percent by local and 
non-Jordanian financial institutions; total proceeds amounted to around $86.2 
million.”374 Throughout the privatisation of JTC US-based Merrill Lynch acted as 
the consultant and financial advisor for the project while legal firm Macarthy, of 
Canada, was the legal consultant. As a result of the privatisation of JTC, over 
seven thousand jobs have been created and over $500 million invested in the 
telecommunications sector in Jordan. Since 2000 and the initial steps towards 
privatisation of the sector, two more telecommunications operators have 
established themselves, Mobilecom (2000) and Fastlink (2002). Total revenues 
from the project (as shown in table 4.1 above) stood at $691 million.375  
 
There are a number of other major projects that have been completed in a number 
of fields as outlined above. It would be useful in other studies to outline these 
projects and provide some form of assessment of their success and implications. 
However, for the purpose of this study the above discussion is sufficient to 
develop the analysis of contemporary Jordanian economic policy. The next 
logical step in the analysis is to examine Jordanian efforts towards trade 
liberalisation. This is the most relevant issue area in this chapter in terms of this 
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study. However, it has been the intention to create a picture of contemporary 
Jordanian interests and so the previous sections should be viewed in this light.  
 
Trade Liberalisation  
 
As part of the government’s efforts to maximise the benefits of the structural 
adjustments of the late 1980s and mid-1990s as well as to further the process of 
economic reform in order to boost economic growth, a broad ranging policy of 
external trade liberalisation through domestic legislation and international 
institutions was established in the late 1990s.376 Efforts towards greater intra-
Arab trade have been underway for many years dating back as far as 1953 and the 
establishment of a treaty between the member states of the League of Arab States 
aimed at facilitating transit of trade (one element of what is termed the first wave 
of Arab regionalism).377 Further attempts at greater Arab integration were 
pursued throughout the following decades including the 1964 creation of the Arab 
Common Market (ACM) which envisaged the elimination of all tariffs between 
Arab states.  
 
In 1981 the Agreement for Facilitation and Promotion of intra-Arab Trade was 
signed by all Arab states.378 This was followed by another declaration for the 
elimination of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured and semi-
manufactured goods. However, the impact of these and other agreements on intra-
Arab trade has been until recently, minimal, leading to what appears to be a latest 
wave of regionalism.379 The latest round of integration goes much further than 
previous attempts and it could be argued that this wave of regionalism has more 
in common with the broader processes of globalisation than regionalism and is 
powered by the increasing importance of international institutions.  
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For the Jordanian government, this wave of integration has not been ignored. 
Unlike some regional governments, such as those of the GCC states, the 
Jordanian government has been active in promoting policies aimed at greater 
economic integration with the Arab world as a whole and perhaps more 
importantly with the global economy.380 There are six main elements to the 
government’s process of trade liberalisation and economic integration. These 
elements are as follows: accession to the WTO, the Jordan-EU Association 
Agreement (JEUAA), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), the 
Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA), the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), and bilateral FTAs such as the JUSFTA. 
 
Within the government’s decision making bodies there exists a debate that dates 
back to the establishment of the latest round of trade reform in 1996. The trade 
policy issue in debate is whether the process should focus on regional or global 
integration.381 Referring back to the discussion in chapter two, there is much 
evidence that suggests that trade liberalisation and economic growth are directly 
and positively related.382 There is even more evidence that suggests that non-
discriminatory trade liberalisation leads to higher economic growth than 
preferential liberalisation.383 Preferential trade liberalisation is likely to cause a 
diversion in trade. This can include diversion away from sources of efficient 
production and lower costs to sources of less efficient production and higher 
costs. Furthermore, trade diversion could mean that access to larger or more 
lucrative markets is prevented.384 For the Jordanian government these 
implications have been considered and a non-discriminatory and broad ranging 
process of multilateral trade liberalisation has been pursued. Accession to the 
WTO is a clear indication of the government’s chosen route to trade 
liberalisation.  
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Accession to the WTO 
 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became the one-hundred and thirty-sixth 
member of the WTO on April 11 2000 following initial negotiations that began in 
late 1994.385 The accession negotiations were largely focused on the major 
economic and legislative reforms discussed above whose implementation was 
required before admission to the organisation was possible. According to the 
Jordanian Ministry of Industry and Trade the government had to make 
“amendments to the [kingdom’s] Trademarks and  Copyrights laws” and  new 
laws had to be created “on Patents, Models and Industrial Design, Integrated 
Circuits, Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition, Geographical Indications, and 
Plant Variety Protection”386 (discussed at length in chapter seven). Furthermore, 
existing laws on “Standards and Metrology, the Customs Law, General Sales Tax 
Law, and the Law on Unifying Fees and Taxes”  had to be revised in order to 
conform with WTO standards and regulations.387  
 
The Jordan-European Union Association Agreement 
 
The JEUAA is just one of a number of Association Agreements signed between 
the EU and MENA states and is just one element of the broader Barcelona 
Process between the two regions.388 The agreement also replaces the 1977 
Cooperation Agreement signed by the EU and Jordan. The JEUAA itself was 
signed November 24 1997 but was not ratified by the Jordanian Parliament until 
September 1999. The implementation of the agreement was delayed still further 
until May 15 2002 as it was not ratified by all of the then fifteen EU member 
states until that time. As an element of the process of regional integration 
between the EU and MENA the JEUAA incorporates three issue areas which are 
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of importance to greater bilateral and multilateral integration: these areas are in 
the political, economic and financial, and socio-cultural spheres.389 
 
Article three of the JEUAA states that a regular political dialogue shall be 
established between the two parties especially between the EU parliament and the 
Jordanian parliament.390 The aim of the political aspect of the agreement is to 
develop mutual understanding and cooperation between the parties with emphasis 
placed on the achievement of peace, security and human rights. Quoting the text 
directly the political dialogue aims in particular to do the following:  
 
…develop better mutual understanding and an increasing 
convergence of positions on  international issues, and in 
particular on those issues likely to have substantial effects on one 
or the other Party; enable each Party to consider the position and 
interests of the other; enhance regional security and stability; and 
promote common initiatives.391 
 
The economic component of the JEUAA aims to establish in progressive steps an 
FTA between the EU and Jordan by 2010. The agreement covers the following 
sectors: industrial and agricultural products, services, right of establishment, 
payments and movements of capital, competition, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), standards and measurements, financial cooperation, economic 
cooperation in the field of industry, agriculture and investment, transportation, 
telecommunications, science and technology, environment and tourism as well as 
energy.392 This element is based upon the provisions existing in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS). Also important to the development of links between the EU 
and MENA are socio-cultural issues. In this respect the JEUAA also has 
provisions established in order to increase the interaction between civil society 
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actors.393 Emphasis is placed upon education, training, the role of women in 
society, migrant population groups, health and cooperation in justice and home 
affairs and in particular action to combat international crime such as drug 
trafficking and international terrorism.394  
 
Significantly the JEUAA has had limited impact in both the total value and total 
quantity of trade between the Jordanian and the EU markets. Furthermore, the 
sectors within which this trade takes place have remained constant. This is 
important for two reasons. First, there is a stark contrast between the results of the 
JEUAA and the JUSFTA (discussed below) in the value and quantity of trade in 
goods and services as well as the sectors within which trade takes place. Note that 
the JEUAA is some three years older than the JUSFTA. The second way in which 
this is important is in the implications for the positive returns on FTAs for the 
Jordanian economy. The later discussion on non-state actors (chapters five, six 
and seven) engages with this anomaly and offers an explanation. Figure 4.1 
below outlines the constant nature of trade relations between Jordan and the EU.  
 
Figure 4.1 Total Jordanian Trade Levels With the EU 2001-2007395 
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A number of MENA economies are liberalising their trade regimes. However, 
there has been a distinct lack of political will and commitment to fully integrating 
with both the regional economy and the global economy. There has also been a 
serious lack of cohesion and agreement on the ways in which to pursue an 
overarching MENA free trading economy.396 This is shown by the number of 
regional economic integration projects ongoing as of late 2007. These are as 
follows; GAFTA, GCC, the Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU), and MAFTA. All of 
these preferential trade agreements have the same aim of reducing tariff and non-
tariff barriers to intra-Arab trade and promoting greater economic integration. 
However, they often overlap and contradict one another and often lose internal 
cohesion.397  
 
The largest and most comprehensive agreement, in terms of the scope of states 
involved and the range of issues dealt with is GAFTA, signed at the League of 
Arab States General Meeting on February 19 1997 in Amman.398 Jamel Zarrouk 
argues that to some extent GAFTA was created as a result of the fear that the EU-
MENA Association Agreements would divert intra-Arab trade away from the 
MENA regional economy to Europe.399 It can also be argued that GAFTA came 
as a response to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations which it was believed 
would hinder Arab access to the European economy. At the same time as the 
Barcelona Process was born so too was an Executive Programme, established 
under the auspices of the League of Arab States. The aim of the Executive 
Programme was to revive the 1981 Agreement for Facilitation and Promotion of 
Trade, which had largely been abandoned. It was realised that the main flaw of 
the 1981 agreement was that it was merely a statement of intent and did not 
include any concrete steps or targets for implementation. GAFTA was established 
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to reduce traditional barriers to intra-Arab trade at the rate of 10 percent per year 
with the end target being 0 percent tariff on all intra-Arab trade by 2010.400  
 
However, progress in implementing the negotiated steps towards tariff reduction 
in GAFTA since 1998 has been interrupted and unequal.401 Nevertheless on 
January 1 2005 the full removal of customs duties on all merchandise traded 
between the member states came into effect. Bernard Hoekman and Jamel Zarouk 
claim that the role of the Jordanian government, and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade in particular, was instrumental in the early stages of negotiating and 
implementing GAFTA. The result of Jordan’s involvement has been a three-fold 
increase in trade exchange between the Jordanian market and those of the other 
member states of GAFTA402 (see table 4.2 below).  
 
Table 4.2: Jordanian Trade Levels in US$ Millions with GAFTA Members403 
Year Imports Exports Total Balance 
1993 719.76 411.2 1130.96 -308.56 
1994 749.11 482.2 1231.31 -266.91 
1995 854.1 642.13 1496.23 -211.97 
1996 1039.2 674.3 1713.5 -364.9 
1997 931.12 764.4 1695.52 -166.72 
1998 716.4 634.4 1350.8 -82 
1999 788.8 570.9 1359.7 -217.9 
2000 1077.25 580.13 1657.38 -497.12 
2001 1147.9 1082.1 2230 -65.8 
2002 1268.49 1229.26 2497.75 -39.23 
2003 1571.8 1235.65 2807.45 -336.15 
2004 1702.3 1297.02 2999.32 -405.28 
2005 1759.05 1311.5 3070.55 -447.55 
2006 2064 1433 3497 -631 
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The Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area 
 
As a result of what Hassan Al-Atrash and Tarek Yousef call the uneven 
development of GAFTA404 a number of other regional trade agreements have 
been signed by various members of the original seventeen Arab states who 
created GAFTA as well as other states. The Jordanian government signed the 
MAFTA agreement (also known as the Aghadir Process) on February 25 2005. 
The agreement involves Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan and was initially 
agreed at a meeting between the foreign ministers of the above mentioned states 
in Aghadir, Morocco on May 8 2001.405 The Aghadir Declaration has three key 
objectives which are as follows: 
 
1) To enhance mutual Arab cooperation and to further develop the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement and the efforts exerted to 
establish an Arab Common Market. 
 
2) To establish a strong economic alliance responsive to 
challenges of sustainable economic development and global 
economic developments. 
 
3) To arrive at a proper mechanism for trade liberalisation 
between the Mediterranean-Arab countries and the EU, and 
which will be compatible with contemporary economic trends 
in both the regional and international arenas.406 
 
It at first seems confusing as to why a secondary regional economic integration 
initiative would be taken three years after the GAFTA agreement was signed and 
came into effect. A closer analysis of the MAFTA agreement though shows that 
this initiative while having the same aim of reducing trade barriers within the 
MENA region has two main differences to GAFTA. Firstly, MAFTA is relatively 
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exclusive in the sense that it includes Arab states on the Southern Mediterranean 
(granted Jordan does not actually have a Mediterranean coastline).407 Second, the 
medium to long term intention is to increase the prospects specifically for EU-
Arab integration. In this respect, the initiative aims at developing a single block 
with which negotiations with the EU can commence.408 It is worth noting that 
GAFTA also seeks to create a single block with which other regions could 
negotiate economic cooperation. The creation of MAFTA signifies a desire of the 
member states’ governments to further encourage the process of greater 
integration with the global economy – a process which is rather slow in the 
context of GAFTA.409  
 
The Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement  
 
Due to the relevance of the JUSFTA to this current piece of work a slightly more 
in-depth look is necessary here than has been granted to the other FTAs signed by 
Jordan outlined above. However, as it is just one element of trade relations 
between the two states (as will be shown in the following chapters) only an 
introduction and brief evaluation is required here. Thus the following section 
discusses the origins of the JUSFTA, a breakdown of the main elements, a 
summary of its implementation up to the point of this work and the overall 
impacts seen thus far on US-Jordan trade levels in terms of total value and 
quantity.  
 
Origins 
 
One could argue that the JUSFTA is merely a reward to Jordan by the United 
States for supporting US policy in the MENA region. During an interview held in 
Amman in December 2006, Yousef Al-Shamali, the Deputy Director of the 
Foreign Trade Policy Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
described this position as viewing the FTA as granting Jordan access to the 
world’s largest market as a form of support for the Jordanian government’s pro-
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western stance.410 This assumption would be based on the belief that the 
Jordanian economy will benefit by greater exports to the US market – a 
development that is seen as contributing to economic growth and employment in 
Jordan.411 This may all be true: for certain the fact that Jordan was the first Arab 
state to sign an FTA with the United States and only the fourth globally did have 
something to do with the support the Jordanian government has given the United 
States over the past decade or so. This support has come in the forms of 
cooperation in military missions in the region and diplomatic and economic 
efforts to promote stability in the Palestinian territories. However, one must not 
accept this interpretation without delving deeper into the FTA’s origins.  
 
Accepting the argument above prevents the researcher from examining a number 
of other factors that may have been involved in the creation and ratification of the 
JUSFTA. For one, the position of the United States should not be seen simply as 
a reward for an ally. As mentioned above Jordan was only the fourth country 
globally to sign an FTA with the United States. This alone adds more importance 
to the FTA. To reward the Jordanian government’s cooperation and political 
stance, the United States need only extend the numerous grants given Jordan 
under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) project 
there.412 Or simply provide the Jordanian military with new or upgraded 
equipment as happened in 1996 as a result of the signing of the Jordan-Israel 
peace treaty in 1994.413 Rather it is the case that there are overarching factors 
which the Bush Administration took into account when ratifying the JUSFTA.  
 
The JUSFTA was a first in many ways in US trade policy. It was the first with an 
Arab country and only the second in the MENA region – the first being with 
Israel. It also was the first time a bilateral FTA between any states included 
provisions for labour, the environment and IPRs.414 As will be shown below and 
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in later chapters the impact of the JUSFTA on trade levels between the two states 
has been significant and has evolved into a model for FTAs between the United 
States and other MENA states. This latter point is perhaps the most compelling in 
light of the position of the US government towards the MENA region and its 
current political, military and economic activity there. In the chapter four it is 
shown that the Bush Administration has spear-headed a comprehensive change in 
US-policy towards the region. The United States wishes to transform its relations 
with the MENA region.415 In this way, the JUSFTA was not merely a reward but 
an initial step on the way to transforming economic relations with the MENA 
region. If this is true then the ‘reward’ is greater for the United States than for 
Jordan - this will be discussed in more depth in the following chapters.  
 
What is also important and often overlooked in the discussion of the JUSFTA is 
the position and contribution of the Jordanian government in the formation of this 
agreement. It is often assumed that the Jordanian government was handed out 
charity and gratefully took it. However, this view only hinders a deeper analysis 
of the agreement and its implications. As has been shown above, and indeed has 
been the purpose of this chapter, the interests and foreign and trade policy of the 
Jordanian government have undergone a transformation in the last decade. Pursuit 
of membership in the WTO, the signing of multiple bilateral (such as the Jordan-
Singapore FTA of May 16 2004) and multilateral FTAs (GAFTA, MAFTA, 
JEUAA) have been a priority of the Jordanian government. The Ministry of 
Industry and Trade has transformed Jordanian foreign trade policy since 1997 and 
pushed for greater economic liberalisation and reform. As part of this process, 
negotiations for the JUSFTA were launched in 1998 under the Clinton 
Administration – the JUSFTA was in fact finalised while the Clinton 
Administration was still in office and the Bush Administration merely ratified 
it.416 The desire for greater access to the US-market went hand in hand with the 
overall diversification of Jordanian foreign trade. The results of the agreement 
with the United States have been very significant for the Jordanian economy as 
will be shown below. However, the greater significance lies in the pursuit of trade 
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liberalisation and the repositioning of the Jordanian economy in the global 
economy as a result of this process (to be discussed in the following chapters).   
 
Outline of the FTA 
 
With regards to trade in goods, the FTA requires the removal of all tariffs by 
2010. The transition to 0 percent tariffs is scheduled in four main stages as shown 
in table 4.3 below. The exception is a list of two-hundred and fifty Jordanian 
products which were granted immediate 0 percent tariff access to the US-
market.417  
 
With regards to trade in services Jordan already had complete access to the US 
market at the time the FTA came into effect.418 The United States however did 
not have reciprocal access to the Jordanian market. The FTA calls for the total 
liberalisation of this market in Jordan for access to US-based and US-affiliated 
corporations over a ten year transitional period. The sectors to be liberalised 
include: energy distribution, convention services, printing and publishing, courier 
services, audiovisual, education, environmental, financial, health services, 
tourism, recreation and transport services (an assessment of trade in financial 
services is the focus of chapter seven).419 The agreement also stipulates in annex 
2.2 that 35 percent of the value of any good that is traded between the two 
economies must originate in the exporting country.  
 
Table 4.3: Removal of tariffs between Jordan and the USA420 
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2000 Tariff Level Phase-out Period 
<5% 2 years 
5%-10% 4 years 
10%-20% 5 years 
>20% 10 years 
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Implementation  
 
The JUSFTA came into effect on December 17 2001 and has seen success in the 
implementation of the phased reduction in trade barriers. The target year of 2010 
to have eliminated all barriers to trade between the two economies looks set to be 
met. To summarise, tariffs on all goods outlined in the agreement have been 
reduced according to schedule: unhindered access to the Jordanian services 
market has been granted to US-based corporations; studies have been completed 
according to the labour and environment provisions of the agreement and joint 
committees established; and the dispute mechanism (although not tested) has 
been confirmed.421 The impacts have been significant and have transformed 
Jordan-US trade relations in terms of value, quantity and to a certain extent 
sectors involved. As can be seen from the tables below the overall value and 
quantity of trade between the two markets has increased from $568.2 million in 
2001 (the last year before the FTA came into effect) to a total of $2.1851 billion 
in 2007, and is estimated to rise to approximately $2.4 billion in 2008.422 
Furthermore, while traditionally the United States held a surplus trade balance 
with Jordan ($109.8 million in 2001) since the FTA came into effect the trade 
balance has been in Jordan’s favour ($8 million in 2002 and $472.7 million in 
2007).423  
 
An analysis of the sectors in which this trade has taken place and within which 
this growth in trade has been witnessed is important and revealing. It offers an 
insight into the nature of trade relations between the two economies and will 
provide the basis for the analysis of the impact of non-state actors in Jordan-US 
trade in the following chapters. The main Jordanian exports to the US market are 
in the following sectors: textiles and clothing, Dead Sea cosmetics, orthopaedic 
appliances, olive oil, chemical fertilizers, paints and varnishes, luggage, 
antibiotics, household appliances and articles of jewellery.424 Other sectors which 
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appear to be on the rise in total export value are phosphates, aluminium bars and 
insecticides.425  
 
Table 4.4: Jordan Trade Levels in US$ Millions with The United States 2000-
2007426 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
2000 73.3 316.9 -243.6 
2001 229.2 339 -109.8 
2002 412.4 404.4 +8.0 
2003 673.5 492.4 +181.0 
2004 1,093.45 51.5 +541.9 
2005 1266.8 644.2 +622.7 
2006   1422.1 650.3 +771.7 
2007 1328.9 856.2 +472.7 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The aim of this chapter has been to discuss state-level facilitation of trade in 
Jordan. This has been done by tracing the changes in the main interests in 
contemporary Jordanian domestic, foreign and trade policy and the domestic and 
international environment within which these take place. Towards this endeavour 
a number of key interests and processes have been identified. These signify a 
break from traditional interests which have been largely focused on national 
security and regime survival. An overarching shift has been made in the key 
objectives of Jordanian decision-making. With an analysis of the major policy 
directions taken by the Jordanian government over the past decade it can be 
discerned that the main policy focus is now on issues of economic reform and 
international cooperation which are aimed at achieving economic growth and 
sustained development. It must be noted, however, that issues and interests of an 
economic nature are directly linked in an interdependent relationship with 
political issues and interests. One element of the reform pursued has been to 
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reform the regulatory framework within which trade takes place to facilitate 
greater levels of trade between Jordan and international markets in the anarchic 
international system. This has been done by engaging with international 
institutions in the form of both IOs, such as membership of the WTO and regimes 
such as the GAFTA and JUSFTA.   
 
This transformation from security to economic interests dates back to the mid-
1990s. However, with the ascension to the throne of King Abdullah II came a re-
configuration of how government interests in Jordan are formulated. This has led 
to subsequent reform-oriented governments which have pursued economic reform 
more aggressively in the form of structural adjustment, privatisation and the 
liberalisation of trade. The implications of this reorientation for the political 
economy of trade relations between the United States and Jordan have been 
significant and will remain so in the medium to long term future.  
 
As outlined in chapter one this study is not state-centric and in fact aims to 
diversify the study of actors in trade relations. However, it is important to include 
the relevant state actors – or national governments – as part of the analysis. The 
Jordanian government is one of the central actors impacting trade between the 
United States and Jordan. This impact comes in many ways but the most 
important here are in the forms of government control of state borders, 
administration and the creation and enforcement of international agreements. In 
this way the government of Jordan has adopted a policy direction which has 
overtly facilitated trade. By pursuing economic liberalisation and reform the 
government has attempted to develop an environment where economic activity 
can evolve, seeing this as being in the state’s best interest. By creating a more 
transparent political environment states can attract economic activity. Coupled 
with privatisation this political reform has led to greater inward investment and 
economic activity. The government’s efforts at structural adjustment and trade 
liberalisation have complemented this process and have spawned greater 
economic integration with the international economy thus facilitating trade – a 
key goal in the pursuit of economic growth.  
 
 138 
As this and the following chapter show the governments of the United States and 
Jordan have pursued policies aimed at facilitating trade between the two states 
which have culminated in the JUSFTA. This agreement is an integral element in 
the regulatory regime governing bilateral trade. While both governments have 
pursued their respective national interests, these over-lap and have resulted in a 
synthesis of interests in the overall facilitation of trade. In the case of Jordan links 
between and the interdependence of economic and political issues at the domestic 
and international levels have shaped a set of state interests. Full rationality is not 
assumed in state identification of interests and the decisions taken in order to 
pursue national goals. However, the analysis above presents the argument that the 
Jordanian government has identified various state interests and has generated 
policy decisions which it is believed will achieve these goals. Furthermore, these 
policies include as a main element the reform of political and economic forms of 
governance at the domestic level and the engagement with international 
institutions at the international level.  
 
The Jordanian government has in the past decade and a half or so pursued a slow 
and uneven process of political liberalisation as well as macro-economic 
structural adjustment, privatisation and engagement with international 
institutions. While there are unique characteristics to all of these policy areas they 
have one broad common characteristic. They are all, in one form or another, 
aimed at achieving economic growth and stability. Facilitating trade is a key 
element in fostering economic growth in Jordan and the engagement with 
international institutions as a means of inter-state and inter-market cooperation is 
a pivotal component of this facilitation.  
 
The assumption that international institutions encourage cooperation and stability, 
offering a level of governance of international relations in an international system 
which is characterised largely by anarchy seems to be less important in Jordanian 
policy making than the benefits to economic growth through international trade. 
This would suggest that liberal economic thought and the importance of 
international institutions in facilitating trade are more important in understanding 
the Jordanian government’s involvement in IOs and trade regimes. A similar 
discussion of US interests, foreign and trade policies and involvement in 
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international institutions follows in the next chapter. This analysis presents a 
clearer assessment of state actor belief in the utility of international institutions in 
fostering cooperation and stability in international relations. Broadly speaking the 
United States has different interests to Jordan and different policies are pursued in 
order to achieve these goals. However, the engagement with international 
institutions and with Jordan in these institutions is a key convergence of the two 
states’ policies. The following chapter thus develops, in line with the discussion 
in this chapter, the argument that cooperation between Jordan and the United 
States through international institutions is overall a positive-sum game but with 
multiple levels of zero-sum and positive-sum games. 
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 Chapter Four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State-Facilitation of Trade: US Interests and Trade 
Policy  
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Introduction 
 
This chapter completes the analysis of state actor facilitation of trade between 
Jordan and the United States. The focus here is on the continuities in US interests 
in the MENA region and Jordan, and changes in foreign and economic policies 
there. The main argument here is that US foreign and economic policies to the 
region are in fact largely one and the same and have been used in conjunction 
with each other to pursue policy goals and interests. These goals and interests 
have remained largely constant but major foreign and economic policy directions 
have changed - as is exemplified by the move towards bilateral economic 
integration through international institutions and trade liberalisation.  
 
There are two broad categories which need to be discussed in order to understand 
US facilitation of trade with Jordan. These are firstly, US interests and second US 
foreign and economic policies. This chapter is therefore constructed in four main 
sections. The first section offers a brief discussion of the three main US policy 
goals with regards to the MENA region and Jordan. The second section then 
offers historical examples of US policy in pursuit of these interests from the onset 
of the Cold War to the present. This section demonstrates the differences between 
policies which rest upon military or hard power and those which rest upon soft 
power and international institutions.  
 
Understanding broader trends in US trade policy is essential to the discussion of 
US-Jordan trade policy and so must be included at this stage of the thesis. Section 
three thus offers an analysis of US trade policy as a whole and not simply to 
Jordan or the MENA region. The move from focusing on multilateral trade 
liberalisation to bilateral liberalisation since the mid-1990s is discussed here. The 
following section then develops an assessment of US trade policy to the MENA 
region as a whole and how US-Jordan trade policy fits in to this adding to the 
discussion of the JUSFTA included in the previous chapter.  
 
A concluding section then summarises the main policy goals and interests the 
United States has had with regards to the MENA region and Jordan, as well as 
contemporary US trade policy. A conclusion of how US-Jordan trade policy is 
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shaped by these interests and policies is then offered. What this section does not 
do is offer an overall summary of US foreign economic policy or trade relations. 
This is an important issue area, however, this chapter exists to serve a much more 
specific function within this this particular argument. So more general issues of 
US external economic policy are only touched upon to the extent that they make 
sense in terms of this discussion. To do otherwise would be a large, and 
unnecessary, discussion. 
 
US Interests in the MENA Region 
 
It is possible to identify three core interests that the United States has in the 
MENA region which act as demands and constraints on US policy there. It must 
be made clear that the United States, as both state and market of non-state actors, 
has an incalculable range of interests with regards to the states and markets of the 
MENA region. However, for the purpose of discussing US foreign and economic 
policy in the region three core interests are primary and dominant. These interests 
have developed since the late nineteenth century and have grown in importance 
since the 1950s.427  
 
The first core interest to develop was access to the region’s markets for US 
exports of goods and capital as well as markets to import from.428 This interest 
emerged as the first major US policy interest in the region and has remained 
relatively constant. The second core interest has been the maintenance of secure 
access to the region’s natural resources – mostly oil and gas.429 Here it must be 
noted that access to these resources for the broader global economy has been as 
important to the United States as securing access for the US economy. This 
interest developed from the early twentieth century but was not overly significant 
until the 1930s. The final core interest emerged after the 1950s as the MENA 
states became independent from European patrons and the former imperial 
powers largely withdrew from the region. The subsequent power vacuum, 
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growing importance of oil and gas in the global economy and instability in inter-
state relations that ensued led to the US interest of creating stable and cooperative 
relationships with the states of the region.430 This third core policy goal has 
developed in large part in order to achieve the first two policy interests (and 
during the Cold War reinforced broader US policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union). 
 
Throughout this period of core US interests and especially after the third core 
interest of achieving inter-state cooperation, Jordan has been less important than 
some states, such as Saudi Arabia. However, following a series of developments 
which resulted in a decrease in US-friendly regimes in the region (discussed 
below), Jordan became a more significant potential partner for the United 
States.431 Since the 1990s Jordan has developed into one of the more important 
states for US-MENA cooperation. This has mostly been due to worsening 
relations between the United States and other states in the region since the 1990s 
(such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen) as well as instability in others which otherwise 
maintain healthy relationships with the United States (such as Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia).432 Thus while Jordan only represents a small market (and prior to 2001 
trade with the United States was insignificant) and possesses no natural resources 
of significance, the importance of Jordan in inter-state cooperation and regional 
stability have made US policy to Jordan partly synonymous with broader US-
MENA policy. The following discussion offers examples of how US policy in 
pursuit of its core interests has developed and how US-Jordan policy has been 
impacted. 
  
The Development of US-MENA Policy  
 
The United States, while arguably the most influential and important external 
actor in the MENA region, has not had core interests in the region for much more 
than seventy years. While some, such as Douglas Little,433 would argue this is not 
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the case and US interests and policy goals in the region date back to the mid- to 
late-nineteenth century, one must examine the commitment of the United States 
to pursuing its interests in the region over time. Let us start in the late eighteenth 
century when the newly independent United States was far from possessing the 
capabilities and resources of the great European powers of the time.  One of the 
areas of most disparity was in naval power. The United States did not possess a 
sufficient naval capacity at that time and as a result could not protect its shipping. 
Britain had formerly guarded American shipping while it was a colony but that 
privilege had been revoked following the American Revolution in 1776.434 By the 
turn of the nineteenth century US shipping in the Western Mediterranean and 
Eastern Atlantic had to be protected by relying on payments of goods and money 
to the Barbary States of the North African coast.435 However, such agreements 
were constantly breaking down either because the United States did not pay on 
time or because the Barbary States raised their demands.436  
 
An action of this kind by the Caramanli ruler of Tripoli in 1801 prompted a war 
between the United States and Tripoli that lasted until 1805 as well as a series of 
wars with the broader Barbary Coast that lasted until 1815. The most famous 
event of the war was the march from Alexandria to Tripoli by the US consul in 
Tripoli, William Eaton, and a small number of US Marines.437 This expedition 
was ultimately a failure but it signified the first US military engagement in the 
region and a significant commitment to pursuing policy goals. General Eaton (as 
he was later entitled) was able to redeem his initial lack of success when in 1815 
the newly formed US Navy was able to send a squadron to Algiers under 
Commodore Decatur and secure a favorable treaty from the Algerians thus ending 
US reliance on ‘protection’ payments.438  
 
                                                 
434
 See Allison, R. J., 2000, The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 
1776-1815, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
435
 Ibid. 
436
 Mansfield, P., 1992, The Arabs, Clays Ltd, St Ives Plc., pp: 113-14. 
437
 Thus the origin of the opening line of the Marine Hymn: ‘From the halls of Montezuma to the 
shores of Tripoli’.  
438
 Allison, R. J., 2000. 
 145 
The following century was not, however, overly characterised by active US 
policy making or engagement in the region.439 Unlike the European powers which 
had ventured into the quagmire of the region in the previous decades and 
remained involved440 the United States remained largely detached from the 
region. This had more to do with broader isolationist tendencies within US 
government.441 Broader US foreign policy during the nineteenth century reflected 
the tendency to remain disengaged from international affairs except for the 
promotion abroad of the principles on which the American nation was founded. 
Thus John Quincy Adams, who would become the sixth President of the United 
States in 1825, in an 1821 address warned of seeking ‘Monsters to Destroy’ and 
greater involvement in the broader world.442 During the first half of the twentieth 
century US interests in the MENA region were significant. However, US policy 
toward the region remained less active than that of European powers and much 
less vigorous than US policy towards other regions such as South America or 
South East Asia.443  
 
It is more appropriate to identify US interests in the MENA region and then 
discuss how vigorously these have been pursued through foreign and economic 
policy to determine how and when they became central in US foreign policy 
overall. Thus the following section highlights key periods of US policy to the 
region as a whole and demonstrates some of the policies taken in pursuit of the 
three core US interests. It is important to note that there is a distinct difference 
between the two main types of US policy to the region. The first is characterised 
by hard power in the form of military power and coercion. The second form of 
policy is characterised by what Joseph Nye has termed soft power444 in the form 
of liberal institutions and integration. Both forms, however, demonstrate the 
commitment of the United States to pursuing its interests in the MENA region.  
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Soviet Influence and US Responses in the 1950s and 1960s  
 
By the onset of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war both the US government and academic 
scholars had acknowledged that the MENA region was increasingly important in 
world politics. In the inaugural issue of The Middle East Journal, the first 
American scholarly quarterly that was established to study the contemporary 
Middle East, it was declared that “the region was now ‘very near’ the United 
States, both in point of time-distance and with respect to the United States’ new 
involvement there in questions of power politics.”445 Yet, even with the 
realisation of the strategic, economic and political importance of the MENA 
region, US policy towards the region remained to a large extent non-committal 
until the 1950s.446 
 
The importance of the MENA region to the United States increased further 
following the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. However, this was not due to any 
normative response to the plight of the Jewish nation. Instead it had more to do 
with an assessment of the utility of securing access to the region’s resources and 
markets, in no small part in the pursuit of US supremacy and the defeat of 
international Communism.447 In the 1950s and 1960s the United States was 
increasingly concerned with surging Soviet influence in the MENA region and a 
perceived threat to US allies and interests there. 448  This concern was justified by 
two key assumptions. The first was that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) was an expansionist power whose motivations while ideologically based 
were nothing more than imperial designs and confrontational to the West.449 The 
second was that the strategic interests of the Arab states would leave them 
susceptible to Soviet influence if the United States did not present itself and its 
support as a second option.450  
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Developments following the end of the Second World War and their 
interpretation by US scholars, analysts and politicians led to the embedded 
assumption that the USSR did pose a threat to US interests.451 As a result of this 
interpretation of the international political environment the policy of Containment 
was conceived and implemented. George F. Kennan a former advisor, diplomat, 
political analyst, and historian, is regarded as the author of the Containment 
strategy.452 By analysing Soviet foreign policy, traditions, ideology and Russian 
history Kennan argued that the USSR was an expansionist power.453 Furthermore, 
regardless of its historical interests, Kennan argued that the USSR would pursue 
new avenues of expansion in any region of the world – including the MENA 
region.454 
 
The United States was increasingly concerned with the rapid increase in Soviet 
influence in the MENA region throughout the 1950s and 1960s.455 This concern 
was coupled with the realisation in the 1940s that the Arab world was 
strategically important to the West and the United States in particular for a 
number of reasons. First, in the geographical sense the Arabs sit astride the Suez 
Canal, besides the Straits of Gibraltar, and they control the northern approaches 
to the Indian Ocean.456 Second, because a small percentage of the region’s people 
control a vast amount of the world’s oil and gas reserves.457  Regardless of the 
growing US interest in maintaining the MENA region independent of the 
Communist sphere of influence – if not within the US sphere – Soviet 
advancements were made. In late 1955 it was revealed that Egypt under Colonel 
Gamal Abdul Nasser had negotiated a massive arms deal with Czechoslovakia - 
tantamount to a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal.458 Egypt was able to purchase some 
two hundred tanks and other advanced weapons systems. This arms deal signalled 
the gradual opening up of the Soviet arsenal first to Egypt and subsequently also 
                                                 
451
 Flemming, D. F., 1961, The Cold War and Its Origins: 1917 - 1960, New York: Doubleday 
Publishers.  
452
 Gaddis, J. L., 1998, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
453
 Kennan, G., 1986, p: 888. 
454
 Ibid. 
455
 Flemming, D. F., 1961. 
456
 Ambrose, S., and Brinkley, D., 1997, pp: 254-255. 
457
 Yergin, D., 1991, The Epic Quest for Oil: Money and Power, London: Simon and Schuster.  
458
 Schlaim, A., 2000, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, London: Penguin Books, p: 
127. 
 148 
to Syria and Iraq.459 Along with severely altering the balance of power in the 
region, this arms deal allowed the Soviet Union to develop a foothold where it 
previously had to accept western exclusivity.  
 
As a result of the announcement of the Czechoslovakian arms deal then Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles offered the Egyptians US aid for the Aswan High 
Dam in return for a rebuke of the arms deal and future Soviet assistance. By 
February 1956 Nasser was ready to sign an agreement, however, Dulles had 
trouble selling the project to the United States.460 Pro-Israeli politicians 
denounced the dam, southern Congressmen wondered why the United States 
should build a dam that would allow the Egyptians to produce more cotton thus 
threatening their industries and the Cabinet feared supporting the project would 
unbalance the budget.461 The matter was made worse when in April 1956 Nasser 
formed a military alliance with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen and refused to 
cancel the Czechoslovakian arms deal.462 For Secretary Dulles there was only one 
option – to withdraw the backing of the Aswan High Dam. He had believed at the 
time that the Russians would not be able to take the United States’ place and back 
the dam project due to a lack of technical and financial capabilities.463 However, 
the Russians had both capabilities and began work on the project at the invitation 
of Nasser in 1957.  
 
With thousands of Russian technicians and engineers and their families as well as 
large amounts of Soviet money now in Egypt a firm foothold in the region had 
been established. The US position in the MENA region was not strengthened nor 
emulated by the pan-Arab sentiments emanating from Egypt. Nasser continued to 
spread propaganda for Arab unity and socialism while continuing to take 
increasing amounts of Soviet economic and military aid.464 Secretary of State 
Dulles and President Eisenhower grew increasingly concerned that the Soviet 
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Union would move into the region and fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of 
the European powers and were convinced this must not be allowed to happen.465 
 
In light of this expansion of Soviet influence in the region a new foreign policy 
doctrine was called for. In a message given to Congress on January 5 1957 then 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the Eisenhower Doctrine which stated 
that the United States would use armed force upon request in response to 
imminent or actual aggression from Communist forces in the Middle East.466 
Furthermore, countries that took stances opposed to Communism would be given 
aid in various forms.467 The military provisions of the doctrine were applied in 
the Lebanon Crisis in the following year. The intervention in Lebanon perfectly 
illustrated Eisenhower’s methods and the solidification of US strategic policy 
towards the MENA region. It was a unilateral action not approved by the UN that 
was undertaken in haste and with the aim of supporting an undemocratic 
government that had very little popular support amongst its own people.468 The 
Lebanon intervention was indeed a far cry from the normative policies employed 
by the Wilson Administration. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the 
intervention in Lebanon demonstrated the importance of US interests in the 
region and the significance of US policies aimed at securing these interests.   
 
Premier Khrushchev had not wanted to escalate the situation in the region 
following the US action in Lebanon and so refused Nasser’s request for more aid 
in 1958.469 Khrushchev realised that the US action was taken to protect its oil 
interests in the region which were extremely important to the West and not so 
important to the USSR.470 However, Khrushchev was also not willing to resist 
exploring further avenues for involvement in the Middle East at a time when the 
Soviets were making progress in military and strategic parity with the United 
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States.471 Pressures on US policy were increased when in late 1957 US 
newspapers discovered and published the findings of a committee headed by H. 
Rowan Gaither Jr., of the Ford Foundation. The Gaither Report concluded that 
Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) was increasing at a much faster pace than 
that of the United States, that the Russians were spending as much on developing 
heavy industries and military forces as the United States and that by 1959 the 
Soviets might be able to launch an attack on the continental United States with 
over one hundred ICBMs carrying megaton-sized nuclear weapons.472 As a result 
of the growing pressures and concerns Eisenhower increased the US military 
presence in the MENA region. He dispersed strategic bombers and installed 
medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) armed with nuclear warheads in 
Turkey.473 These policies were further embedded by the 1967 Six Day War and 
the deepening relations between the USSR and Egypt, Syria and Iraq that 
followed.  
 
Idealism and Realpolitik During the 1970s 
 
In November 1976 Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Gerald Ford to become the 
President of the United States. While the preceding decade of US foreign policy 
had been characterised by the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger and confrontational 
doctrines such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, Carter’s foreign policy would initially 
be idealistic and Jeffersonian.474 He did not regard Communism as the chief 
enemy and argued that the United States had become too fearful of the perceived 
Communist threat. Instead he argued that the United States had given too much 
support for corrupt and dictatorial right-wing governments around the world as a 
result of its policy of Containment.475  
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Idealism rather than strategic imperative would be the core of Carter’s US foreign 
policy. Carter represented a return to normative principles such as the protection 
of universal human rights as well as the right to self-determination and the respect 
of the rule of law whether domestic or international. With regards to the MENA 
region this entailed settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through establishing a 
viable and secure Palestinian state, the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel 
and her neighbours, and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee crisis.476 However, 
Carter was shaken when in December 1979 some eighty-five thousand Soviet 
troops invaded Afghanistan to support the existing pro-Moscow government there 
which could not suppress a growing Muslim insurgency. Carter went as far as to 
declare that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted “the most serious 
threat to world peace since the Second World War.477  
 
Fearful of a threat to western oil supplies Carter backed away from the SALT II 
talks, announced that the restrictions on CIA activity abroad would be lifted and 
declared a Carter Doctrine for South West Asia. Defining the Persian Gulf region 
as an area of vital importance to the United States, Carter announced that he 
would repel any Soviet assault there by any means necessary – meaning the use 
of military force, including nuclear weapons.478 This stark contrast with the 
idealistic foreign policy Carter had intended to formulate and implement when he 
came to office was further influenced by other events taking place in the MENA 
region.  
 
In an unexpected turn one of Carter’s aims, that of securing peace in the Middle 
East, became a sincere possibility. In December 1977 then Egyptian President 
Anwar Al-Sadat went to Israel to speak directly to the Israeli Parliament. This 
was an act of great courage that was helped by Carter’s efforts to mediate 
between the Israelis and the Arabs. Sadat also realised that Egypt could not afford 
another war with Israel and was incapable of removing the Israelis from the Sinai 
Peninsula by force.479 In the fall of 1978, Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime 
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Minister Menachin Begin to the Presidential retreat at Camp David. In almost two 
weeks of intensive discussions there were five issues on the table: Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, West Bank of the Jordan 
River, and East Jerusalem and recognition of the PLO as the legitimate 
representation of the Palestinian people. In return Israel would receive 
recognition of the right to exist in peace and security from her Arab 
neighbours.480 However, only the issue of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and 
subsequent Egyptian guarantees of peace could be agreed upon and the talks 
reached an impasse. Undeterred Carter made a sudden trip to the Middle East in 
early 1979 during which he persuaded Sadat and Begin to sign a peace treaty 
resulting in a staged Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.481  
 
Carter’s idealism had paid off. However, it was the very conclusion of a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel that further solidified the lack of stability and 
peace in the remainder of the Middle East and made the pursuit of US policy 
goals there unachieved. The Arab states had been split into two camps and 
Israel’s position strengthened as a result. This led to the inability of the remaining 
Arab states to bargain and achieve at least some of their goals. Without achieving 
the necessary goals it would be impossible for the Arabs to negotiate peace with 
Israel.482 Israel in the mean time was rewarded not only with peace with Egypt 
but also a massively improved negotiating position from which point they could 
engage in negotiations if it best suited them or not if the likely outcomes of 
negotiations would be mediocre.483  
 
In the same year as the Egypt-Israel peace treaty events farther to the east also 
shook the foundations of US foreign policy. Since 1953, the year in which the 
CIA was involved in a coup to restore the Shah to power in Iran, the United 
States had strongly supported Iran. Eisenhower was perhaps the most enthusiastic 
supporter of the Shah while Kissinger and Nixon viewed Iran as the United 
States’ best friend in the Middle East, a principle partner in the containment of 
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the Communist threat and the only reliable supplier of Middle Eastern oil.484 
However, what the US, and the CIA in particular, failed to realise was that the 
Iranian leader was despised at home as much as he was praised abroad and anti-
US feeling was growing among Iranians. In late January 1979 the Ayatollah 
Khomeini – an exile living in Paris who had emerged as the leader of the Iranian 
opposition – returned to Iran while the Shah was on extended ‘vacation’. 
Khomeini was greeted by hundreds of thousands of supporters concluding a 
bloodless revolutionary coup moved by religious and nationalistic zeal that the 
US administration had no idea was possible.485 The result was a loss of perhaps 
the most strategically important ally the United States had outside of Europe. 
Despite all the rhetoric of idealistic foreign policies – of which US support for the 
Iranian dictator was not an example – events in the Middle East had once again 
shown that strategic interests not liberal ideals had to dictate foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the three core policy goals the United States was pursuing there had 
to be pursued using force and coercion if necessary.  
 
The 1990-1991 Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and War  
 
On August 2 1990, Iraqi troops invaded and overran Kuwait. On the same day 
President George H.W. Bush condemned the invasion and asked world leaders to 
join him in action against Iraq. On the same day the UN Security Council 
condemned Iraq and demanded an immediate and full withdrawal from Kuwait 
on pain of mandatory sanctions.486 Four days later a full economic embargo was 
placed on Iraq. This followed a joint statement issued by then US Secretary of 
State, James Baker III and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in 
Moscow calling for a worldwide embargo on arms to Iraq.487 The Cold War had 
ended and Communism had ceased to be a major threat to the United States. The 
geopolitical environment had been greatly altered, so much so that many heralded 
the dawn of a ‘new world order’ in which the rule of law and multilateralism 
would be the key characteristics of international relations.488 In this new 
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environment the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 presented the first real test of 
both these characteristics as well as what US policy in the new world order would 
look like.  
 
By August 8 1990 President Bush had put in motion a defensive operation 
entitled Desert Shield in which he dispatched US Paratroopers, an armoured 
brigade and fighter airplanes to Saudi Arabia where they were joined by forces 
from Syria, Egypt and Morocco. At the same time the UN was finally fulfilling 
its role. Since its foundation following World War Two, the UN had been largely 
left paralysed by great power rivalry and the use of the veto in the Security 
Council. With the end of the Cold War came the end of much of this hostility and 
in the political vacuum created was space for greater UN effectiveness.489 The six 
months following the invasion that started the crisis saw the United States 
actively pursuing the creation of an international military coalition that would 
eventually consist of over thirty states, empowered by a UN mandate to restore 
Kuwaiti sovereignty and punish Iraqi aggression. With regards to the invasion 
President Bush declared that ‘this will not stand’. A World War Two veteran and 
heading an administration filled with World War Two veterans, Bush had 
seemingly learned the lessons of Munich in 1938.490 Open aggression between 
members of the international community simply could not be accepted and 
collective action must be employed in order to preserve world peace.  
 
The mistake of interpreting Bush’s foreign policy in the early 1990s as being 
idealistic must not be made. At the same time as the Persian Gulf Crisis, events 
around the world perhaps demanded more multilateral humanitarian intervention. 
In the former Yugoslavia conflict was erupting between Serbs, Croats and 
Bosnians which was tearing the state apart. This conflict was largely 
characterised by massive civilian and material loss and ethnic cleansing.491 
However, President Bush and indeed all of Western Europe did little to intervene 
until the mid-1990s. Furthermore, US interest in the Persian Gulf was still 
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dominated by strategic imperatives. While Bush had lived through World War 
Two, he had also lived through the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and fully understood 
the importance of the Middle East to US interests and security. As such the 
overwhelming US response to the crisis can be seen more as a result of a US 
foreign policy constructed on realist interpretations of events than one founded on 
the concern for Kuwaiti civilians.492 This is extremely important in terms of US 
policy towards the MENA region. Bush’s response to the events of the summer of 
1990 indicated that the United States, free from the constraints of Cold War 
considerations, was still inclined to pursue its key foreign policy goals there by 
force if needed.  
 
Democratic Enlargement 
 
When Bill Clinton took office in 1992 he inherited a US foreign policy 
framework that was unlike any previously seen. The United States remained 
militarily engaged around the world, and pivotal to the global economy. 
However, the United States that President Clinton would lead for the next eight 
years was the only superpower in a world relatively free from great power 
rivalries and characterised by an emerging pattern of multilateralism. 
Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and international Communism 
(with the exception of North Korea, Cuba and China – where a slow process of 
economic liberalisation was taking place in the latter) the world was seen as 
embracing the very values that the United States was founded upon.493 The rule 
of law, democracy and free market economics were interpreted as being in 
ascendancy around the world.494 However, Clinton possessed no post-Cold War, 
post-Gulf War strategy which he would promote while in office. He did, 
however, have three broad policy goals which he intended to pursue. First, his 
administration would work to modernise and restructure the US military and 
security capabilities; second, elevate the role of economics in international 
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affairs; and third, promote democracy abroad. These three imprecise aims would 
shape US policy towards the MENA region for the next decade and more.  
 
On the whole though, Clinton had little interest in forging a new and grand 
relationship with the rest of the world with foreign and trade policies to 
complement it. In his first eight months in office he made only four foreign policy 
speeches and in general followed the implementation of his predecessor’s 
policies.495 By the end of his first year as President, Clinton began to realise the 
importance of a central foreign policy doctrine both for purposes of domestic 
appeasement and international stability.496 The administration’s public and much 
touted military blunders in Haiti and Somalia, along with right-wing rumour-
mongering and severe criticism by foreign policy analysts preceded the necessity 
for some form of foreign policy direction. For such a direction Clinton turned to 
his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, to construct some form of concept 
that would embrace his three main policy goals.497 The result was ‘Democratic 
Enlargement’, a phrase which embodied the notion of expanding the international 
community of free market democracies. Lake working with Jeremy Rosner, a 
speechwriter for the National Security Council, developed a blue print that had 
four key components. First, “strengthen the community of market democracies;” 
second, “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where 
possible;” third, “counter the aggression and support the liberalisation of states 
hostile to democracy;” and finally “help democracies and market economies take 
root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”498 
 
At first interpretation the doctrine of Democratic Enlargement can appear to be 
idealistic. Encouraging and facilitating the empowerment of the masses and 
supporting the accountability of those who govern in order to truly emancipate 
the individual is indeed a noble cause. However, Clinton categorically rejected 
the idealistic notion that the United States was duty bound to promote 
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constitutional democracy and free market economics around the world.499 Rather 
like his predecessors, he saw the protection of primary US strategic and economic 
interests as the core of US foreign policy. The interests the United States had in 
the MENA region were no exception. He simply needed a policy that would 
provide this protection, and the spread of democracy and economic freedom was 
seen as the surest way to international peace and cooperation.500 At the heart of 
the Clinton Administration was an overwhelming concern with domestic renewal. 
The United States had by 1992 amassed a federal budgetary deficit of over $290 
billion, the highest in US history. Clinton had seen the fiscal imbalances he had 
inherited as a result of twelve years of Republican economics and an over-
emphasis on foreign policy as opposed to domestic management.501 Nevertheless, 
by 1994 Clinton and his staff had begun to incorporate foreign policy with 
domestic renewal.  
 
The realisation that the processes of globalisation had led to the rapid integration 
and interdependence of many of the world’s states and in particular the most 
advanced and prosperous states, was reflected in one of the more important policy 
documents of the Clinton presidency: the National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement (the so-called En-En document).502 The document 
states that:  
 
…the line between our domestic and foreign policies is 
disappearing – that we must revitalise our economy if we are 
able to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives, and global 
influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to 
open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.503 
 
Between the release of the first En-En document in 1994 and a third in 1996 
domestic renewal and democratic enlargement had become intertwined to form 
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the linchpin of US foreign and trade policy. While Washington had for some 
years taken the lead in trying to achieve peace in the Middle East, in December 
1993 Clinton was on the sidelines when representatives of the late Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat met with the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 
Oslo to resolve political differences. The result of the Oslo process was a 
Declaration of Principles between Palestinians and Israelis which included a 
removal of Israeli soldiers from Arab towns in the occupied West Bank and self-
rule for the Palestinian Authority (PA) by mid-1996.504 The declaration was 
signed in an elaborate ceremony held at the White House on September 13 1993, 
but Clinton was more of a spectator rather than an active participant. With a 
peace process under way that had little to do with US foreign policy Clinton 
adjusted his focus on the MENA region to economics. He organised a series of 
economic summits with Israeli and Arab leaders, held in Casablanca, Amman, 
and Cairo. These summits while not providing any substantial agreements 
between the various parties did signal a major development in the normalisation 
of relations between Israel and the Arab world. Furthermore, Clinton’s push for 
democratic enlargement relied first on economic liberalisation and the adoption 
of free market economic policies that would help integrate the MENA region into 
the global economy.505  
 
For the remainder of his time in office President Clinton led his administration in 
foreign and trade policies that would be determined in its pursuit of national 
interests. However, this policy direction was implemented not by strategic 
brinkmanship, open hostility or the stockpiling of increasingly destructive 
weapons systems but by encouraging the spread of the liberal principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and free marketeering – in short liberal international 
institutions. This approach to foreign policy construction and implementation 
would be to a certain extent inherited by Clinton’s successor. As has constantly 
been the case in US foreign and trade policy, the junior Bush administrations’ 
policy approach has differed to that of previous administrations. This is partly a 
result of changing international relations and partly a result of the individual 
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peculiarities of those who are involved in the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of democratic enlargement and the use of international 
institutions has remained, albeit in an altered form and implemented through 
more overt means (such as the forced regime change in Iraq). 
 
The Bush Doctrine  
 
The terrorist attacks on the continental United States on September 11 2001 
marked the first time since the war of 1812 that the US mainland had been 
attacked by a foreign power. The severity of the attacks and the psychological 
ramifications they brought with them cannot be underestimated. A President, who 
much like his predecessor had little interest in foreign policy when he took office, 
was thrust into a major international crisis that necessitated a major US response 
at the international level.506 When George W. Bush took office in 2000 he had 
given only one foreign policy address in his election campaign. This trend was 
followed for the first six months of his administration which overwhelmingly 
focused on domestic issues such as education reform, faith-based initiatives, 
energy sources and production, and tax relief.507 As a consequence Bush was 
criticised for not only his lack of interest in foreign affairs but also his seemingly 
dangerous lack of knowledge about the international realm. In comic humour, 
The Economist in 2000 showed a picture of a US astronaut on the moon with the 
caption: “Mr. Bush goes to Europe.”508 In no region of the world was the Bush 
Administration’s lack of will and ability to engage felt more than in the MENA 
region.  
 
During the 2000 presidential campaign Condoleezza Rice published a foreign 
policy manifesto which argued for a strict national interest standard for US 
foreign policy.509 Rice criticised Clinton’s failure to distinguish between areas of 
vital US interest and areas of trivial importance. She claimed that rather than 
concentrating on powers that had the ability to affect the global order, such as 
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Russia and China, or on pivotal alliances such as in North East Asia, the Clinton 
Administration had dissipated US credibility and military prowess on issues and 
regions of a peripheral nature.510 In this manifesto Rice only mentions the MENA 
region once. Furthermore, she argued against the pursuit of societal engineering 
on the vast scale envisioned in the doctrine of democratic enlargement. Rice’s 
suggestions were evident in the foreign policy of the first nine months of the 
Bush Administration. The main foreign policies pursued focused on the US 
withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the deployment of 
ballistic missile defences and challenging emerging Chinese pretensions to 
regional hegemony.511  
 
With regards to the most pressing issue in the politics of the MENA region, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was clear that Bush had regarded the conflict as 
beyond effective US influence, in part because of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The level 
of violence, distrust and political disagreement had seemingly unravelled 
previous advancements in the peace process and Washington had no desire to 
engage to the extent that Clinton had in 1999 - when the President made a 
spectacular last push for peace culminating in the Camp David summit between 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat.512  
 
The events of September 11 2001 provided the ‘hawks’ in the administration, 
especially those that saw re-shaping the Arab world the best chance for securing 
US interests, with the opportunity to push their agenda.513 Since 1945 the United 
States has had to interpret and react to threats and overtures of friendship 
emanating from the MENA region. Often these have not come from the Arab 
world as much as they have come from outside powers such as the Soviet Union. 
However, in the post-Cold War era the only threats perceived by the United 
States in the MENA region have come from the Arab world.514 As a result of US 
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interpretation of Arab threats over the past decade or so Washington has 
formulated policy initiatives that revolve around either accommodation of Arab 
interests or imposition of US interests – the latter of which has been the more 
common of the two and an example of which is the forced regime change in 
Iraq.515  
 
US Trade Policy in the Twenty-First Century 
 
According to John Rothgeb Jr., US trade with other states is a very significant 
element of both the global economy and the United States’ international 
relations.516 Furthermore, US trade policy has for the best part of the last century 
been a major constitutive element of overall US foreign policy.517 Within the 
making of US foreign economic and trade policy there are two broad camps that 
can be identified. The first camp advocates free trade and the expansion of liberal 
international institutions to govern and protect free trade.518 The second advocates 
protectionism and public-private partnership in order to achieve economic 
prosperity and maintain the United States’ position in the world economy.519 
According to Carl Kress, the Regional Director for the MENA at the US Trade 
and Development Agency, within both of these camps exist two other schools of 
thought which cut across the divisions between free trade advocates and 
protectionists. These are those that view trade policy as a key component in 
broader US foreign policies and in essence synonymous with political policy, and 
those that place little emphasis on the importance of trade policy with respects to 
achieving policy goals.520 Fred Bergsten argues that the former school of thought 
is prevalent in contemporary decision making circles in Washington.521 
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The utility of trade policy in achieving foreign policy goals is described as 
consisting of two elements. The first is punitive and is perhaps the more well 
established of the two. Here, economic sanctions and trade embargoes have 
historically been employed in order to punish actions which are undesirable to the 
United States or are illegal under international law. Furthermore, this type of 
policy is employed to discourage further undesired actions on the part of the 
target state and coerce alternative actions.522 The second and more recent element 
dates back to the twentieth century in terms of US trade policy. Here the use of 
trade policy is more positive and seeks to either reward a course of action on 
behalf of another state, encourage and increase interdependence between the 
United States and the target state, or both. In the case of the latter the assumption 
that international institutions lead to trade liberalisation, which in turn leads to 
economic integration and inter-state cooperation is key.  
 
Contemporary US trade policy is dominated by the advocates of trade 
liberalisation and international institutions.523 Furthermore, a paradigmatic shift 
has been witnessed in the past fifteen years which has greatly transformed the 
directions of US trade policy. Through the early 1990s US trade policy was 
centred on multilateralism and engagement with IOs and governing regimes. The 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT system, while long and 
tumultuous, signified a watershed in multilateral trade policy. The eventual 
conclusion of the round resulted in the creation of the WTO after the signing of 
the final agreement in Marrakech, Morocco in 1994 by one-hundred and eleven 
states. The WTO was designed to strengthen the GATT system of governance, to 
serve as a forum for the completion of future FTAs and strengthen the overall 
multilateral system of international institutions governing trade.524  
 
The role of the United States in completing the Uruguay Round and the creation 
of the WTO was instrumental. However, the encouragement of European states 
was perhaps more significant. The drift towards bilateral negotiations and 
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initiatives that had begun to characterise US trade policy resulted in European 
states relaxing certain objections to greater multilateral trade liberalisation. These 
included various agricultural, textiles and clothing, and manufactured goods 
objections.525 The enticement was enough to ensure US engagement and support 
for the completion of the negotiating round. While January 1 1995 signified a 
strengthening of the multilateral trading regime it did not signify that the United 
States was enduringly committed to multilateralism in its pursuit of foreign 
economic policy goals.  
 
By the late 1990s a clear break with the reliance on multilateralism had emerged 
as the United States increasingly focused on the creation of bilateral international 
institutions. This move gathered pace following the 1994 implementation of the 
North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement which while multilateral in 
the sense that it included three states, shared more characteristics with bilateral 
agreements. Furthermore, NAFTA in essence was counter to the broader 
multilateral processes of trade liberalisation through the GATT and then the 
WTO.526 The move to bilateralism was solidified after 2000 with the completion 
of the JUSFTA and its subsequent ratification and the rapid increase in bilateral 
FTAs signed by the United States since. According to Jeff Schott, the US 
government has been very eager to encourage trade liberalisation and the 
expansion of various institutions such as respect for IPRs but has been unhappy 
with the slow pace of multilateral negotiations.527 In short, the success and utility 
of trade liberalisation and international institutions governing trade for US policy 
interests depends on their implementation. If implementation is slow to 
materialise then so too will the achievement of US policy goals.  
 
As discussed in chapter three, the JUSFTA was only the fourth bilateral FTA 
signed by the United States. Since 2000, however, the United States has signed 
and implemented a further six bilateral FTAs and is currently in negotiations with 
thirteen states for future FTAs: three of which are pending Congressional 
approval, two are pending implementation and three are still being negotiated. 
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With regards to the bilateral FTAs already agreed and ratified these are as 
follows: Singapore (2003), Chile (2004), The Dominican Republic (2004), 
Bahrain (2004), Australia (2005), and Morocco (2006). At the time of writing 
agreements with Colombia, Panama, and The Republic of Korea are awaiting 
congressional approval, and agreements with Peru and Oman are awaiting 
implementation. The United States is currently negotiating FTAs with Malaysia, 
Thailand and The United Arab Emirates.528  
 
In addition to bilateral FTAs the United States has also pursued regional FTAs 
with a small number of states. While these agreements are multilateral by 
definition there is a clear connection with the bilateral policies pursued. The 
United States is currently negotiating a regional FTA with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland – the five members of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU). The negotiations were launched in 2003 but the 
process has been somewhat slow and has often stalled on issues such as IPRs.529 
After only twelve months of negotiating the United States agreed to an FTA with 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 2003. The 
agreement, labelled the US-Central America Free Trade Area agreement 
(CAFTA), was coupled with the US-Dominican Republic FTA to become the 
US-DR-CAFTA. The United States is also negotiating a regional FTA with 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (the US-Andean Community Agreement).530  The 
one thing all of these agreements have in common is that the United States is 
negotiating on one side and the other states either already constitute a regional 
grouping of some kind (such as the SACU) or are negotiating with the United 
States as a group. The result is that they reflect the same processes as bilateral 
FTA negotiations.  
 
The increase in bilateral FTAs in the MENA region from two in 2001 to a likely 
six by the end of 2008 and a further three or four (with preliminary talk of 
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negotiations with Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt)531 by 2012 is highly 
significant. This represents not merely isolated occurrences of bilateral FTAs but 
instead a development of US policy to the region as a whole in pursuit of its core 
interests.  
 
US Trade Policy to the MENA Region 
 
In comparison to other regions such as Europe, South America and South East 
Asia, US trade policy to the MENA region has been less than complex. 
Historically, the United States has pursued access to the region’s markets and 
natural resources.532 However, the latter of these two policy goals has received far 
more attention and rightly so. Discounting trade in natural resources, which 
means US imports of oil and gas from MENA producers, levels of trade between 
the United States and the MENA region have traditionally been very low.533 In 
the latter half of the twentieth century, as discussed above, emphasis was placed 
upon creating and maintaining cooperation on the behalf of MENA states. Little 
emphasis was placed on broader economic integration. On the other hand, the 
proliferation of US-MENA bilateral FTAs, which now account for almost one 
third of US bilateral FTAs either implemented or being negotiated, is very 
significant – which reflects the growing frustration of the US government with 
slow multilateral processes, the Doha Round and the WTO dispute mechanisms. 
This is a key indicator of a shift in policy focus to the region. One would assume 
that if trade liberalisation leads to greater trade and economic growth then the 
United States would be more vigorously pursuing FTAs with major trading 
partners. Or at least one would assume that the United States would pursue FTAs 
with states and regions which constitute important trading partners. The MENA 
region does not fall into this category.  
 
The comparison between the levels of trade between the United States and the 
MENA region (when discounting oil and gas) with US trade with other regions is 
clear: trade between the United States and the MENA region is far below trade 
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with other regions. Regardless of the traditional low levels of US-MENA trade, 
and US-Jordan trade in particular as discussed in the previous chapter, the United 
States has developed an initiative to create bilateral FTAs with regional states 
(starting with Israel in 1984 then Jordan) which will lead to an eventual US-
MENA FTA (the MEFTA initiative).534 The policy direction is clear and needs 
little further analysis: contemporary United States trade policy to the MENA 
region (obviously including Jordan) is to liberalise trade through bilateral FTAs 
followed by a region-wide FTA. It must be noted here that a number of states in 
the region are excluded from these policies (Syria, Iran and Sudan). However, the 
demands and constraints which have led to these policies and the policy goals are 
less clear. As discussed above there are three core policy interests in the MENA 
region for the United States, yet most analyses (as discussed in chapter one) 
examine how these are pursued through conflict or hard power. A discussion here 
is necessary on interpreting how US trade policy may be aimed at achieving its 
main interests in the region.  
 
Former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld defined the Bush administrations’ 
approaches to the MENA region as being aimed at combating instability, 
terrorism and non-cooperation by states in the region.535 Military action such as 
that taken in Afghanistan in 2001 and the ongoing occupation there along with 
the invasion, occupation and counter-insurgency in Iraq are but one type of 
component in this approach. A second more subtle but perhaps more intense 
component of the United States’ approach to achieving its goals in the region is to 
address the structural and systemic factors which hinder greater inter-state 
cooperation. Most answers to such an endeavour focus on political or cultural 
explanations. The unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict is often cited as the root of all 
the region’s problems.536 Culturalists such as Bernard Lewis argue that cultural 
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and historical resentments of colonialism and religious grievances are the root 
cause.537  
 
If either of these is the root of the MENA region’s disillusionment then there is 
little that can be done. The Arab-Israeli dispute is one of the world’s longest 
running conflicts and has proven very difficult to resolve. Colonialism is a past 
phenomenon that cannot be changed. However, we can identify a third possible 
cause that is centred on economics. South America, East Asia and South Asia all 
have deep rooted ethnic and religious conflicts and colonial legacies, however, 
they are arguably less prone to instability as the MENA region when US interests 
are concerned.538 The most evident difference between these regions is that the 
economy of the MENA region remains relatively divided and isolated at the 
regional and global levels. Perhaps the very lack of trade between the United 
States and the region is a cause of instability and hinders US-MENA cooperation. 
The United States seems to have adopted this interpretation and developed a 
policy framework which is aimed at increasing economic integration through 
trade.539 
 
Furthermore, policy makers in the Bush Administration have highlighted the fact 
that the lack of political modernity in the MENA region has become increasingly 
evident since the ‘second wave’ of democracy in the 1960s and 1970s.540 In the 
MENA region, democracy, full respect for human rights, freedom of speech and 
transparent and accountable governance are all relatively rare. According to 
Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 
the region suffers from “a democracy gap”.541 Although three-quarters of non-
Muslim countries around the world are democracies and have been rated as ‘free’ 
by Freedom House, no Arab state has been rated as ‘free’.542 Also highlighted is 
the fact that economic growth in the Arab world has been disappointing and has 
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struggled to keep pace with demographic growth.543 Since the 1980s the MENA 
region (excluding the GCC states) has been one of the slowest growing 
regions.544 According to Dr Zogby, the founder and director of The Arab 
American Institute in Washington, DC,545 the US government seems to have 
pursued liberalising trade through international institutions in order to encourage 
economic integration and inter-state cooperation with the region.  
 
In a speech given at the twentieth anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy at the US Chamber of Commerce on November 6 2003, President 
Bush outlined his administration’s underlying approach to the MENA region. In 
this speech Bush described the emergence of an approach that would foster and 
support economic growth and integration as well as democracy and economic 
freedom in order to assist the region in realising its economic and social 
potential.546 The President somewhat boldly highlighted that: 
 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the 
lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - 
because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the 
expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place 
where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with 
the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our 
country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the 
status quo.547 
 
The Bush Administration has pushed forward an agenda that adopts strategic 
considerations as its core. It has also adopted the Doctrine of Democratic 
Enlargement through international institutions and economic integration as a 
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means of securing inter-state cooperation and thus US interests. The JUSFTA 
was, as has been discussed above, the first bilateral FTA with an Arab state and 
only the second in the MENA region after the 1984 US-Israel FTA. The US-
Jordan agreement was perhaps the logical first step in proliferating bilateral US-
MENA FTAs for a number of reasons. First, Jordan-US trade had already been to 
a certain extent liberalised following the establishment of the qualifying 
industrial zones (QIZs) initiative (see chapter three). Second, Jordan-US trade 
levels prior to 2001 were among the smallest between a MENA state and the 
United States thus the impact of the FTA would not be significant on the US 
economy allowing it to pass through Congress easily. Third, the relatively stable 
and high levels of cooperation between the United States and Jordan at the state 
level made the JUSFTA a good test (and even model to emulate) for further US-
MENA FTAs. In short the JUSTA can be seen as the first step on the path to a 
broader US-MENA FTA and a test for the impacts of trade liberalisation between 
the United States and a MENA state (excluding Israel).  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed US interests in the MENA region as a whole and has 
outlined contemporary US trade policy to the region. It has also discussed the 
context for the more detailed discussion in the thesis, but has also explored some 
of the main forces and factors at work in US policy making towards the MENA 
region. The United States has traditionally held three core policy interests in the 
MENA region which have shaped and held primacy over all other interests. These 
core interests developed over the last century or so in stages with the first interest 
emerging in the late nineteenth century. This interest was the securing of access 
to the region’s markets both as sources of imports – not oil or gas at that stage – 
and markets to export to. The second core interest emerged in the 1930s and was 
securing access to the region’s oil and gas resources. It must be highlighted again 
that the United States has sought access to the region’s resources for itself but 
also for the global economy as a whole. The third core interest has been the 
establishment and maintenance of stable relations with governments of the region 
in order to ensure inter-state cooperation on the part of MENA states. This 
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interest developed and intensified through the 1950s as European powers 
withdrew from the region and Soviet power grew.  
 
Jordan, while a small state with no natural resources of significance, has become 
a key state in the region for the United States in its pursuit of its interests there. 
The traditionally cooperative relationship between the two states, the strategic 
location of Jordan (neighbouring Palestine, Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) 
have been magnified by worsening relations between the United States and some 
of Jordan’s neighbours. Increasing instability at times in some of these states and 
stability within Jordan have further enhanced the kingdom’s importance to the 
United States.  
 
The United States’ pursuit of its policy goals over the past half a century or so 
have been characterised by two key trends. The first is the employment of hard 
power in the form of military power and coercion. This trend dominated the 
1950s and 1960s as the United States endeavoured to contain the Soviet Union’s 
influence in the region and support its allies in regional wars. The use of hard 
power remains a key policy direction as the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis and War as 
well as the 2003 Third Gulf War have shown. However, a second policy trend 
can also be identified: this is the employment of soft power through international 
institutions and economic tools. This second policy direction gained in 
importance in the 1970s in the early Carter Administration as well as again in the 
1990s under the Clinton administrations and the doctrine of Democratic 
Enlargement. Both policy trends, however, are aimed at achieving the three core 
interests.  
 
Contemporary US trade policy as a whole and to the MENA region in particular 
is characterised by a shift from multilateralism to bilateralism. In the case of US 
trade policy as a whole, the mid-1990s saw a move away from focusing on 
multilateral trade liberalisation through IOs such as the WTO and the creation of 
global trade regimes such as the Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs (TRIPs) 
agreement. Rather US trade policy began to become more bilateral in nature and 
reliant on the engagement with international institutions on a smaller scale. The 
belief in the utility of international institutions and trade liberalisation in 
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achieving US policy interests is key here. The slow pace of multilateral 
liberalisation was addressed by pursuing bilateral and small-scale regional FTAs 
and expanding the scope of trade regimes on a case-by-case basis. Trade policy 
towards the MENA region has not been an exception to this policy direction.  
 
Following the implementation of the JUSFTA, which as previously discussed was 
only the fourth bilateral FTA the United States had signed, the United States has 
embarked upon a relatively rapid process of creating bilateral FTAs. A number of 
FTAs have been implemented and a large number of others are in the process of 
being negotiated or ratified. Significantly approximately one third of these 
bilateral FTAs are with states in the MENA region. When considering that US-
MENA trade has historically been among the lowest of US trade with any region 
this is a somewhat perplexing policy focus. Significantly the bilateral FTAs 
which have been pursued have not included the major oil and gas suppliers 
besides the UAE. The overall aim of US-MENA trade policy is the creation of a 
region-wide USMEFTA and this is being pursued by completing bilateral FTAs 
and encouraging the process of intra-region trade liberalisation.  
 
The JUSTA was, therefore, the initial step (not including the 1984 Israel-US 
FTA) and can be seen as a model and test-case for the completion of further 
FTAs with the region. It is possible to argue that due to the close relationship 
between the United States and Jordan, the partially liberalised trade between them 
(that existed as a result of previous engagement in international institutions) as 
well as the Jordanian commitment to trade liberalisation in general that a Jordan-
US FTA was the logical initial step. Thus US interests in the region, the pursuit of 
these interests and broader trends in US trade policy have combined to lead to 
trade facilitation with Jordan through international institutions. 
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Introduction  
 
Thus far the thesis has considered contemporary issues relating to the 
advancement of the discipline of IPE and the study of US-Jordan trade 
relations in particular. An analysis has also been presented of state facilitation 
of trade between the United States and Jordan and the advancement of a 
liberal economic agenda through the agency of state actors. What follows in 
this third section of the thesis is an analysis of the agency of non-state actors 
and how state agency interacts with that of non-state actors to form 
contemporary trade relations between the United States and Jordan. The 
importance of Jordanian-US trade is highlighted in this and the following two 
chapters by showing the uniqueness of how trade has developed on the 
ground. The wider implications of Jordanian-US trade relations as a model of 
economic cooperation and growth are also considered.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to expand on the discussion of state level 
facilitation of trade by examining bilateral trade in T&C goods. In so doing it 
will also be possible to begin to determine how non-state actors in the two 
markets are interacting in the post-FTA regulatory environment. The 
Jordanian economy is a developing economy and one which has had limited 
success in industrialising over the past six decades. As such it is no surprise 
that the production and export of low value-added, often labour intensive 
goods forms a large part of the kingdom’s exports. The production and export 
of T&C goods has become one of the leading sectors in Jordanian exports to 
the US market since 2001 as well as to the MENA and global markets. 
Exports of low value-added goods from the US market to the Jordanian 
market are not a major characteristic of contemporary bilateral trade. 
Therefore, while this chapter is on bilateral trade in T&C goods, the 
discussion is focused largely on Jordanian exports of T&C goods to the US 
market in order to exemplify the development of Jordanian-US trade.  
 
In this chapter the plurality of actors in the relationship between Jordan and 
the United States and trade between them is a key principle. The link between 
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these actors and their interests at the domestic level is linked to the 
international level through a discussion of the broader global market in T&C 
goods and through international institutions which govern this sector. A key 
premise of this chapter is that bilateral trade in T&C goods between Jordan 
and the United States is largely a zero-sum game in that Jordanian gains are 
significant while the United States gains very little if anything at all from 
trade in these goods.  
 
In order to develop the analysis in the preceding chapters and engage with the 
core research questions established in the introduction and developed in 
chapter two, it will be necessary to examine the main characteristics of the 
Jordanian T&C sector. Any consideration of Jordanian exports in T&C goods 
to the US market must begin with a (largely) empirical description of the 
emergence of this sector as a significant and relatively new component in the 
Jordanian economy. A description of bilateral T&C trade flows between 
Jordan and the EU precedes a discussion of Jordan-US trade. The following 
sections of the chapter then discuss the mechanisms which have made this 
growth possible and the limitations to it. Section four therefore considers the 
Jordanian QIZs and industrial estates introduced in chapter three in more 
detail. Section five considers public-private coordination in the sector and 
analyses the agency of non-state actors in the Jordanian T&C sector. This 
section highlights how activity in the T&C sector in Jordan is to some extent 
directed and supported by the government. The analysis here develops the 
concept of a public-private developmental partnership. This is followed by a 
section examining patterns of domestic investment and FDI in the T&C 
sector.   
 
Section seven considers the multilateral labour force involved in the Jordanian 
T&C industry and how, through mechanisms in the JUSFTA regarding labour 
rights, labour issues have acted as a limitation to bilateral trade in T&C goods. 
Any understanding of the development of this sector in Jordanian-US trade 
cannot be fully understood without including an analysis of the market for 
which these goods are destined. The eighth section thus addresses 
developments and preferences in the US market for T&C goods since the mid-
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1990s and in the post-Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) era. A concluding 
section follows summarising the main points and arguments of this chapter 
and further develops the answers to the core research questions.  
 
The Growth of the T&C Sector in the Jordanian 
Economy   
 
The T&C industry in Jordan is relatively young. Prior to 1997 the sector was 
largely inactive and what activity existed was geared towards the domestic 
market as opposed to export markets.548 The principle reason for the 
emergence of the sector in the Jordanian economy was a decision made by the 
Jordanian and US governments to further develop bilateral trade relations. The 
desire to deepen trade between the two economies came as result of the 1994 
Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel and took the QIZs as the 
cornerstone.549 The initiative to develop QIZs - as briefly highlighted in 
chapter three - in Jordan had three main aims: firstly, the QIZs would require 
joint commercial activity between Jordan and Israel - thus helping to 
‘normalise’ relations between the two neighbours and promote economic 
cooperation between them; secondly, to provide a catalyst for job creation and 
FDI within Jordan; and finally, to provide certain sectors of the Jordanian 
economy with unfettered access to the US market – in effect as a peace 
dividend.550 The QIZs and the joint US-Jordanian agencies which regulate 
trade in goods produced in them along with the regulatory legislation agreed 
upon by both states represent a key set of institutions.  
 
The QIZs give Jordanian goods manufactured within them duty and quota free 
access to the US market. Out of this opportunity has emerged the Jordanian 
T&C industry which as stated above and as shown below was largely 
irrelevant in 1997, accounting for a mere 1 percent of GDP (US$71 million). 
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Following the initial establishment of QIZs in Jordan the government through 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade completed a number of studies on how best 
to benefit from the project.551 Jordanian manufactures in the mid-1990s were 
largely uncompetitive internationally and domestically and were grossly 
inadequate to make full use of the QIZ project. The development of the T&C 
industry relied heavily on the comparative advantages inherent in the 
Jordanian economy. These were: access to cheap semi-skilled and skilled 
labour, relatively well developed infrastructure including above-regional-
standard road and transport networks, and a supportive government. 
According to Yousef Al-Shamali, Deputy Director of the Department of 
Foreign Trade Policy at The Ministry of Industry and Trade, “[e]tablishing the 
T&C industry in the QIZs was the only really viable option. There would not 
have been any other industrial sector which would have been able to establish 
itself and compete successfully in the US market – even with (the) free 
access.”
552
 The decision to use the QIZs to develop the T&C export industry 
within Jordan has thus far proved to be highly successful (see table 5.2 
below).  
 
In comparison to the early levels of growth and the limited relevance to the 
Jordanian economy as a whole, by 2006 the sector was contributing 
significantly to export revenues, job creation, overall employment and overall 
GDP. In 2006 the T&C sector accounted for 9.4 percent of overall GDP in 
Jordan and 20 percent of overall industrial value-added.553 To provide some 
measure of how important these figures are it is useful to compare the 
Jordanian T&C industry with similar industries in other states. Here it is most 
useful to examine Jordan’s main competitors in the T&C export industry. 
These are the three major Arab T&C exporting economies Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt (along with Jordan referred to here as the MENA 4). In Tunisia, 
Morocco and Egypt the percentage contribution to GDP of their respective 
T&C sectors in 2006 were 5.6 percent, 5.1 percent and 3 percent 
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respectively.554 The T&C industries in these states are well established and 
were among the first sectors to develop as their modern economies emerged 
after independence from their former European patrons.555 In Egypt, the T&C 
industry dates back many centuries, yet in comparison to the Jordanian T&C 
industry it is playing a far smaller role in the modern Egyptian economy. At 
the same time, contributions to industrial value-added of the T&C industries 
in two of these three states are much higher than in Jordan; 42 percent and 30 
percent for Tunisia and Egypt respectively but slightly lower for Morocco at 
17 percent (see table 5.1). This suggests that while there has been rapid 
growth of the T&C industry in Jordan the relative value-added in comparison 
to other industrial sectors such as the pharmaceutical sector, is low. While in 
Egypt and Tunisia the opposite is true.  
 
Table 5.1 Contributions of T&C Sectors in the MENA 4 Economies556 
 Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan 
Contribution to overall 
GDP (%) 
5.1 5.6 3 9.4 
Contribution to 
industrial value added 
(%) 
17 42 30 20 
Employment (number) 203,800 220,000 1,000,000 80,000 
Share of clothing in 
T&C employment (%) 
45 NA 30 20 
Share of women in 
clothing employment 
(%) 
65 80 25 70 
 
As is shown in table 5.1, the contribution to employment of the T&C sector is 
also extremely important in the MENA 4 economies. Employing low-skilled 
and semi-skilled workers, the T&C sector accounts for as much as one third of 
the industrial labour force in Egypt (approximately one million employees) 
and over two-hundred thousand in both Morocco and Tunisia. In Jordan this 
figure is much lower (expected in the comparison to Egypt due to the 
immense difference in the sizes of the industrial labour forces in the two 
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states) at approximately eighty thousand employees.557 However, the industry 
is relatively young and has only been growing with consistency since 2001.  
 
While the importance of the T&C sector in Jordan has grown in terms of 
contribution to overall GDP and employment it is in the sector’s utility as a 
source of foreign exchange that its real significance is found. In the period 
between 1997 and 2006 exports of T&C manufactures grew from 1 percent to 
32 percent of total exports in value terms.558 Again it is worth comparing this 
figure to the other MENA 4 economies as they provide a bench mark for 
sector utility in foreign exchange as their T&C industries are well established 
and have well established links to international markets. In 2006 Tunisian 
T&C exports accounted for a massive 58 percent of total non-oil exports, 
while in Egypt and Morocco the figures were slightly lower at 52 percent and 
42 percent respectively.559 No other MENA T&C industry or in fact any other 
MENA industrial sector has experienced such a dramatic growth in the same 
period as the Jordanian T&C sector.  
 
Importantly, the composition of Jordanian T&C exports is relatively more 
diverse than the other major Arab T&C exporters.560 In Tunisia for example, 
suits ensembles (for men, women, boys and girls) represent 47 percent of total 
T&C export revenues. At the same time, the T&C exports in Jordan with the 
highest share of export revenues are jerseys, pullovers and cardigans which 
make up only 28 percent of total T&C export earnings. Women’s and girl’s 
suits ensembles make up the next largest share at 20 percent of export 
earnings.561 While Morocco exemplifies a similar pattern to Tunisia (with 
women’s and girl’s suits ensembles alone comprising 31 percent of overall 
T&C export revenue), Egypt has a relatively diversified T&C industry with no 
single group of products surpassing 17 percent of total export earnings (men’s 
and boy’s suits ensembles).562 Figure 5.2 below offers a summary of the other 
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major product groups which are significant exports in the Jordanian T&C 
industry.  
 
Figure 5.1: Contribution of T&C to Total Non-Oil Exports 2006 (%)563 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
%
 
S
h
a
r
e
Jordan Morocco Egypt Tunisia
MENA 4
 
 
Figure 5.2 Top 5 Product Group as Share of T&C Exports 2006 (%)564 
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The Performance of Jordanian T&C Exports in the EU 
Market 
 
As is the case for many developing economies and most industrial sectors, the 
global export market for Jordanian T&C products is largely confined to the 
EU and US markets. However, the reliance on these two markets is not evenly 
balanced. Jordanian T&C exports since 1997 have had very little success in 
the EU market and this difficulty has only been magnified by the end of the 
MFA in 2005 (discussed below). In 2006 Jordanian T&C exports to the EU 
market totalled only US$15.3 million. This was an actual drop from the 1997 
figure of US$23 million and represented only 0.02 percent of the EU market 
share – compared to 0.05 percent in 1997.565 In 2006 Tunisia and Morocco, on 
the other hand, exported US$3.7 billion and US$3.4 billion worth of T&C 
goods to the EU accounting for 5.1 percent and 4.8 percent of the market 
share respectively.566 The largest 2006 market share went to China which 
exported a staggering US$25.4 billion worth of T&C goods to the EU, 
representing 26.9 percent of the market share.567 This level was an increase on 
the 1997 figure of US$13.5 billion (23.3 percent of market share).  
 
Even on the back of the JEUAA signed with the EU in 1997, Jordanian T&C 
exports have proven to be uncompetitive with both regional T&C exporters 
such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt – which all have AAs with the EU and 
longer trading relationships in T&C goods – as well as global competitors 
such as China and other South East Asian producers. The comparative 
advantages Jordan enjoys, such as having access to cheaper labour than 
regional competitors and closer geographical proximity to the EU market than 
South East Asian competitors568 have gone largely unexploited. 
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The main contributing factor which has hindered Jordanian access to the EU 
market is the relative insignificance the JEUAA has had on all Jordanian 
exports to the EU market. In theory the JEUAA should have led to greater 
bilateral trade levels between Jordan and the EU.569 This unfortunately has 
largely not happened. Rather, imports from the EU have increased 
significantly but exports to the world’s largest market have struggled and in 
some sectors, such as the T&C sector, have decreased. The primary causes of 
this dynamic have been the increase in import demands in Jordan due to rising 
levels of consumer prosperity and industrial growth and the signing of AAs 
and broader liberalisation of EU trade with other states.  
 
The Performance of Jordanian T&C Exports in the US 
Market 
 
The US market for T&C goods, especially manufactured clothing has been 
steadily growing over the past fifteen years resulting in expanding 
opportunities for T&C exporters. Although Jordan is a small producer of T&C 
goods, according to Halim Abu-Rahmeh, the CEO of The Jordan Exporters 
Association, it has not missed this opportunity.570 However, unlike the EU 
market with its diversified sources of T&C goods, the United States has 
traditionally imported the vast majority of its T&C goods from Mexico, China 
and the Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA) member states. In total 
these three main sources accounted for 48 percent of total market share in 
2006.571 MENA exporters have faired much worse. Tunisia, Morocco and 
Egypt, for example, while being relatively important sources for the EU 
market, only accounted for 0.83 percent of US imports of T&C goods in 
2006.572 Jordan on the other hand ranks as one of the more important sources 
of US T&C imports accounting for a market share value of 1.5 percent in 
2006.573 While at first impression this is a small figure, in the context of 
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global US T&C market import shares the young and relatively small 
Jordanian T&C export industry has achieved a relatively large share of the US 
market in a very short period of time (1997-2006).  
 
Table 5.2 Market Share Among Major Suppliers to the United States 
T&C Market - 1997 and 2006574 
  1997 2006 
Exporting State 
or Region 
Export 
(US$ 
millions) 
Market 
Share % 
Export 
(US$ 
millions) 
Market 
Share % 
Greater China 14,613 21.5 24,856 23 
CAFTA-DR 7,247 16.4 9,984 14.7 
Mexico 6,541 14.8 8,701 10 
South Asia-4 6,813 10.5 11,124 10.5 
Jordan 4.2 0.01 1,250 1.48 
Egypt 410 0.72 601 0.65 
Morocco 56 0.12 80 0.11 
Tunisia 15 0.03 50 0.07 
 
The experience of the Jordanian T&C export sector has largely been based on 
the combination of comparative advantages within the Jordanian economy and 
government facilitation of trade. Unlike the experience of exports to the EU 
market, advantages bestowed upon the Jordanian economy have allowed T&C 
exports to penetrate the US market in a sustainable manner. Among these 
advantages are: having access to large pools of unskilled, semi-skilled and 
skilled labour, as well as economic and political support from the 
government.575  Jordan does not possess the advantage of close geographic 
proximity to the US market as it does with the EU market and is therefore 
disadvantaged in this way. It would not, therefore, be surprising if Jordanian 
T&C exports enjoyed greater success in the EU market than in the US market. 
However, as has been mentioned above there are certain disadvantages the 
T&C sector has encountered in competing in the EU market. These 
disadvantages also exist in the relationship with the US market, however, the 
mechanisms by which they are overcome vary greatly.  
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Figure 5.3 Jordanian T&C Exports to the US and EU Markets 1997–
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The United States has completed a large number of international agreements 
aimed at providing access to its market for international exporters. The US 
market is indeed more open than that of the EU when T&C imports are 
concerned.577 There also exist other similarities between the two markets: the 
US market has integrated with those of Mexico and Canada through the 
mechanisms included in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
agreement; the US market has witnessed rapidly increasing imports of T&C 
goods from China and South East Asia;578 and trade has been promoted with 
the United States’ closest neighbours and T&C sources in South America.579 
This latter point is shadowed by the increased integration of the EU with its 
neighbours in the southern Mediterranean. In the case of T&C exports to the 
EU, the Jordanian experience has been one of decline and stagnation. Faced 
with similar market access circumstances in the US market since 1997 the 
Jordanian T&C export sector has been one of dynamism and growth.580 This 
is due to one simple difference in the mechanisms of trade facilitation 
provided for by cooperation between the governments of Jordan and the 
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United States that does not exist between the government of Jordan and the 
EU. This difference is grounded in the seemingly urgent and highly solidified 
government commitment to promoting US-Jordanian trade in general as 
discussed in the previous two chapters.  
 
Chapter four analysed the nature of US trade policy towards the MENA 
region in general and to Jordan in particular. The conclusion was that US-
Jordanian trade has increased in significance in the past decade (due to 
economic, political and strategic considerations) and now acts as a model of 
US trade policy with the MENA region as a whole. Much the same was found 
in the analysis presented in chapter three where Jordanian trade policy was 
assessed: here it was determined that the political and economic reforms 
embarked upon by the government of Jordan since 1999 is supported by the 
success of Jordanian–US trade. This dual urgency in promoting trade between 
the two states has led to the mechanisms of special economic zones and the 
FTA. 
 
The Qualifying Industrial Zones and Industrial Estates 
 
The QIZs in Jordan were initially established following the signing of the 
Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Within the treaty there are 
a number of articles demanding the implementation of joint projects between 
the two states.581 The creation of a number of QIZs which would act as 
economic bridges between the two markets was one of these requirements. In 
brief, the QIZs were established as designated industrial estates where all 
goods therein produced would receive duty and quota free access to the US 
market. The conditions set upon the production of these goods concern the 
rules of origin and percentage value-added. In order to receive unrestricted 
access to the US market any goods produced in the QIZs would have to have a 
certified amount of material input of a minimum level from the Israeli 
economy (8 percent) and a minimum value-added from the Jordanian 
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economy (35 percent).582 Certification of these requirements is issued by a 
joint commission consisting of Jordanian and Israeli representatives and 
government bodies.583  
 
Initially the QIZs witnessed little growth, mostly due to the lack of 
government support by the Jordanian and Israeli regimes as well as a 
fundamental lack of manufacturing capacity. However, the utility of the QIZs 
as a means to increase exports was realised following further growth in 
exports to the US market. An increase in FDI which reached over US$500 
million by 2005, was also a key factor in the government’s decision to 
promote the QIZs and expand export oriented industrial sectors.584 According 
to Mohamed Atmeh, the Deputy CEO of the Jordan Industrial Estates 
Corporation (JIEC) - one of several corporations with close links to the 
Jordanian government involved in establishing and running industrial estates 
and QIZs - the QIZs were not initially set up as part of the government’s trade 
regime. Rather they were “a unique project, which were running more as an 
anomaly (as) opposed to in conjunction with our economic strategies of the 
late 1990s.”585  
 
The QIZ projects were not the central tenet of economic policy and export 
activity in Jordan in their first three years. Nevertheless, with increasing 
exports from the zones, and previously unseen levels of FDI flowing in to 
them, the new impetus placed on economic reform and export led growth 
which King Abdullah II’s rule introduced in 1999-2000, the QIZs became 
more important. According to Mohamed Atmeh by 2000 it was believed that 
there were two main benefits from the QIZs. The first was the potential for job 
creation within them and in the economy as a whole as a result of greater 
activity in sectors pivotal to the operation of the QIZs (such as transport and 
services). The second Atmeh described as “…the very tempting access to the 
US market for foreign investors.” He continued to clarify that: 
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The government realised that vast potential for short- to 
medium-term investment existed. It was believed that this 
investment would be focused on the setting up of short- to 
medium-term projects to gain quick access to the US market 
for a limited period of time. By this I mean in sectors like 
clothes and other textiles, where quick production could be 
established with limited capital requirements and limited 
capital gains and risk.586   
 
As indicated above, the Jordanian government’s initial assessment of how to 
utilise the QIZs resulted in the decision to foster the growth of a T&C export 
sector.587 By the turn of the century this was coupled with the private sector’s 
interest and growing investment in the T&C sector within the QIZs (see figure 
5.4). The result has been the overarching dominance of the QIZs by the T&C 
sector – which accounts for approximately 90 percent of QIZ exports to the 
United States – and the sector’s expansion in the Jordanian economy as a 
whole through specially constructed industrial estates. It is important to note 
that industrial estates in Jordan are not QIZs. However, the 2001 
implementation of the JUSFTA has largely negated this fact as all T&C goods 
now enjoy duty and quota free access to the US market.588  
 
The first industrial estates were established in Jordan in the early 1960s, 
prominent among them was the special economic zone established in Aqaba 
in 1963.589 However, slow economic growth and industrialisation through the 
1980s meant that the growth of industrial estates was negligible over this 
period. Furthermore, the government’s concentration on structural policies 
aimed at import substitution rather than export led growth hindered 
investment in the industrial estates which had been established.590  
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Fuelled by the success of the QIZs after 2001 when the FTA was implemented 
and the shift of government economic policy to export led growth and trade 
liberalisation, the past few years have seen a flurry of economic activity. Key 
among the developments of this period was the establishment of more 
industrial estates and the expansion of existing ones.591 Other important 
developments have been the creation and growth of a number of corporations 
tasked with constructing and managing industrial estates;592 corporations 
oriented towards the promotion of Jordan’s industrial estates abroad in order 
to attract FDI;593 and the deepening of the public-private relationship – albeit 
discretely, as is discussed below.  
 
Figure 5.4 Value of QIZ Exports to US in US$ millions 1997–2006594 
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There are currently just over three hundred T&C manufacturers operating in 
Jordan. Of these ninety-two operate within the QIZs and the majority of the 
rest are located within industrial estates.595 While the dominance of the T&C 
manufacturers in terms of overall numbers lies with the industrial estates, 
dominance in terms of value is still firmly in the QIZs. In 2006 T&C exports 
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from the QIZs (only to the US market) totalled US$1.06 billion whereas T&C 
exports form the industrial estates to the US market only totalled 
approximately US$200 million.596 The difference in value of exports is 
attributable to two key factors. Firstly, the main T&C manufacturers have 
been operating in the QIZs for much longer than the T&C manufacturers in 
the industrial estates. The infrastructure and operations were established in the 
QIZs from 1997 whereas in the industrial estates this only happened several 
years later.597 Secondly, growth of the T&C sector has slowed down in the last 
three years meaning further growth in the industrial estates has been 
limited.598 The main advantage the industrial estates do have over the QIZs is 
the continued strengthening of the relationship between public and private 
actors. This relationship is likely to continue, promoting activity in the 
industrial estates in general including the T&C sector.  
 
Public-Private Partnership 
 
Governmental involvement in the Jordanian economy has a long history. As 
was outlined in chapter three, through much of the kingdom’s history the 
government has played a central role in guiding economic activity and 
determining macro-economic structures.599 The result of this link between 
state and market was limited economic growth and industrial development 
followed by un-sustainability in the late 1980s culminating in the 1989 
financial crisis. What has been seen in Jordan since 1989 is a period of 
economic reform through structural adjustment, privatisation and trade 
liberalisation (see discussion in chapter three).600 However, government 
involvement in the economy has not been fully withdrawn. Instead 
government involvement in the economy has been transformed, but 
nevertheless remains. This transformation has led to a shift in the balance 
between state and market actors in the economy and the emergence of a 
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public-private partnership. This partnership is characterised by the 
government having a regulationist role by forming policies and controlling 
macro-economic decisions and market actors implementing these policies and 
micro-managing economic activity. The sustainability of this relationship is 
perpetuated by the fact that both state and market actors achieve their goals 
through this partnership. On the one hand the economy is made ‘business 
friendly’ and conducive to the needs of private enterprise and on the other the 
government achieves economic growth and industrial development.   
 
This partnership operates through a number of key organisations which act as 
a bridge between the public and private sectors. Of these organisations there 
are three identifiable types. The first type of organisation is the traditional 
public-private agency that is oriented towards economic affairs, such as the 
Amman Chamber of Commerce, the Amman Chamber of Industry and the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Jordan. The second type of organisation 
operating in Jordan is the ‘developmental corporation’, such as the Jordan 
Enterprise and Development Corporation (JEDCO), the Jordan Industrial 
Estates Corporation (JIEC) and the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), whose 
purpose is to provide services to private enterprise and who generally claim to 
have autonomy and independence from the government. These actors do in 
fact have close links to government. The third type of organisation or actor is 
the private enterprise. These are wholly private actors such as MNCs and 
domestic businesses which work in a symbiotic relationship with the 
government to further their own interests.601  
 
The Amman Chamber of Commerce 
 
The Amman Chamber of Commerce is a good example of the first type of 
actor involved in promoting the public-private partnership in Jordan. 
According to Sabri Al-Khassib, the Director of Research at the chamber, 
“…the main aim [of the institution] is to meet economic development goals.” 
He continued “[W]e do this by helping the governmental decision-making 
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bodies use the expertise and advice of private actors. This task [is] done by 
registering private corporations, setting up joint committees and conducting 
micro-economic research.”602 The Amman Chamber of Commerce, much like 
the Amman Chamber of Industry and the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Jordan, is a joint public-private entity. The board consists of twelve board 
members who are all elected from the private sector. However, a large part of 
the chamber’s budget and in fact much of its infrastructure (such as the head 
office) are government owned or supplied.  
 
There are currently over thirty-two thousand trade and commerce related 
bodies registered with the chamber which operate in Amman and in the 
surrounding areas. Al-Khassib stated that this number has been increasing in 
the past five years, from four thousand new registrations in 2001 to just less 
than nine thousand in 2006. The vast majority of these new registrations are 
“…involved in trade and commerce with the United States, Saudi Arabia and 
India.”603 Approximately 30 percent of these registrations in 2006 were for 
corporations involved in the T&C export industry. This signifies a drop of 7 
percent on the 2005 figure and is indicative of the overall slow down in 
growth of the T&C sector.604  
 
The Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation 
 
The case of JEDCO is more exemplary of how the public-private relationship 
has developed in the post-JUSFTA era. According to Khawla Al-Badri, the 
Managing Director of JEDCO, the corporation’s “main aim is to help 
Jordanian companies involved in exports to establish themselves, then 
promote them and help their development.”605 Al-Badri explains the 
transformation in JEDCO’s role since the late 1990s as “…[because] under 
agreements signed with international partners such as the EU and the US, 
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and especially following WTO accession the government could not offer this 
support to businesses wishing to export to other markets, there was a niche in 
the market for people like us.”  JEDCO was established in 1972 as a public-
private corporation, one third owned by the Jordanian government, the 
Amman Chamber of Commerce and the private sector each. It had its own 
budget and own Board of Directors but was located within the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. The head office is now located in an independent 
commercial office high rise, but is only a stones throw from the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. The Board of Directors is still equally split between 
public and private members but the director is the Minister of Industry and 
Trade. 
 
While JEDCO operates as a private actor in terms of micro-planning and 
implementation, it is increasingly controlled by the government. When 
questioned about the annual budget of JEDCO, Al-Badri admitted that “…we 
used to have more of our own budget, half from the private sector and half 
from the government, now the government accounts for our entire budget.” 606 
Even more important is the fact that by 2005 the government accounted for 
full ownership of JEDCO as opposed to its previous ownership of one third.  
 
While JEDCO has seemingly become a wholly government body, supporting 
Jordanian export businesses, to some extent in contradiction to a number of 
international agreements signed with other states, a closer examination 
suggests otherwise. The process of government macro-decision making and 
private sector implementation is very much embodied in the structure of 
JEDCO. According to Al-Badri, JEDCO operates independently of the 
government. She claims that “the government made the decision that 
Jordanian exports should be promoted and supported so that economic growth 
can be led by exports. What we do here is provide this support through the 
private sector.”607 It is worth noting that while JEDCO’s budget is supplied by 
the government, its staff (except for half of the Board of Directors) is sourced 
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entirely from the private sector. Furthermore, the management and allocation 
of the budgetary funds are under the control of JEDCO staff not the 
government. Al-Badri explained that the government entrusts JEDCO and 
other such corporations with promoting and developing Jordanian export-
related corporations, supplying the means to complete this task but then 
relying on expertise from the private sector. “People realised after 1989 that 
the government was not capable of directing the economy successfully. 
Governments, especially the one under Ali Abul Ragheb moved to use the 
private sector in a productive way.” Al-Badri continued to describe the now 
dominant belief within government that the private sector can promote the 
Jordanian economy more efficiently than the government.608 
 
While JEDCO’s budget has been increasing over the past three years it is still 
insufficient to promote and help develop all sectors within the economy. 
Rather JEDCO has taken the decision (and not the government) to focus on 
the most beneficial sectors – among these is the T&C export sector. Support is 
provided by JEDCO to T&C export oriented corporations operating within 
Jordan in a number of ways. In the Autumn of 2006 for example, JEDCO 
organised a trade mission to Italy in order to showcase Jordanian T&C goods. 
T&C corporations were invited to join the trade mission and prepare 
marketing and study material along with actual goods to promote abroad. 
JEDCO supplied the funds, arranged the venues and organised all bureaucratic 
matters relating to visas and so on.609 In short JEDCO acts as a middle man 
between Jordanian suppliers and potential destination markets. However, the 
operations of JEDCO do not benefit only Jordanian corporations. Rather 
JEDCO also promotes other actors within the T&C sector (among other 
sectors) through trade missions as mentioned above as well as providing 
technical support to corporations, conducting market, financial and 
consultancy studies and promoting the Jordanian T&C sector abroad.610 
Perhaps the most fitting way to understand the operations of JEDCO are as 
Al-Badri has described them: “Jordan in general has a centralized decision 
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making system, but there is an agenda and many actors involved with some 
autonomy and influence in the implementation of decisions.”611 
 
The Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation  
 
JIEC is one of a number of private sector entities which create, promote and 
maintain industrial estates and QIZs within Jordan. JIEC is perhaps one of the 
more useful examples when trying to understand how the public-private 
relationship impacts economic activity ‘on the ground’ especially with regards 
to the T&C sector. At the time of writing JIEC operates five industrial estates 
including three QIZs612 and is planning the construction of four more.613 It is 
an independent, autonomous corporation that has its own budget, but has close 
links to the government. Key among these links is that the Head of the Board 
of Directors is the Minister of Industry and Trade (as is the case with JEDCO) 
and 67 percent of the capital comes from the government.614 Again, similar to 
JEDCO, the remainder of the Board of Directors (the board has thirteen total 
members) come from the private sector and have no role in government. 
Another similarity with JEDCO is that JIEC was established by the 
government in 1984 but later developed into an autonomously operating 
corporation. In an interview conducted with Mohammed Atmeh, the Deputy 
CEO of JIEC, in December 2006 JIEC was described as “a profit oriented 
corporation, but (it is) also oriented towards the development of the nation.”615 
 
Atmeh outlined four main contributions to the national economy which JIEC 
focuses on. The first he described as inward capital flow or FDI. The very 
nature of the Jordanian trade regime is oriented toward making the Jordanian 
economy appealing to foreign capital for both medium and long term 
investment. In short the activity of actors such as JIEC is to not only make 
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profits but to also make Jordan ‘business friendly’. By creating industrial 
estates and QIZs JIEC attracts foreign corporations and capital to expand their 
operations or relocate to Jordan. Here duty and quota free access to the US 
T&C market as well as increasingly free access to MENA T&C markets and 
the EU market are “very tempting and very profitable.”616 Furthermore, the 
majority of industrial estates in Jordan, including JIEC industrial estates, offer 
a number of key incentives. The JIEC-owned Al-Hassan (Irbid) industrial 
estate for example, offers comprehensive custom-built infrastructure which 
investing entities can buy or rent. Other incentives include free amenities and 
services including free electricity, water and communication and all-inclusive 
customer services.  
 
Working in correlation with the JIB (discussed below), JIEC also offers 
foreign investors twelve years of tax free operations - JIB offers ten years tax 
free operations as standard to all non-Jordanian investors while JIEC offers an 
additional two years.617 This is extremely attractive to foreign investors and 
MNCs who operate in the T&C sector but who are likely to maintain only 
medium-term investment activities in Jordan. In the past five years these 
incentives among others have worked and according to Atmeh “inward capital 
flow to [our] industrial estates and QIZs has been increasing very rapidly, and 
so [our] intention to build five more estates in the near future.”618  
 
Other key objectives which Atmeh highlighted as being at the heart of JIEC’s 
operations include horizontal capital flow. Here, the industrial estates and 
QIZs are seen as central locations of economic activity which act as 
distribution points for capital at the local level. The wages of the employees of 
the factories located in the industrial estates, for example, add purchasing 
power to the local economy. Food, clothing, entertainment and transport all 
have to be provided in some measure to the employees and through this 
mechanism further economic activity is generated.619 With this in mind, JIEC 
industrial estates and QIZs (much the same as virtually all industrial estates 
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and QIZs in Jordan) are distributed around the kingdom, often according to 
where the government says they should be. Areas of low or lower economic 
development, such as Muagar (the location of one of JIEC’s planned new 
industrial estates) have been the site of the development of industrial estates 
and QIZs. According to Atmeh: 
 
[t]his is because, from the business point of view, there is a 
large source of cheap labour, plenty of open land for 
development and good transport links. From a societal point 
of view, we can provide jobs for local residents both directly 
and indirectly through economic spread. We can benefit the 
nation as well as ourselves (…) in this relationship it is a 
partnership.620 
 
In terms of sector development, the majority of industrial estates and QIZs are 
dominated by T&C manufacturers. The operations of JIEC are no exception to 
this. Of the existing two industrial estates and three QIZs which JIEC owns, 
only one is not dominated by T&C. This is the Ma’an estate where activity is 
more evenly spread between T&C and glass manufactures. There are two 
reasons why T&C dominate JIEC’s industrial estates and QIZs: the first is that 
studies conducted prior to their creation concluded that focusing on T&C 
would be most beneficial. According to Atmeh these benefits are, firstly that 
the US market for T&C manufactures is large and therefore offers greater 
profitability than other sectors. And secondly, because focusing on T&C 
manufactures is a fast way to make money. This point is relevant to both 
public and private interests. Finally, in compliance with existing company 
policies, and in coordination with the ministries of Industry and Trade, and 
Labour, JIEC would be able to offer greater employment opportunities by 
promoting labour intensive manufacturing.  
 
The second reason why the industrial estates and QIZs are dominated by T&C 
is as a result of other market forces. A common mistake in much trade-
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literature is that government policy in developing states dictates the form of 
activity, such as the nature of industrial estate production.621 However, in the 
case of the JIEC run industrial estates and QIZs private sector actors seem to 
have been attracted by purely economic reasons. For example, duty and quota 
free access to the US market and the natural comparative advantages 
offered.622  
 
The Jordan Investment Board 
 
The growth of JIB is exemplary of the increasing importance of market forces 
and private sector actors in the development of the T&C sector. JIB was 
established in 1990 as a department within the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Its primary objective was to attract FDI into Jordan.623 Its original budget was 
low, as was its number of staff. However, following a number of key 
amendments to national laws governing trade and capital flows in the mid-
1990s such as the 1995 Investment Promotion Law, JIB has been promoted as 
a key actor. The result was the detachment of the organisation from the 
government and its development as an independent and autonomous entity. 
The majority of its seventy-five employees are sourced directly from the 
private sector and not from government as is common with many similar 
bodies.624  
 
JIB’s importance continues to grow and its participation in the Jordanian 
economy is becoming increasingly diverse. In 2006 the organisation’s overall 
budget was US$1.3 million. This figure rose to over US$6.3 million in 2007 
on the back of greater FDI and government revenues.625 At the time of writing 
JIB has three main offices in Jordan – the head office in Amman, a regional 
head office in Aqaba and one in Queen Alia International Airport. Along with 
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the increase in its budget, JIB is also opening new offices abroad to further 
enhance its role in promoting investment opportunities in Jordan. Offices 
which are due to open in 2007 are located by region as follows: in the Persian 
Gulf; Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh; in the Far East – China; and in 
the EU; Spain, Greece and Italy.626 
 
The focus of JIB’s purpose and operations are on promoting Jordan as an 
investment market abroad. This is done in a number of ways and for multiple 
sectors. According to Elias Farraj, the Chief Advisor to the CEO of JIB, 
Jordan has seen a large increase in FDI since September 11 2001. This is 
discussed in greater detail below but it is useful to briefly assess the impact of 
JIB on investment in the T&C sector. “The majority of FDI coming into 
Jordan in the past five years has come from the Gulf states.”627 Farraj 
described this as being the result of two sets of processes. First, the 
withdrawal of GCC investment-capital from the US market post-9/11 and the 
subsequent desire to re-invest in other markets – largely in the EU but also 
significant amounts in the MENA region. The second set of processes is 
political and economic instability in neighbouring regional states and the 
relative stability of Jordan as an investment market.628 The construction and 
housing sector has witnessed the greatest increase in investment since 2002 
and this is where GCC investment is mostly used. However, JIB does not 
promote this sector.  
 
One of the sectors that JIB does promote is T&C manufactures. This sector is 
promoted in the Jordanian investment market and abroad. One of the main 
activities of JIB in promoting T&C manufactures is the organising and 
implementation of targeted trade missions. Here JIB staff conducts market 
studies to ascertain which location or market is most suitable for exploitation 
of opportunities. According to Farraj this could be a region, city or even a 
corporation. Once the target has been identified a trade mission is arranged 
and includes JIB staff along with representatives of T&C manufacturers 
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operating in Jordan as well as representatives of other Jordanian corporations 
such as JIEC and JEDCO.629  
 
The involvement of JIB does not, however, stop after the completion of any 
trade mission. Rather if investors or corporations wish to set up operations in 
Jordan or invest in existing ones JIB is the primary contact. The ‘One-Stop-
Shop’ is the flag ship operation provided by JIB and was established in 2003. 
Its purpose is to help private sector actors to establish their operations in 
Jordan as quickly and easily as possible. The rationale being that: “the quicker 
[investors or corporations] get set up, the quicker we get economic activity in 
Jordan. Also, it is another incentive for foreign organisations wishing to invest 
and operate to make quick profits.”630 There are ten different government 
departments responsible for investment. These are as follows: the ministries of 
Industry and Trade, Labour, and Interior; the Department of Health; The 
Department of Tourism; The Greater Amman Municipality and other 
municipalities – depending on location; The Department of Land; the 
Department of the Environment; and the Customs Department. These all now 
have offices located in the JIB offices around the kingdom. Each of these ten 
departments has cut down red tape and continues to do so. The pre-2003 
average period for registration of investment or a new corporation was ninety 
days. This has subsequently been reduced to thirty days and the target by late 
2008 is fourteen days.631  
 
Once a private sector actor has registered with the One-Stop-Shop it can apply 
for registration with JIB. If the application is accepted – and according to 
Farraj every application as of 2007 had been accepted, although some with 
minor amendments – JIB provides support with all dealings with government 
and other private sector actors. The result of JIB’s development and support of 
the T&C manufacturing sector as well as others has been the registration of 
over three thousand five hundred projects worth over US$6 billion since 1997. 
Approximately half of this figure has been in the T&C sector.  
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Multilateral Investment in the T&C Sector 
 
As mentioned above, investment in Jordan has been increasing since the mid-
1990s and has witnessed unprecedented growth since 2003. Significant 
amounts of this investment have gone to the T&C sector. In 1996 total 
investment inflows to the  Jordanian economy amounted to US$301 million, 
in 2000 this figure had risen to US$754 million and by 2006 total investment 
amounted to just over US$2 billion (see table 5.3). Investment in 2006 was 
relatively evenly split between domestic investment and FDI – with FDI 
accounting for slightly over US$1 billion. Significantly 2006 was the first 
year that FDI in Jordan exceeded domestic investment.  
 
Table 5.3 Total Investment in Jordan in US$ Millions 1996-2006632 
Year  Investment Domestic Investment FDI 
1996 301 181 120 
1997 380 224 156 
1998 452 285 167 
1999 556 340 216 
2000 1119 683 436 
2001 1243 746 497 
2002 424 238 186 
2003 369 210 159 
2004 589 329 260 
2005 754 415 339 
2006 2001 991 1010 
 
The trend in total investments in Jordan has been slightly irregular in the ten 
year period between 1996 and 2006. According to JIB Chief Executive 
Officer Maen Nsour, the kingdom’s economic and political reforms, including 
structural adjustment and trade liberalisation since the mid-1990s have created 
a more attractive investment climate.633 The improving climate resulted in 
steady increases in investment from 1996 to 2001. However, increasing 
tensions between Iraq and the international community and the intensifying 
Al-Aqsa Intifada led to a dip in investor confidence in Jordan from 2001 to 
2004. A sharp drop of US$498 million followed as overall investment 
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decreased to US$502 million in 2002. As the war in Iraq materialised in 2003 
and the insurgency began to emerge, investments decreased even further to 
US$303 million in that year – a fraction above the 1996 level before the major 
investment-friendly policy changes took affect. However, 2004 and 2005 
witnessed rebounding confidence in the Jordanian economy. This was helped 
by the influx of (mostly wealthy) Iraqis wishing to avoid strife in Iraq and the 
emergence of Jordan as an entry point and base of operations for many private 
and government actors operating in Iraq.634 By 2006 the investment climate 
had made a complete recovery and new levels of investment were being 
witnessed. This increase in investment has not followed the sectoral pattern in 
the 1997-2003 period. Instead, while some sectors such as construction have 
increased their share of total investment, others such as mining have actually 
seen their share decrease as investment figures have recovered.635 After 
construction the T&C sector has witnessed the strongest growth in 
investments. Overall levels of investment in the T&C sector increasing from 
US$392 million in the 1997 to 2002 period to US$1.06 billion in the 2003 to 
2006 period.636  
 
Traditionally the majority of investment in most sectors has come from 
domestic sources. However, as a result of greater economic liberalisation and 
the activity of organisations such as JIB and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, FDI has become increasingly important. As stated above FDI now 
comprises over half of all investment annually and accounts for the majority 
of the rapid increase in investment levels seen in 2006. In relation to the T&C 
sector FDI has counted for the majority of total investment since the sector 
first began to emerge in the mid-1990s. This is partly due to the fact that the 
sector was established and promoted as primarily export oriented taking 
advantage of free access to the US market.637 Farraj has highlighted the fact 
that the Jordanian market only offers limited profitability. With a population 
of approximately five and a half million in 2007 and GDP per capita of 
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US$1960 (or US$4900 Purchasing Power Parity method) the Jordanian 
consumer market is limited.638 Investors are attracted to Jordan because the 
Jordanian economy as a whole has “free access to a market size of over 1.3 
billion people.”639 This is the combined population total of all the markets 
which Jordan has duty and quota free access to following the signing of the 
various agreements outlined in chapter three. 
   
Labour Issues 
 
As highlighted above, the T&C manufacturing sector in Jordan is a labour 
intensive sector. A characteristic of the sector is that the labour force 
employed is generally semi-skilled. Furthermore, T&C is a low value added 
sector - albeit profitable to a certain extent. These three characteristics when 
combined with the average income for semi-skilled labourers in Jordan 
(approximately US$900 per annum) results in a low salary for employees of 
the T&C sector which was estimated to be US$700 per annum.640 By 
international and domestic standards this is not necessarily an extremely low 
figure. However, when coupled with two other dynamics of labour in the 
T&C sector the issue of labour rights emerges. These other two dynamics are 
as follows: multinational characteristics of the work force, and employee 
representation.641  
 
First let us examine the multinational nature of the workforce. The Ministry of 
Labour in Jordan has estimated that there are over thirty-six thousand 
expatriate workers employed by T&C manufacturing corporations operating 
in Jordan.642 The remainder of the approximately eighty thousand employees 
in the T&C sector come from the local population. Of the expatriate 
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employees there are four main nationalities, these are Chinese, Bangladeshi, 
Indian and Sri Lankan.643 Figure 5.6 shows the percentage breakdowns of the 
main nationalities in the T&C workforce. The vast majority of the expatriate 
workforce enters Jordan through international employment agencies. The 
average employment period for these expatriates working in Jordan is 
estimated by the Ministry of Labour at between two and a half and three 
years.644 
 
Figure 5.6 T&C Workforce Nationalities as Percentage 2007645  
Sri Lankan
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In early 2006 international and domestic media attention began to focus on the 
conditions and rights of T&C sector employees. Concerns emerged about the 
number of hours employees were made to work, the salaries paid to them, 
human rights abuses and representation issues.646 As stories of worker abuse 
and mismanagement increased in frequency a number of US-based and 
international human rights organisations began to call for government 
intervention. On September 21 2006 The American Federation of Labour and 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) and the National Textile 
Association (NTA) – both US-based organisations – requested the US 
government invoke chapter seventeen (the dispute mechanism) of the 
JUSFTA citing violations of labour rights.647 The JUSFTA which as 
highlighted in chapter three now forms the backbone of US-Jordan trade 
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relations included an unprecedented chapter regarding labour rights (Article 
6). This chapter requires both states to comply with internationally recognised 
labour rights and to enforce their respective labour laws.648  
 
The problem of labour abuses in Jordan’s T&C sector stems from two main 
factors which have allowed labour abuse to occur. The first is related to the 
nature of the global T&C industry and the T&C sector in Jordan. As outlined 
above the semi-skilled, multinational and low paid labour required by this 
sector means that labour is sourced from peripheral labour pools.649 The 
second factor is that Jordan’s labour code and related laws have serious 
deficiencies that allow for the weakening of labour rights. In short there is a 
naturally vulnerable workforce operating with limited protection from private 
capital interests.  
 
There are a large number of key deficiencies in the Jordanian labour code and 
laws. Firstly, and extremely importantly in relation to the rights of the T&C 
labour force, union membership is restricted to Jordanian nationals – no 
expatriate workers can be involved in any way in any trade or labour 
unions.650 Second, union membership for Jordanians is also restricted by age, 
occupation and criminal background. Any Jordanian seeking union 
membership must be twenty-five years old or more, have no criminal 
convictions and can only be involved in a union of his or her profession.651 A 
third major deficiency is that the government controls union representation by 
industry, allowing only one union per industry (of which only seventeen have 
been defined as eligible). Furthermore, the government’s labour code and 
laws demand that any union has to have at least fifty members when first 
established.652 A fourth issue is that the government’s labour code gives the 
Minister of Labour control over the governing documents and charters of any 
union. This means that the minister must be consulted and his consent given 
before any union can be formalised – in effect allowing the government to 
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determine what the union’s purpose is. The final issue is that the government 
of Jordan requests a minimum of fourteen or twenty-eight days notice prior to 
a general strike for the non-public service and the public service sectors 
respectively.653 In practice this means that unions are required to obtain 
permission from the government to strike. When combined, these five 
deficiencies in labour code and laws means that labour rights in Jordan are 
limited thus weakening the position of the labour force in relation to both 
government and business.   
 
Several days after the AFL-CIO and NTA request to the US government, the 
Jordanian government issued a statement declaring “[R]egrettably the AFL-
CIO and the NTA decided to file their case just days after labour conditions in 
Jordan were vigorously scrutinised and further remedial steps were agreed 
upon.”654 The ‘remedial steps’ referred to in this statement were declared a 
number of weeks prior to the AFL-CIO and NTA action. The then Minister of 
Industry and Trade, Salem Khazala, acknowledged in June 2006 that the 
government had failed to enforce its own laws regulating labour and had 
failed to protect expatriate workers.655 It was also announced that a number of 
factories in the kingdom’s industrial estates and QIZs where violations had 
been reported would be closed until investigations could be completed. By 
January 2007 four factories had been closed, three remaining closed through 
2007.  
 
In an interview with Maha Ali, the Director of the Department of Foreign 
Trade Policy in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, conducted in December 
2006, the issue of labour rights in Jordan were highlighted. According to Ali 
the development of trade relations with the United States has been good for 
labour rights in Jordan. It is worth quoting her at length here: 
 
The JUSFTA was an historic agreement with relation to 
labour rights. No previous bilateral free trade agreement had 
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included a chapter on labour. Here we do take seriously the 
condition of employees in the industrial estates [and QIZs] 
and enforcement of Article 6 of JUSFTA has become a 
priority. Before the JUSFTA was signed, we would not have 
any action on labour abuses so in that way the agreement is 
progressive.656 
 
The US Market and Jordanian T&C Exports 
 
The US T&C market is the largest in the world. It accounts for approximately 
24 percent of T&C global imports (approximately 37 percent for apparel).657 
Over the past decade the US market has witnessed sustained growth in 
imports.658 Foreign imports of T&C goods now supply over two-thirds of the 
US market. This figure has also been consistently increasing over the past five 
years as US T&C firms continue to source goods directly from developing 
states. The US T&C manufacturing sector has seen production decline to 
US$53 billion in annual exports – a decline of over 15 percent in the 1999-
2006 period.659  
 
At the same time that US T&C production has been decreasing the overall 
market size has been increasing. The difference in domestic supply and 
demand has been met by foreign imports which have increased rapidly due to 
freer trade. Since 2001 the United States has signed a number of FTAs and 
Trade Promotion Acts (TPAs)660 and the MFA came to an end in 2005. The 
result has been greater access to the US market for overseas T&C producers 
and greater potential for outsourcing by domestic producers. The introduction 
of the MFA in 1974 controlled the amount of T&C goods exported by 
developing producers and so somewhat protected the US T&C sector. The 
ending of the MFA on January 1 2005 saw the EU and US markets flooded 
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with developing states’ exports of T&C goods. Most of the increase in imports 
came from China and India which increased their exports to the US market by 
approximately 55 percent and 26 percent respectively in the first five months 
of 2005. In response the US and EU re-imposed quota limits on Chinese 
imports. In the case of the United States a unilateral imposition of a 7.5 
percent growth quota was implemented in June 2005.661  
 
The effect on Jordanian T&C exports to the US market was minimal in 
comparison to the effects on other states – such as Moroccan exports to the 
EU. T&C exports from Jordan increased by 13 percent in 2005, down from 
the 19 percent increase seen in 2004, but nonetheless still one of the more 
impressive postings after China, India, Cambodia, Bangladesh and Indonesia. 
While the US market became more competitive with the end of the MFA 
some states which had previously been supplying the US with large quantities 
of T&C goods maintained a competitive edge. Jordan was one of those states 
and the T&C export sector remained strong in the US market. This is in part a 
result of the near total orientation of the Jordanian T&C sector to the US 
market as well as lower labour costs than most competitors and quicker 
production times despite the greater distance to the US market in relation to 
some producers.662  
 
One advantage that Jordan enjoys over the majority of other T&C competitors 
in the US market comes from the JUSFTA. While other states now have duty 
and quota free access to the US market, stringent rules of origin lower 
efficiency and profitability. Article 14 and annex 2.2 of the JUSFTA allow 
Jordan to source material from anywhere in the world and still have free 
access to the US market. This is an unprecedented measure and one that has 
not been replicated in any other agreement between the US and another 
state.663 According to Maha Ali this provision was granted to Jordan in part as 
a peace dividend for the peace agreement with Israel and partly because the 
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United States wants the Jordanian economy to thrive.664 This latter point 
cannot be over-emphasised. “Jordan-US trade is an important model of 
bilateral cooperation for the United States in the Middle East [and North 
Africa], one that the Bush Administration wants to see work.”665  
 
 
Figure 5.8  Percentage Change in US T&C Imports by Leading Sources 
Post-MFA (2004-2007)666 
 
 
The quota restrictions re-imposed on China by the United States will come to 
an end in 2008. It is anticipated by many that Chinese T&C exports will again 
increase exponentially and thus so will competition in the US T&C market.667 
The forecasted decline in the US T&C production sector will offset some of 
this increased competition as will continued growth of the market. 
Nevertheless, the Jordanian T&C sector will face increased competition in the 
future. However, it is likely that the three main advantages the Jordanian T&C 
sector enjoys – relaxed rules of origin, being oriented to the US market and 
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favoured support from the US government – over other states will remain and 
allow exports to continue to post steady yearly increases.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The growth of the T&C sector within Jordan can be seen as being linked 
directly to the transformation of the government’s macro-economic policy as 
well as to the establishment of the QIZs and their related bilateral institutions. 
In particular, changes in foreign trade policy and engagement with institutions 
pertaining to trade since the mid-1990s have had a significant impact. The 
pursuit of greater economic integration with international markets through 
trade liberalisation and bilateral agreements with the United States and others 
have produced both the opportunity for the T&C sector to expand. Gaining 
duty and quota free access to the US market was taken advantage of by 
promoting certain export-oriented manufacturing sectors within the Jordanian 
economy from 1997 onwards and the implementation of the JUSFTA in 2001 
furthered these processes. In the subsequent years the Jordanian government 
has worked in conjunction with private sector actors and semi-governmental 
organisations to support and promote the T&C sector both at home and 
abroad.  
 
Since 2001 exponential growth in inward investment to the T&C sector has 
been witnessed. The build up to and materialisation of the US-led invasion of 
Iraq temporarily disrupted investment flows but levels of FDI and domestic 
investment have since reached record levels. Continued growth in exports to 
the US market is expected to be seen over the coming years as Jordanian 
exports compete in an increasingly aggressive market in the post-MFA era. 
The overall partnership between the Jordanian government and private sector 
actors – largely from abroad – and the relatively strong position of Jordanian 
T&C manufactures in the US market should lead to a further entrenchment of 
US-Jordan trade relations. In turn this will likely serve to compel the 
Jordanian government to maintain the current ‘business friendly’ environment 
within the kingdom and potentially further liberalise the economy. In turn 
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T&C exports to the US market likely will continue to grow in the short to 
medium-term future.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the engagement with 
multilateral and bilateral institutions in the forms of IOs such as the WTO, 
trade regimes such as the MFA and key agreements such as the JUSFTA have 
had a significant impact upon trade liberalisation. Furthermore, trade levels 
between Jordan and the United States have also been impacted. In the first 
instance trade liberalisation has occurred to a great extent between Jordan and 
the United States whereby at the time of writing all trade in goods is fully 
liberalised. In the second instance trade levels in T&C goods have grown 
rapidly, albeit in a bilateral manner as exports from Jordan to the US market 
account for practically all trade in T&C goods. The economic growth of this 
sector in Jordan is highly significant and has been relatively rapid, adding to 
the overall Jordanian economy and GDP through increased exports, 
investment and horizontal economic spread. This suggests that Jordanian 
governmental facilitation of trade with both the United States and other 
markets through engagement with international institutions and domestic 
reform is achieving the aim of economic growth. However, this analysis is 
only of one economic sector. Furthermore, it is a low value-added, labour 
intensive sector which is not necessarily representative of the Jordanian 
economy as a whole.  
 
The issue of state-actor involvement in international institutions as a means to 
increasing economic integration is important to the analysis in this chapter. 
However, the role of non-state actors also is pivotal. Here, the roles of 
organisations such as JIEC, JEDCO and the JIB have been instrumental in the 
increasing levels of bilateral trade in T&C goods. The support that these 
actors have given to T&C manufacturers has been very important in allowing 
these corporations to operate in Jordan and export competitively to the US 
market. The T&C manufacturing corporations operating in Jordan have been 
buoyed by rising levels of international investment. This has allowed them to 
exploit the opportunities provided by the JUSFTA and export to the US 
market. In short if it were not for the agency of these actors the impact of 
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international institutions on their own would not have the significant impact 
on bilateral economic integration that has been witnessed.  
 
With regards to the United States, as discussed in chapter four, economic 
growth has not been the key interest that has compelled the United States to 
pursue greater cooperation with Jordan through international institutions and 
subsequent bilateral trade liberalisation. Rather broader interests relating to 
inter-state cooperation at the international level and in the political and 
security spheres seem to have been more important. In this study there is 
evidence of greater market integration, or possibly the creation of market 
dependence, where the Jordanian T&C sector has become dependent upon 
access to the US market. There is also evidence of the utility of international 
institutions in facilitating trade and encouraging non-state actor cooperation 
across markets. However, there is little evidence, beyond speculation, 
provided in the analysis of bilateral trade in T&C goods that suggests that 
greater state level integration and cooperation between Jordan and the United 
States has followed.   
 
The issue of labour rights in Jordan which is embodied in the JUSFTA and 
which forms a key element of the regulatory regime of trade between the two 
states offers some insights here. The linkage of a domestic non-state actor 
economic matter in Jordan to state actor cooperation and regulation at the 
international level through international institutions is certainly important. The 
AFL-CIO request to the US government regarding non-state actor 
management of labour issues in Jordan, as discussed above, and subsequent 
state level coordination is an example of state level cooperation and 
integration. However, how far this form of cooperation permeates other state 
relations is unanswerable at this stage. Simply assessing one economic sector 
and one form of trade is not sufficient in order to answer the main questions in 
this thesis and so two more economic sectors and forms of trade are analysed 
in the following chapters in order to shed more light on the topic. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bilateral Trade in Pharmaceutical Products 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the nature and level of trade in 
pharmaceutical goods between the United States and Jordan, and to examine 
how the regulatory framework within which this trade takes place has begun 
to reshape the interaction of the two sectors. The assessment of the political 
economy of trade relations between Jordan and the United States is furthered 
by analysing what can be termed a ‘second form’ of trade activity – trade in 
high value-added, capital intensive goods. This type of trade is characterised 
by relatively equal levels of trade in terms of total value and quantity as well 
as by a more important role for the United States in creating the framework 
within which bilateral trade occurs. 
 
Analysis of bilateral trade in pharmaceutical goods between Jordan and the 
United States poses a number of problems as well as useful insights when 
assessing the political economy of trade between the two states. Problems are 
posed due to the relatively insignificant levels of trade in pharmaceutical 
goods in overall monetary terms. Jordanian exports of such products to the US 
market, for example, constitute a mere 2-3 percent of total exports. US 
pharmaceutical exports to the Jordanian market are also small in relation to 
total exports and in relation to US exports to other markets in the MENA 
region. However, the pharmaceutical sector constituted a major element of the 
JUSFTA and a deeper analysis of both the Jordanian and the US 
pharmaceutical industries and how they are interacting presents some 
interesting conclusions. In relation to bilateral trade in T&C the interaction of 
the two pharmaceutical markets highlights a very different side to bilateral 
relations. While trade in T&C goods is heavily one-sided, in that Jordanian 
exports constitute the majority of trade flows, trade in pharmaceutical goods is 
more even, but with US exports constituting the larger part of trade levels. 
More important than the actual levels of trade in goods is the institutional 
framework within which pharmaceutical trade takes place. This structure has 
been reshaping the relationship between the two pharmaceutical markets since 
2001. 
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Once again the following analysis will draw upon the key principles of the 
critical liberal institutionalist approach used in this thesis to study the ways in 
which the international institutions engaged with by Jordan and the United 
States have liberalised and facilitated trade between the two. Also, this chapter 
will study a plurality of actors and their relationships at the domestic and 
international levels to analyse what the effects of trade liberalisation have 
been. A key question in this and the preceding chapter is whether or not state 
actor interests are being achieved or not.  
 
To develop the analysis presented here it is necessary to first outline the 
global environment in pharmaceutical trade and the key institutions which 
govern it, of which the United States and Jordan are a part and so which 
largely determines this form of bilateral trade. The first section of this chapter 
thus addresses the impacts of the WTO-negotiated TRIPs agreement and how 
both the United States and Jordan have complied with this agreement. 
Following on from this first section is an assessment of the provisions of the 
JUSFTA relating to international IPRs and thus how trade in pharmaceutical 
goods is managed under the agreement.  
 
The third section provides an overview of the Jordanian pharmaceutical 
industry and how it has developed over the past decade and a half. Here the 
growth of the sector to become the second leading export earner in the 
Jordanian economy is described followed by an analysis of the main actors 
operating in the sector.  The importance of investment and technology flows 
are highlighted as these two issues have formed the backbone of activity in the 
sector since the mid-1990s. The relationship between domestic and external 
private sector actors is also briefly analysed.  
 
A detailed assessment of the US pharmaceutical sector in this thesis would be 
overly complex and time consuming and is not necessary for the purpose of 
this chapter. However, a brief assessment is offered followed by an 
assessment of pharmaceutical trade in relation to contemporary US trade 
policy and bilateral FTAs. A review of the main US actors either exporting to 
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or operating in the Jordanian sector is then presented. A final section 
summarises the main points and arguments presented in this chapter and 
offers a conclusion on the complex nature of trade in pharmaceutical goods 
between Jordan and the United States. 
 
TRIPs and Pharmaceutical Production in Jordan and 
the United States 
 
At the time of writing there is no single legal international regime which 
governs IPRs with absolute jurisdiction. Copyright, patent or trademark for 
any product or process for which these rights are eligible can only be provided 
by national governments in the territorial entity for which such rights are 
required.668 In many cases national legislation for the provision of these 
protective rights differ and in some cases do not exist in any recognisable 
form. However, attempts to manage the international issue of IPRs have been 
underway since the nineteenth century669  and a number of international 
agreements do exist. The most important of these agreements is the WTO 
agreement on TRIPs established at the end of the Uruguay Round of 
Negotiations of the GATT treaty in 1994. As both the United States (1995) 
and Jordan (2000) are members of the WTO and therefore signatories to the 
TRIPs agreement their pharmaceutical industries and trade in pharmaceutical 
products are shaped by the rules governing international IPRs through these 
institutions.  
 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) defines intellectual 
property as “creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, as 
well as symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce.”670 In relation 
to the pharmaceutical industry this includes both products, such as a new drug 
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or medicine, and processes by which pharmaceutical products are created.671 
The TRIPs agreement covers a broad range of IPRs, including patents, 
trademarks, copyright and trade secrets. Within each of these areas the 
agreement establishes the minimum standard of protection which all WTO 
members and signatories to TRIPs must abide by. Also included in the 
agreement are enforcement provisions and a dispute mechanism whereby any 
dispute is reported to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). If one 
member state believes that a second is in violation of the TRIPs agreement 
then these states may conduct dialogues through the DSB following which if 
no settlement is made the DSB will convene a panel to rule on the dispute.672  
 
The agreement includes the provisions of earlier treaties on copyrights, 
patents and trademarks. These are the Berne Convention in the case of the 
former and the Paris Convention in the case of the latter.673 With regards to 
copyrights the TRIPs agreement obligates the member states to each provide 
protection from the time of registration up to a minimum of fifty years of 
protection from the death of the author or creator.674 In relation to 
pharmaceutical goods this is not as relevant a provision as that pertaining to 
patents. Here member states agree to provide the patentees the exclusive 
rights to exclude other actors from producing, using, selling or importing the 
patented good.675 There are exceptions under certain circumstances such as in 
situations deemed emergencies,676 and the control of products or processes 
which is viewed as in violation of the order public or morality. Patents are 
given a minimum of twenty years protection from the filing date under the 
agreement, after which time they would be off-patent unless otherwise 
negotiated. It is worth noting at this point that each bilateral FTA signed by 
the United States since 2000, including the JUSFTA, has addressed in some 
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manner this provision. Under US law, patents are given a minimum of twenty 
years protection from the date of issuance of the patent. The US concern here 
is that intentional delaying of the registration process could significantly 
reduce the period of actual patent protection once patentability has been 
issued under WTO rules.677  
 
For many developing states, as has been the case for Jordan, signing up to the 
TRIPs agreement has resulted in major structural adjustments in their 
pharmaceutical industries.678 Prior to becoming the one hundred and thirty-
sixth member of the WTO and having to abide by the provisions in the TRIPs 
agreement, Jordanian pharmaceutical production consisted of about 10 percent 
unlicensed in-patent products.679 Under the agreement this would no longer be 
possible following the offered adjustment period (discussed below). In order 
for Jordanian pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue to produce in-patent 
products they had to either register these products with the government of 
Jordan by gaining a license from the patentee to do so or be issued a 
temporary licence by the government (usually in exceptional or emergency 
circumstances).680 Under the TRIPs agreement the issuance of compulsory 
licences is allowed although severely restricted. According to Article 31, 
compulsory licences can be issued if the proposed user has:  
 
… made efforts to obtain authorisation from the patent owner 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and must 
demonstrate that such efforts have not been successful within 
a reasonable period of time. However, this requirement may 
be waived in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.681 
 
Furthermore, the issuance of such a license by a national government is 
revocable at any time, must result in remuneration of the patent holder and 
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will be subject to bi-annual independent WTO review.682 Under these strict 
controls the Jordanian government has not issued a compulsory licence for a 
patented pharmaceutical product. 
 
In the case of Jordanian pharmaceutical manufacturers, a set time limit was 
given for abiding by all TRIPs agreement rules. WTO member states are 
given a transition period from membership to the TRIPs agreement in which 
to adjust and implement all necessary measures to comply with the stipulated 
rules.683 This period is one year for developed states, five years for 
underdeveloped states and ten years for the least developed states until 2010, 
with the latter extended to 2013. Jordan became a member of the WTO in 
1999 and had to accept TRIPs provisions immediately. However, rather than 
accepting the five year transition period on offer the Jordanian government 
immediately upon becoming a WTO member fully implemented the TRIPs 
agreement.684 Patent Law No. 32 was drafted in 1999 to supersede the Patent 
and Industrial Design Law No. 22/1953. The new legislation offered full 
compliance with TRIPs regulation, and includes the following features:  
 
1) It allows the grant of patents in all fields of technology, 
whether it is a product or a process invention, provided that 
the conditions are met of novelty, inventive step and 
capability of industrial application.  However, the only 
exceptions which pertain to the subject-matter is based on 
Article 27.3 of the TRIPs Agreement. 
 
2) The patent owner's rights are covered in the Jordanian law in 
conformity with Article 28 of the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
3) The law established a mechanism for issuing a compulsory 
licence and limited it to three situations only.  Moreover, the 
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Jordanian law adopted provisions similar, not identical, to the 
provisions of Article 31(a) to (k) of the TRIPs Agreement.   
 
4) The Jordanian Patent Law has introduced a unique provision 
in order to encourage inventors to register their patents in 
Jordan and this is through Article 4(f), which extended the 
novelty term from twelve months from the first application to 
eighteen months after filing an application anywhere outside 
Jordan. 
 
5) The Jordanian Patent Law has introduced a provision where, 
in the case of an infringement of a process patent, the burden 
of proof must be reversed, so that a defendant must prove that 
an identical product has been produced without infringing the 
rights of the patent owner, consistent with Article 34 of the 
TRIPs Agreement.685 
 
As a founding member of the WTO and leading advocate of the TRIPs 
agreement, the United States was in compliance with all provisions of the 
agreement at its inception on January 1 1995. The United States has been the 
leading advocate of respect for and implementation of protection for IPRs 
over the past three decades.686 Furthermore, the United States government has 
consistently linked bilateral trade policy to IPRs since the early 1980s.687 As 
mentioned above, US bilateral FTAs have addressed IPRs in detail and in 
most cases have strengthened further compliance with international IPRs.688  
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Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the 
JUSFTA 
 
The provisions of the JUSFTA pertaining to IPRs were largely designed by 
the United States and were included in the agreement at the insistence of the 
US government.689 There is no evidence that the Jordanian government 
actually resisted the inclusion of these provisions. However, likewise there is 
limited evidence that suggests that during the negotiating process the 
Jordanian government proactively pursued the inclusion of agreements on 
IPRs related issues. Rather the JUSFTA further strengthens the IPRs regime 
within which Jordanian pharmaceutical manufacturers must operate. Article 4 
of the JUSFTA deals with IPRs by specifying provisions on ratifying previous 
international agreements, including the Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks690 and the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty.691 It is important to note that these provisions were with 
regards to Jordan and not the United States. This is because Jordan was not a 
signatory to the previous agreements included while the United States was. 
 
The FTA also addresses trademarks (Article 4, 6-9), copyright and related 
rights (Article 4, 10-16), patents (Article 4, 17-21), measures related to certain 
regulated products (Article 4, 22-23), enforcement of IPRs (Article 4, 24-28) 
and transition periods (Article 4, 29). With regards to the provisions on 
patents the JUSFTA has slightly stricter rules than the TRIPs agreement. The 
process of registering a patent is more demanding and the issuance of a patent 
right is made for a minimum of twenty years after the patent registration 
process has been completed.692 Furthermore, the JUSFTA commits both states 
to ensure that their statutory punishments for infringements on IPRs are high 
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enough to deter any such infringements. United States legislation already 
ensures a very high level of protection for IPRs. In Jordan prior to 2001 and 
the implementation of the FTA, legislation was not as stringent. Thus, again 
these provisions were largely aimed at strengthening such rights in Jordan.693 
Transition periods for meeting the provisions in Article 4 varied from 
immediate implementation to three years for the different requirements. 
Jordanian ratification of the World Copyright Treaty and WPPT, for example, 
was two years from the entry into force of the FTA, while abiding by rules on 
pharmaceutical patents would take effect immediately.694 This is in 
comparison to the five year adjustment period offered by the WTO in relation 
to the TRIPs agreement. As Hamed El-Said and Mohammed El-Said have 
noted, there exists a significant difference between TRIPs regulations and 
what has been termed TRIPs-Plus agreements as embodied in bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs.695 Here, the provisions of FTAs relating to the protection 
of IPRs can be seen to be much more stringent than the WTO-negotiated 
TRIPs agreement.  
 
The Jordanian Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing as a component of the Jordanian economy is 
one of the more dynamic sectors and over the past decade has been rapidly 
emerging as a leading contributor to GDP. The sector began to emerge in the 
early 1990s. While pharmaceutical manufacturers have been operating in 
Jordan since the 1960s their activity was limited and growth was not 
dynamic.696 However, by 1990 increasing exports to regional markets in the 
Middle East began to propel the sector forward. The domestic market is 
relatively small with a current population of approximately 5.8 million 
(January 2008) and was even smaller in 1990 with a total population 
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estimated at only 3.5 million. Furthermore, European pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have traditionally captured a large share of the Jordanian 
market leaving a smaller share for domestic producers. According to the 
Export and Finance Bank in Jordan, European corporations traditionally have 
supplied about two thirds of the Jordanian market and Jordanian producers 
have accounted for the remaining one third.697  
 
Under these conditions domestic producers embarked upon exporting drives 
through the 1990s to neighbouring markets. As a result, over the past decade 
Jordanian pharmaceutical producers have become the leading MENA region 
exporters to the Lebanese, Iraqi, Saudi Arabian and UAE markets. The 
Jordanian pharmaceutical sector is widely seen as the leading such sector in 
the MENA region outside of Israel. Production facilities, staff, market access 
and quality have all received a better rating than pharmaceutical sectors in 
other MENA states.698 In 1990 total pharmaceutical exports reached US$49 
million, most of which went to the Iraqi market (US$25 million).699 This 
accounted for 5.8 percent of total Jordanian exports and approximately 60 
percent of pharmaceutical sector revenue. By 1995 total pharmaceutical 
exports had tripled and totalled just over US$142 million - most of which was 
still to regional markets. Total pharmaceutical exports continued to rise from 
1995 and by 2006 export revenue totalled just under US$304 million.700 As a 
share of sectoral revenue exports now stand at 70 percent - total revenue in the 
pharmaceutical sector currently totals US$400 million - and pharmaceutical 
exports are now the second largest exports in value terms after T&C goods 
representing 4 percent of GDP and 12 percent of total exports.701 
 
In comparison to exports, imports of pharmaceutical goods over the past 
decade have seen a much slower pace of growth (see table 6.2). This is due to 
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two factors: firstly the Jordanian market for pharmaceuticals remains 
relatively small and growth in this market is limited by an only average 
population growth (2.6 percent) and the over-saturation of the market with 
producers. Furthermore, unequal income distribution and relatively modest 
per capita income growth (equivalent to approximately $300 per year over the 
past decade) have limited growth in the domestic market. Third, imports had 
been growing at a slower rate relative to exports (until 2005, when imports 
began to rise at a higher rate than in previous years) as Jordanian corporations 
expanded their activities and in particular their exports to traditional markets 
(which in 2006 still accounted for almost 90 percent of pharmaceutical 
exports) and expansion into new ones such as Europe and the United States.702  
 
Figure 6.1 Total Pharmaceutical Exports & Imports 1991 - 2006703 
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In an economy which has traditionally had difficulties providing enough 
employment opportunities to reduce unemployment figures to a level of 
perhaps 15 percent - as opposed to the current (unofficial) 30 percent - sectors 
which have seen consistent employment growth are key to the overall health 
of the economy.704 Employment in the pharmaceutical sector has witnessed 
solid growth in the past decade and predictions suggest that this growth is 
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likely to continue.705 In 2007 the sector employed just under eight-thousand 
workers with four-thousand seven-hundred employed directly in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing. This is in comparison with total employment 
of only one-thousand eight-hundred in 1991 – a 257 percent increase in a 
fifteen year period.706 While the growth in employment in the sector is 
important, the location of employment opportunities and the type of 
employment are equally important. As discussed above, QIZs and other 
industrial estates are placed strategically around the kingdom - in part to 
benefit the local economies and communities. The majority of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers now operate in these zones and estates. However, unlike T&C 
manufacturers, pharmaceutical corporations are mostly located in or around 
the Amman area. This is partly because of the specific services and facilities 
needed and access to the relevant labour pools.  
 
Jordanian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
 
According to the Jordanian Association of Manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals 
and Medical Appliances (JAPM), the main representative body for the 
pharmaceutical sector, there are currently seventeen Jordanian corporations 
involved in pharmaceutical manufacturing.707 In 1995 there were only eleven 
such corporations with the oldest being Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
(APM) which was established in 1962. The growth in the number of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers was slow throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. However, by 1995 a large expansion in the number of manufacturers 
took place peaking at eighteen domestic producers by 2001. Some observers 
have claimed that this growth in manufacturers shows a dynamic and growing 
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sector.708 The increase in domestic producers has partly led to an increase in 
overall sector capital investments, which currently total US$400 million with 
production value for 2006 at US$249 million. In comparison the 1990 figures 
stood at US$192 million and US$112 million respectively.709 However, the 
increase in private sector actors in the domestic market has also limited 
domestic market penetration for some of the corporations. The increase in 
competition for domestic market shares has largely been confined to domestic 
producers while European producers maintain their overall position in the 
market.710 Furthermore, only three of the Jordanian pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have been able to compete in international markets in any 
sustained manner. The three largest corporations account for 80 percent of 
domestic production, 90 percent of exports and over 75 percent of market 
capital.711  These are Hikma Pharmaceuticals, APM and Dar Al-Dawa and it 
is to these three corporations that we shall now turn.   
 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals  
 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals is currently the largest Jordanian manufacturer 
operating in the pharmaceutical sector. Founded in 1978 in Amman, Hikma 
has pursued a policy of internationalising its activities and expanding into 
external markets in order to increase profits.712 In its first decade of operation 
Hikma pursued expansion into regional markets, namely Saudi Arabia (where 
it is the fourth largest operating pharmaceutical corporation) and Algeria (the 
second largest operating pharmaceutical corporation). Following successful 
operation in these two markets as well as the domestic market Hikma began to 
implement a set of policies in 1990 aimed at gaining access to the European 
and US markets. This policy has been successful to a large extent and is 
attributable to two factors. The first method used to gain greater access to 
these key markets was to acquire manufacturing capabilities in them 
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(discussed below). The second method pursued was to target niche markets 
for certain pharmaceutical products by focusing on research and development 
(R&D) and gaining approval for products by the relevant regulatory bodies 
such as the Food and Drug Agency (FDA) in the United States.713 As a result 
Hikma has transformed itself from first a domestic-focused producer to a 
regional actor into an MNC with international operations and sales. In 2006 
Hikma had sales in twenty-eight states.714 Significantly, sales have doubled 
since 1996 and the US market now represents 50 percent of all Hikma sales 
while Europe accounts for 7.8 percent and the MENA region including the 
domestic market accounts for 42.2 percent of sales revenue.  
 
In order to expand into the US market (the world’s largest pharmaceutical) 
Hikma purchased West-Ward, a New Jersey, US-based corporation in 1991. 
By 2006 the Hikma subsidiary had been transformed from a loss-making 
manufacturer into a profitable operation bringing in US$120 million of sales 
revenues.715 Through West-Ward, Hikma has gained stable and sustainable 
access to the US market and the expansion of R&D activities as well as an 
increasing number of USFDA approved products have spurred US sales. In 
the European market production facilities in Portugal and Italy have allowed 
Hikma to penetrate the world’s second largest pharmaceuticals market. An 
injectable manufacturing facility was built in Portugal in 2002 consisting of 
four production lines. One line produces cephalosporins, while the other three 
lines produce liquid injectables for sale in all Hikma markets. A new seven-
thousand five-hundred square metre cephalosporin manufacturing facility has 
been developed in Portugal and is operational as of summer 2007. Also 
developed and operational in 2007 is a production facility for injectables in 
Italy. This plant focuses on producing lyophilized products and works in 
conjunction with a new warehouse and packaging facility.716 
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In the MENA region too, greater access to markets has been pursued by 
acquisitions and the development of manufacturing facilities. In Saudi Arabia 
Hikma has a number of manufacturing facilities owned by Jazeera 
Pharmaceutical Industries (JPI), which is now fully owned by Hikma (final 
acquisition of the remaining shares of JPI took place in Autumn 2006).717 
These facilities produce solid, semi-solid and liquid products but not 
injectables. In Algeria construction of a production facility for solid, semi-
solid and liquid branded generics began in 2006 and once completed the 
facility will supply the Algerian market.  
 
Of more importance to increased product sales and market access is the 
attainment of regulatory body approval for Hikma products. Prior to 1999 as 
mentioned above, Jordanian manufacturers of pharmaceutical goods operated 
in a relatively lenient IPRs regime. However, following membership of the 
WTO and compliance with the TRIPs agreement, and implementation of the 
JUSFTA this regime was significantly altered. In order for Hikma, as well as 
all other domestic manufacturers to comply with new legislation and maintain 
domestic and export sales licences would have to be obtained for in-patent 
products. Furthermore, in order to gain access to the main international 
markets not only would licences for in-patent products be needed but also the 
registration and approval of new products developed by Jordanian 
manufacturers would be required. As is discussed in more detail below the 
pharmaceutical industry is largely driven (at least in the medium- to long-term 
future) by development of new products. To sell products in the US market 
approval of both the products and manufacturing facilities by the USFDA is 
first needed.718 Likewise, in Europe approval of both products and facilities is 
required from the Medical and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA).719  
 
With regards to generic pharmaceutical goods manufactured by Hikma, the 
main production facilities for these products are located in Jordan and Eaton 
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Town, New Jersey in the United States. Both of these facilities have been 
given USFDA and MHRA approval allowing goods produced in them access 
to the US and European markets. Also given approval by the US and EU 
bodies are the production facilities in Saudi Arabia, Portugal and Italy. The 
facility currently under construction in Algeria is also being developed to 
USFDA and MHRA approved standard and so should gain approval once 
fully operational.720 Between 1995 and 2006 Hikma has received USFDA 
approval on thirty-three products, the vast majority of these being approved in 
the post-2001 regime. A further twenty-one products are awaiting approval, 
most of which are CNS, cardiovascular, anti-infective and musculoskeletal 
products. The cephalosporins, lyophilized and injectable goods produced in 
the Portuguese and Italian facilities have received MHRA approval and as a 
result sales in the European market have expanded from 1 percent of total 
sales in 1995 to 7.8 percent in 2007.  
 
The growth of Hikma Pharmaceuticals over the past fifteen years or so and in 
particular following Jordanian membership of the WTO in 1999 has been 
dynamic. By focusing on gaining access to international markets by locating 
production facilities through acquisitions and licensed development, products 
have been given a degree of comparative advantage over other producers. By 
gaining regulatory body approval for many of its pharmaceutical products and 
by investing in R&D in order to gain approval on products in development 
Hikma has managed to capitalise on competitive advantages and has increased 
sales in external markets including the US market which is now its most 
important sales market.  
 
Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
 
APM was the first Jordanian pharmaceuticals manufacturer to begin 
operations. It was established in Salt 1962 and its first production facility 
began operating in 1966. Its core product lines include intravenous solutions, 
chemical and nutritional products, a small range of cosmetics and a wide 
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range of medications.721 Growth of APM has been witnessed at a steadily 
increasing rate in the past decade from US$16 million in revenue in 1991 to 
over US$89 million in 2006. As a result of the change in management regime 
of the industry in Jordan, overall sales dropped 12.2 percent in 1999 and a 
further 6.4 percent in 2000.722 However, in both years net income increased 
slightly as a result of the move towards the production of higher-value goods 
and decreased production costs. Since 2001 sales have recovered and posted 
strong growth. Sustained growth was also supported by the issuance of 
production rights by external MNCs operating in the pharmaceutical industry 
(discussed below). With the small size and relatively high level of competition 
in the domestic market, exports have dominated APM revenue since the 
1970s. In 2006 export sales constituted 71 percent of total revenues while 
domestic sales (17 percent) and public tenders (12 percent) made up the 
remaining sales revenues.723  
 
As mentioned above, the pharmaceutical industry is extremely competitive 
both within Jordan and in international markets. The only method of 
sustaining growth and competitiveness in the medium to long term is to invest 
in R&D activities to produce new and quality assured goods. In a sector which 
has become highly saturated with relatively small corporations, market share 
and overall capital resources can be reduced. According to Fakhry Hazimeh 
this has been the case in Jordan since the early 1990s.724 APM realised 
relatively early on in the first period of transformation in the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical sector (the second being the post-1999 change in governing 
regime) that the combining of resources would be necessary to maintain 
competitiveness. In light of this APM negotiated a total merger with 
Advanced Pharmaceuticals, a small corporation established in 1994.725 
According to Issam Hamdi Saket, the Managing Director of APM, the merger 
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was seen to be beneficial as Advanced Pharmaceuticals brought with it a 
number of new products as well as an MHRA certified production facility. In 
return APM offered relatively large capital resources, a large labour pool and 
highly established regional marketing systems.  
 
The APM strategy since the mid-1990s has been to adapt to the emerging 
TRIPs dominated regime governing the international pharmaceutical industry. 
After 1999 this strategy has intensified. According to Saket production has 
diversified away from the generic pharmaceutical goods which had dominated 
production since APM’s establishment towards high-value added USFDA and 
MHRA approved products.726 Other efforts to facilitate the flow of technology 
and know-how to APM include the arranging of conferences, seminars and 
trade missions between Jordanian physicians and pharmacists (most working 
for APM) and experts from other states and corporations.727 While APM has 
not made extensive efforts to gain USFDA and MHRA approval for its 
production facilities and products it has constantly pursued licensing 
agreements from patent holders.728 The largest such licensing agreement is 
held with Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd., a Japanese pharmaceutical MNC 
for the production of goods such as Takepron and Danzen which are 
prescribed for ulcer treatment and antibiotic treatment respectively.  
 
The overall growth and development of APM has to a large extent not been as 
successful as that of Hikma Pharmaceuticals. However, the general pattern of 
performance has been similar. The change in governing regime has presented 
both opportunities and challenges to Jordanian pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Both Hikma and APM have developed strategies to combat the challenges and 
exploit the benefits of complying with the TRIPs dominated international 
environment. The growth pattern is similar for Dar Al-Dawa (DAD), the third 
leading Jordanian pharmaceuticals corporation as well as the other smaller 
actors.  
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Dar Al-Dawa 
 
DAD was established in 1975 in Amman as a public shareholding 
corporation. While smaller in size compared to Hikma and APM, DAD still 
boasts capital resources of US$28 million in 2006.729 While maintaining a 
significant presence in the domestic market, DAD is largely an export 
oriented corporation obtaining over 70 percent of its revenues from the export 
of goods to international markets. Overall growth since 1991 has steadily 
increased, however, it is in the post-1999 period that rapid growth has been 
seen. The majority of this growth has been spurred by further penetration in 
regional markets, most notably in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Other major 
markets include Iraq, Libya, Russia and Romania.730  
 
In 2002 DAD was issued with current Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) 
from the MHRA for its manufacturing facility located in Na’ur, Jordan.731 All 
goods produced in this facility therefore qualified for sale in the EU market. 
Other facilities operated by DAD include one in Algiers, Algeria and one in 
Tripoli, Libya. Both facilities are geared to serve their respective markets but 
exports from them to external markets are limited.732 Approval of facilities 
and products has not been attained from the USFDA although extensive 
efforts have been made since 2002 to gain USFDA approved status. DAD 
manufacturing processes and products have come into line with USFDA 
regulations and applications for USFDA approval have been made for the 
Na’ur facility. Even without approval by the USFDA, DAD operations have 
to take place in a relatively strict quality assurance environment in Jordan.  
 
While manufacturing standards are important in all manufacturing industries, 
quality assurance is usually a matter for corporate policy. However, in Jordan 
extensive governmental regulations, which have been further strengthened 
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since 1999 have resulted in a relatively strict domestic quality assurance 
regime.733 Gaining USFDA approval would allow DAD to expand its 
international operations and gain access to the US market, joining Hikma as 
the only Jordanian pharmaceuticals corporation to enjoy such access. As will 
be discussed below, Jordanian membership in the WTO and the JUSFTA 
present Jordanian corporations with more opportunities to gain access to the 
US market and so USFDA approval has been sought by several other 
corporations, although not yet achieved.  
 
In order to remain competitive in both the domestic market and more 
importantly in international markets, DAD has also pursued a policy of under-
license production of internationally approved products. There are currently 
six joint ventures between DAD and its subsidiaries with international 
partners across the MENA region and in Eastern Europe. These include, Dar 
Al Dawa – Algeria, an Algiers based marketing and distribution specialist for 
pharmaceutical goods (DAD now owns 90 percent of this corporation); Dar 
Al Dawa Pharma – Romania, a DAD owned manufacturing subsidiary.734 
DAD produces under-license goods for New York-based Pfizer and 
Switzerland-based Novartis.735 Joint ventures in the domestic market have 
also been pursed. DAD owns a 43 percent share in NutriDar, a Jordanian 
corporation established in 1994 which produces baby food for the domestic 
and external markets. Its export markets are based solely in the MENA region 
with sales totalling just over US$8 million in 2006.736 A second joint venture 
is with DADVet (32 percent share), a corporation specialising in veterinary 
medicines and equipment and in particular the conducting of field trials of 
products developed by regional and global actors.737  
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TRIPS, JUSFTA and the Jordanian Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
  
Joining the WTO in 1999 and thereafter having to comply with TRIPs 
agreement regulations transformed the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector. Prior 
to 1999, government legislation and regulation of the industry had begun to 
strengthen quality assurance and compliance with some international 
agreements on IPRs. However, the vast majority of Jordanian corporations 
producing both generic, off-patent and under-license products did so without 
fully complying with both contemporary good manufacturing practices 
(cGMP) and, in many circumstances, patent-holder permission.738 After 1999 
this would no longer be possible in the case of the latter point and in the case 
of the former would not allow for sustained growth of the sector. All 
pharmaceutical goods produced in Jordan which were not under-license or 
off-patent prior to 1999 immediately became illegal as a result of the 
Jordanian government’s decision to forego the allowed five year transition 
period to full TRIPs compliance. It was claimed by many observers both 
within the industry and external to it that sustained competitiveness in the 
domestic and external markets as well as future growth would be seriously 
undermined by the change in governing regime.739 In addition, the JUSFTA 
would strengthen this regime with regards to bilateral trade with the United 
States. However, according to Fakhry Hazimeh, decision makers in 
government and those involved in negotiating WTO membership and the 
JUSFTA saw opportunities for further expansion in the sector. Furthermore, 
the possibility to strengthen comparative advantages already enjoyed by 
Jordanian corporations vis-à-vis regional and international competitors was 
anticipated.740   
 
The change in regime was seen as a bad thing because TRIPs laws and FTA 
provisions would have to be enforced, thus hindering domestic production and 
raising costs of both manufacturing and products for domestic consumers. It 
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was feared that there would be a loss of revenues resulting from the inability 
to produce certain goods or the loss of profits due to remuneration of relevant 
patent-holders. The resulting decline of Jordanian corporations would then 
lead to a loss of international and domestic market share as they would not be 
able to compete with European MNCs which enjoy larger capital resources.741  
 
However, these fears have not been entirely realised. Even the smaller 
corporations have been able to maintain sales and activity in the domestic 
market. Instead adjustment to the new governing regime and exploitation of 
the new opportunities created by this shift has been seen. Conformity with 
international standards has led to USFDA and MHRA approval of certain 
products of Hikma Pharmaceuticals, and some facilities for APM, DAD and a 
range of smaller corporations allowing for greater market access.742 In the 
case of Hikma, as mentioned above, US sales now constitute a large part of 
revenues, while European sales have increased rapidly since 2001 for APM 
and regional exports have risen for DAD. Access to the US and European 
markets would not have been possible prior to conformity with international 
standards and laws. In order to combat the challenges presented by TRIPs and 
FTA provisions as well as gaining USFDA and MHRA approval, the leading 
Jordanian corporations have pursued a number of strategies. The most 
effective has been to fully comply with the necessary regulations and improve 
both manufacturing processes and products.  
 
Encouragement of joint ventures with domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers 
has also been pursued. The results have been technology and knowledge 
transfer, greater capital investment, greater external market access and 
increased funds for R&D activity.743 Prior to WTO accession Jordanian 
manufacturers did comply with some process and product patents and so 
further compliance has had measured impact. As other regional states join the 
WTO and conform with TRIPs regulations, Jordanian manufacturers will not 
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be disadvantaged but instead will be in a better position to enjoy advantages 
stemming from already adjusting to the dominant international regime.  
 
In short, the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector has become an export driven 
sector which has been moving towards the following goals: a greater share of 
the domestic market; a greater share of international markets propelled by 
both increased shares in current export markets and access to non-traditional 
markets (mainly the US and EU); conformity with international standards to 
improve quality and thus attractiveness to FDI; some knowledge and 
technology transfer through joint ventures with external MNCs; and increased 
R&D activity while increasing production levels of generic and licensed 
pharmaceutical products.744 
 
The Jordanian pharmaceutical sector has become much more attractive to 
external actors since 1999. Growth has been strong and successful export 
expansion is likely to continue. The overall investment climate in Jordan was 
negatively affected by the build up to and the actual US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2002-2003. Furthermore, continuing problems in Palestine and Lebanon have 
kept some FDI away from the region as a whole. However, the Jordanian 
market has proven resilient for a number of decades and the investment 
climate has recovered strongly. As further USFDA approval is sought 
Jordanian exports to and investments in the US market may increase. This 
would be a dramatic shift in bilateral trade relations between the two states. 
Potential for greater US pharmaceutical exports exists and following the 
implementation of the JUSFTA, US pharmaceutical corporations have 
actually increased their share of the Jordanian market (although European and 
Jordanian actors still dominate).745 However, what is perhaps of more interest 
in relation to the assessment of contemporary and future trade between Jordan 
and the United States in pharmaceutical goods is the potential for cooperation 
between US and Jordanian corporations.  
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The US Pharmaceutical Industry and Government 
Policy 
 
United States policy with regards to international IPRs deviates slightly from 
the overall structure of contemporary US trade policy outlined in chapter four. 
To briefly recap, this thesis claims that US trade policy has become 
increasingly bilateral in nature as opposed to focusing on the multilateralism 
of the post-World War Two and post-Cold War eras. In particular the 
negotiation of bilateral FTAs or Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) as 
some observers have called them,746 under the Bush Administrations has 
become a policy tool used in order to achieve broader political and economic 
goals. In short, bilateral FTAs between the United States and other states are 
not necessarily solely about economic benefit but they are also about US 
foreign policy goals (see discussion in chapter four). However, in the case of 
US policy on international IPRs, foreign policy plays a minor role compared 
with domestic and international economic policy.747 Indeed, the inclusion of 
stringent provisions relating to IPRs in the Moroccan and Australian FTAs, 
for example, had presented major negotiating problems.748 In the case of the 
JUSFTA the provisions relating to IPRs are not as severe as the FTAs the 
United States has since implemented with other states.  
 
While the bilateral FTAs the United States has negotiated since 2000 have 
included articles on IPRs, they do not act as the only policy approach that the 
United States has pursued in order to bolster international respect and 
enforcement of property rights laws. Rather the issue was at the forefront of 
US foreign economic and trade policy from the late 1980s and became an 
increasingly important issue through the 1990s and the period of 
multilateralism pursued under the Clinton Administrations.749 During the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the United States had two primary 
                                                 
746
 Schott, J. J., 2004, p: 3. 
747
 Bergsten, C. F. et al., 2005, The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Policy 
for the Next Decade, Washington: Institute for International Economics, pp: 417-419. 
748
 Thomas J. R., 2005, p: 7. 
749
 Bergsten, C. F., 2005, pp: 19-24. 
 236 
policy goals: the first was the creation of a more concrete governance body for 
the international trading regime to replace the GATT system; the second key 
policy goal was the internationalisation of IPRs and a system of laws and 
regulations which would create a strict and enforceable regime.750 As 
mentioned above many observers have noted that the TRIPs agreement and its 
enforcement through the WTO do not necessarily meet all of the expectations 
of the US government or those of many actors in the private sector. Bilateral 
FTAs can therefore be seen as a mechanism through which the United States 
can strengthen the regime governing international IPRs with FTA partners.751  
 
With regards to the provisions of the JUSFTA relating to the T&C sector there 
is little evidence that the agreement with Jordan was, firstly ever expected to 
have, and secondly has had a significant impact on the US T&C sector. The 
Jordanian market is too small to allow for increased US T&C exports and 
using Jordan as an access point to a larger market in the MENA region and 
beyond would not be of much benefit as US T&C manufacturing exports to 
the MENA region are relatively small and static anyway. There has been no 
large scale lowering of the price of T&C goods in the US market as a result of 
cheaper Jordanian T&C goods being imported on an increased scale since 
2001. Likewise there has been no significant increase in US exports in T&C 
goods or related material to Jordan.752 Much of the Jordan-US trade has taken 
this form, with no significant impact on the US economy and a significant 
impact on the Jordanian economy. However, emphasis on IPRs has been more 
for economic rather than political or strategic reasons.753  
 
There are a number of core economic reasons why the United States has 
focused on IPRs when negotiating and implementing bilateral FTAs. A 2005 
research study conducted by the US Congressional Research Service 
concluded that intellectual property is a cornerstone of both the health and 
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competitiveness of the US economy in the twenty-first century.754 US 
manufacturing industries have been in relative decline vis-à-vis other states 
since the 1980s. This is partly a result of the industrialisation of other states 
around the world in the past two decades and partly because the nature of the 
US economy has changed. The US economy is now very much a knowledge-
based economy with high value-added products and services accounting for 
increasingly large amounts of the state’s GDP.755 The US pharmaceutical 
industry is just one example of this, as is the finance sector which is looked at 
in the following chapter. The US pharmaceutical industry and consumer 
market are the largest in the world. There are over seven hundred and fifty 
corporations involved in pharmaceutical manufacturing in the United States 
and total revenue for the pharmaceutical sector in 2006 surpassed US$289 
billion.756 Total employment in the same year amounted to over one hundred 
and seventy-three thousand employees (compared to twenty-three thousand 
employees for the United Kingdom and only eighteen thousand employees in 
Germany – the second and third largest pharmaceutical sectors in terms of 
employment).757 These figures depict an industry and market far surpassing 
any other. This sector as well as other knowledge based and high value-added 
sectors are therefore extremely important to the US economy. Protecting IPRs 
such as patents, trademarks and copyrights is seen as key to maintaining the 
strength and revenues of these sectors.758 
 
The JUSFTA, while ensuring that Jordanian manufacturers abide by a strict 
regulatory regime for IPRs, does little in terms of preserving the 
competitiveness and revenues of US manufacturers on its own. Likewise, no 
single bilateral FTA is entirely significant on its own in these terms. However, 
the spread of the international regime for IPRs through the WTO and the 
TRIPs agreement coupled with a rising number of bilateral FTAs does. 
                                                 
754
 Thomas J. R., 2005, p: 7. 
755
 Kress, C., Regional Director Middle East and North Africa, US Trade and Development 
Agency, interview held in Washington DC, United States, on March 24 2008.  
756
 PhRMA, 2006, Industry Profile: Pharmaceuticals, Washington: Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America.  
757
 Van Beuzekom, B., and Arundel, A., 2006, OECD Biotechnology Statistics, Paris: OECD, 
p: 21. 
758
 Maskus, K., 2000.  
 238 
Furthermore, the bilateral FTAs the Bush Administrations have signed since 
2000 all have the potential of expanding into larger multilateral FTAs. The 
proposed US-MENA FTA being an example of this, with the JUSFTA being 
followed by the Bahrain-US FTA, the Morocco-US FTA, the Oman-US FTA 
and proposed FTAs with other regional states such as Egypt.  
 
US Corporations Operating in the Jordanian 
Pharmaceutical Market  
 
Unlike the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector, the US sector is not dominated by 
a small number of corporations and actors. Instead there are a large number of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, many of which have extremely large capital 
resources and wide ranging activities in many markets. However, even these 
large corporations only occupy a small percentage of the US market.759 It is 
possible for US-based corporations to have such high levels of revenue with 
only a limited share of the US market for three core reasons. Firstly, the sheer 
size of the domestic market means that large profits can be made even with a 
small percentage share of the market. Second, US pharmaceutical 
corporations are among the most competitive in the world and dominate many 
international markets leading to large revenues from exports. And finally, the 
large amounts of capital and human resources employed by US corporations 
in R&D activity (the highest in global terms) allows them to remain 
competitive and own the rights to new products and processes.760 It is these 
latter two issues which are of most relevance to pharmaceutical trade with 
Jordan.  
 
US pharmaceutical exports to the Jordanian market have expanded relatively 
rapidly in the past decade and especially in the post-1999 period. In 1995 total 
US exports stood at just under US$5.08 million, this figure grew to US$7.6 
million in 1999 and totalled just under US$19 million in 2006.761 This 
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quadrupling of exports value in the twelve year period is quite dramatic and 
translates into US corporations having an increased share of the Jordanian 
market relative to European firms – Jordanian manufacturers have also 
slightly increased domestic market share as highlighted above. US 
corporations have also begun to increase their activities in the Jordanian 
market through investment and joint projects with Jordanian counterparts. 
This has only been possible as a direct result of the Jordanian government’s 
implementation of TRIPs agreement provisions and the JUSFTA provisions 
relating to IPRs. As the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector’s operating practices 
and regulatory regime comes further into line with that of the US sector, US 
corporations have been able to capitalise on some of the advantages presented 
by involvement in the Jordanian market.  
 
In short these advantages are greater access to the MENA market through 
Jordan, lower operating costs in the development of new products and 
processes through joint R&D activity, and investment opportunities in the 
expanding Jordanian pharmaceutical industry. However, thus far only a small 
number of US corporations have been involved in the Jordanian sector in 
these ways. In fact, according to Fakhry Hazimeh the expectation in Jordan 
was that there would be far greater investment and joint projects between 
Jordanian corporations and US entities following 1999.762 An examination of 
the activities of US corporations in Jordan reveals this tendency to engage 
with the Jordanian market only at a limited level. 
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Figure 6.2 US Pharmaceutical Exports to Jordan 1995 – 2006763 
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Pfizer 
 
Pfizer is one of the largest pharmaceutical MNCs in the world, ranking third 
in global sales (US$32.4 billion per annum).764 However, although Pfizer 
accounts for approximately 10 percent of global sales, sales and activity in the 
MENA region have remained relatively limited. This is largely due to the fact 
that this region only accounts for 10 percent of the global market and is 
relatively saturated with domestic, European and other US pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.765 A second factor hindering or otherwise discouraging greater 
activity in the MENA market as a whole has been the growth of other markets 
such as India which has diverted investments and sales from the MENA 
region.766 Nevertheless, the global pharmaceutical industry has maintained 
steady growth over the past decade and a half and Pfizer as one of the leading 
corporations has continued to expand its global presence.767  
 
As mentioned above, the changes in the governing regime for the 
pharmaceutical (and other intellectual property related fields) in Jordan since 
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1999 have created an environment which is more in line with the US industry. 
This theoretically should facilitate the operation of US pharmaceutical 
corporations in Jordan, whether that is investment, sales or joint projects such 
as R&D activity. Pfizer has explored these opportunities – although only to a 
limited extent.768 Pfizer is typical of large pharmaceutical MNCs in terms of 
its profit making activities. While it is a major producer of pharmaceutical 
goods, it is largely a research-driven global entity, constantly developing new 
products and processes. Due to this reliance on R&D for profits Pfizer has 
been increasingly outsourcing its R&D activities to markets with lower R&D 
costs but appropriately high standards of operating procedures and IPRs 
protection.  
 
Since 2000 Pfizer has been expanding its operations in the Jordanian market. 
This is a trend which has not been seen before in the small Jordanian market 
due to its previously weak IPRs regime. The number of employees working in 
the pharmaceutical sector in Jordan on behalf of Pfizer increased between 
2000 and 2006.769 As mentioned above DAD produces goods which are 
licensed by Pfizer – this licence was granted in 2001 following the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement and Pfizer’s decision to start to 
expand in the Jordanian market. In 2004 Pfizer took the decision to conduct 
clinical trials in Jordan as part of its R&D process for cardio-vascular drugs. 
In total four clinical trials have been conducted over a two year period in 
conjunction with the King Hussein Medical Centre and Hospital in Amman. 
The trials are believed to have involved up to two-hundred patients. 
According to Fakhry Hazimeh the lower operating costs for the trials in 
Jordan along with the highly skilled professionals available to conduct them 
and the quality facilities in Amman, attracted Pfizer. These incentives were 
coupled with the now strong IPRs governing regime in Jordan.770  
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Merck and Co. 
 
The majority of large and successful pharmaceutical MNCs are relatively old 
– due to the length of time it takes to develop new products and processes, 
pharmaceutical corporations tend to need many years to develop and grow and 
Merck & Co. is no exception to this rule. Originally established in Germany in 
the late seventeenth century a US-based branch of Merck KGaA was set up in 
New York in 1891. This corporation was later confiscated in 1917 during the 
First World War and became an independent US corporation that same year. 
In 2006 Merck & Co. had grown to become the largest global pharmaceutical 
MNC with total sales of US$51.8 billion per annum.771  
 
In a similar manner to Pfizer’s expansion in Jordan, Merck & Co. has 
increased its number of staff working in Jordan five-fold since 2000. The vast 
majority of these employees are employed in clinical trial projects currently 
being conducted in collaboration with Jordanian corporations. In the period 
2003-2006 Merck and Co. carried out three clinical trials at the King Hussein 
Medical Centre and Hospital. However, these trials were more limited than 
those carried out by Pfizer.772 Perhaps the activities of Merck and Co. in 
Jordan which are most important are a series of educational meetings and 
academic programmes held in Amman. These peaked in 2004 when seventy-
five were held.773 There were two main aims of these events, which included 
meetings, seminars and lectures. Firstly, events have been focused on IPRs 
and strengthening the IPRs regime in Jordan through the dissemination of 
information pertaining to the TRIPs and JUSFTA agreements. Second, events 
were used to share and develop both products and processes as well as R&D 
activities being conducted in Jordan by Merck and Co.774 While the Jordanian 
pharmaceutical industry has not received as great a benefit as could have been 
expected as a result of implementing TRIPs and JUSFTA IPRs provisions, 
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observers such as Keith Maskus note that this form of technology transfer and 
intellectual engagement is in itself a significant investment.775  
 
Other US Corporations Operating in Jordan: Aventis, 
Organon, Bristol Myers Squibb and Eli Lilly 
 
There are in total six US based pharmaceutical MNCs operating in the 
Jordanian market through sales and investments. Pfizer and Merck & Co. have 
the largest investments in Jordan but the remaining four corporations do have 
a significant presence in the market also in the form of sales, investment, and 
clinical trials. Aventis has tripled its workforce in Jordan since 2000. Six local 
and relatively small clinical trials as well as a relatively large clinical R&D 
trial were conducted through 2004 and 2005 in conjunction with the King 
Hussein Medical Centre and Hospital.776  
 
Organon was the first US-based pharmaceutical MNC to conduct clinical 
R&D trials in Jordan. In 2000 Organon initiated a number of trials for its new 
fertility therapy. However, in the past three years Organon has had limited 
activity in Jordan.777 Likewise Bristol Myers Squibb has conducted R&D 
trials in Amman, including a three year five-thousand patient trial initiated in 
2001 to study risk factors affecting cardiovascular health in Jordan.778 The 
corporation is also a member of the Jordanian Ministry of Health’s 
participation in the HIV/AIDS Accelerated Access Initiative – which is a joint 
initiative between a number of MNCs and international organisations which 
includes UNAID, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the WB and 
UNICEF among others.779 Continuing this same pattern of activity, Eli Lilly 
has also conducted a number of clinical trials and further R&D projects are 
planned for the 2007-2009 period.780 However, Eli Lilly has not restricted its 
activity to this form of investment alone, rather it is currently the only US 
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MNC which has a marketing partnership with a Jordanian counterpart (Hikma 
Pharmaceuticals) where co-promotion activity takes place in both the US and 
Jordanian markets for both corporations. These initiatives have been driven by 
the private sector following the liberalisation of the investment and 
privatisation laws since 2000 and the firming up of the IPRs protection regime 
in Jordan. 
 
TRIPs, JUSFTA and the US Pharmaceutical Industry  
 
The US pharmaceutical industry is driven by the development of new 
products through R&D activity – as well as on financial flows and capital 
investments. In order for US pharmaceutical corporations to maintain their 
profit margins and market presence they continue to develop new products. 
However, R&D activity is very costly in terms of capital resources, time and 
manpower. In the pursuit of reducing R&D costs and increasing profits 
corporations such as Pfizer and Merck and Co. have pursued the outsourcing 
of some R&D activities to other states and markets where R&D costs are 
lower but where high standards and operating procedures are met along with 
IPRs protection being guaranteed.781 In markets where IPRs are not enforced 
or respected there is little incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
conduct R&D for fear of the likely theft of technology, information, products 
and processes. However, through the US government vigorously pursuing the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement and more stringent bilateral 
provisions relating to IPRs, more markets are becoming ‘business friendly’ for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.782 As a result outsourcing of R&D activity is 
taking place at an increasing pace and is likely to continue. This includes 
outsourcing to the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector. The lack of enforcement 
of IPRs in neighbouring states such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt has further 
helped promote the Jordanian market as a regional market for R&D 
outsourcing. 
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The very nature of the pharmaceutical industry means that the outsourcing of 
production is not often witnessed. In the T&C industry moving manufacturing 
plants to less developed states usually has the benefit of lowering production 
costs and thus increasing profits. However, the production of pharmaceutical 
goods is characterised by relatively low production costs (as opposed to very 
high R&D costs) and low transport costs no matter where they are produced 
due to the fact that the goods are small, light and mass produced. Of course, 
the production facilities are relatively expensive to construct, operate and 
maintain. This is necessary in order to gain approval by regulatory bodies 
such as the USFDA in order to sell the goods in the largest markets and so is 
unavoidable. Also, it is the development of the products not the actual 
manufacturing of them which is expensive – again this has little to do with 
where they are actually manufactured.783 According to Professor Michael 
Ryan, the fact that the manufacturing of pharmaceutical goods is rarely 
outsourced is precisely why US corporations have not invested in Jordan in 
that way.784 Rather, Ryan suggests that investment in the pharmaceutical 
sector comes in the form of R&D, product licensing, and clinical trials (in the 
case of the latter usually because payment and compensation costs are 
extremely low in developing states such as Jordan).785 It is in these areas that 
US corporations have begun to invest in the Jordanian pharmaceutical sector.  
 
As mentioned above, US corporations in the past five years have increased 
their range of activities in Jordan. Sales have grown relatively rapidly but 
investment has been slightly slower to emerge. However, a number of key 
R&D and clinical trial projects have been conducted or are currently 
underway. With the continued strengthening of the Jordanian IPRs regime and 
further marketing by Jordanian corporations the experiences of Pfizer, Merck 
and Co. and Aventis will possibly lead to more investment and clinical trials. 
Furthermore, this is likely to take place not just between Jordanian actors and 
the US corporations discussed above but also other US-based actors.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed a second form of trade activity between Jordan and 
the United States: trade in high value-added, capital intensive and high-
technology manufactured pharmaceutical goods. Studying this form of trade 
develops the overall analysis in this thesis as it offers an analysis of a different 
form of trade in a number of ways. Not only is the type of economic activity 
very different to the activity in the T&C sector discussed in the previous 
chapter but it also entails different institutional frameworks, different types of 
actors and different processes. In chapter five Jordanian state and non-state 
actors as well as foreign actors operating in Jordan dominated bilateral trade 
in T&C goods. This is quite fitting due to the nature of the Jordanian economy 
as a less developed one which has had only measured success industrialising 
and so specialises in labour-intensive, often low value-added manufactures. 
However, the United States represents the most advanced economy in global 
terms and has by far the greatest resources dedicated to R&D in high-
technology industries.  
 
As discussed above the pharmaceutical industry is driven by R&D and large 
capital pools. Thus the US economy would naturally be expected to be more 
dominant in trade in pharmaceutical goods. However, the analysis presented 
in this chapter demonstrates that trade between Jordan and the United States 
in pharmaceutical products is much more even than would be expected. Trade 
levels are much more even in value terms than say trade in T&C goods. 
However, this is not simply because actors based in either market are as 
competitive as each other. It would be more appropriate to claim that trade 
between the two markets is in fact limited to the same extent. Jordan-based 
actors are largely uncompetitive in the more advanced international markets 
such as the US and EU. Furthermore, they have relatively low capital assets 
and limited access to some of the latest technologies and either have not 
attempted to or have failed to receive approval from the relevant regulatory 
bodies in foreign markets. Only Hikma Pharmaceuticals has managed to 
penetrate the US market to any great extent. Nevertheless even this 
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corporation’s levels of trade with the US market are quite insignificant in 
overall market terms. For actors based in the United States the Jordanian 
market simply is not attractive. Over-saturation of the market supply due to a 
large number of small Jordanian corporations and larger European MNCs 
along with the limited population size, limited income and resulting small size 
of the market have largely discouraged US-based actors.  
 
Regardless of the small levels of overall trade between the two states in 
pharmaceutical goods significant elements of the political economy of trade 
between them can be discussed. Here there are two main features which are 
important in understanding both the nature of Jordan-US economic interaction 
and the role of the international institutions the states have engaged with. In 
the first instance, trade liberalisation seems to have had little impact on overall 
levels of trade in pharmaceutical products. The expansion of Hikma 
Pharmaceuticals into the US market dates back to the early 1990s and so 
predates the period of liberalisation and increased state level cooperation. 
Exports of goods from the US market to the Jordanian market are very limited 
in value even though they have seen significant increases since bilateral trade 
liberalisation was embarked upon. However, some US corporations have 
begun to operate in the Jordanian market since 2001 in the form of joint R&D 
ventures with Jordanian actors and clinical trials – albeit in a limited capacity. 
This has only been made possible due to Jordanian involvement in IOs such as 
the WTO and adherence to various regimes such as the TRIPS agreement and 
JUSFTA. This form of activity (while not overly significant in trms of scope) 
has thus emerged as a result of the state level facilitation of trade through 
international institutions.  
 
The question regarding which state interests have been pursued and if these 
are being achieved must also be addressed again here. Referring back to the 
discussions in chapters three and four it was determined that the Jordanian 
government has pursued policies of political and economic reform and 
engaged with international institutions in order to pursue sustained economic 
growth. With regards to the United States the proposition was put forward that 
the US government maintains traditional interests in Jordan and the MENA 
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region based largely on security and support for its foreign and economic 
policies there. The state level cooperation with Jordan and the resultant 
facilitation of bilateral trade through trade liberalisation and international 
institutions is one element in the United States’ efforts to deepen state level 
cooperation and market integration with Jordan. The analysis of trade in 
pharmaceutical products does offer some insights in to how successful the 
pursuit of these interests has been. The reorientation of the Jordanian domestic 
regulatory regime and engagement with global regulatory regimes for 
pharmaceutical goods, especially protection for IPRs has begun to lead to an 
adjustment in the domestic sector and competitiveness of actors involved in it. 
However, trade liberalisation with the United States as mentioned above has 
had limited impact thus suggesting that economic growth in the sector and 
thus the broader economy may be slow to materialise. The United States’ 
facilitation of trade in this sector has not significantly deepened the integration 
of the two markets. There are signs that greater state level cooperation through 
joint engagement in the WTO-led regime governing IPRs, for example, could 
lead to greater cooperation through unifying some state interests.  
 
The issue of the balance between multiple relations between different actors at 
the domestic and international levels and the gains sought and achieved at 
these different levels is also illuminated by the analysis presented here. Unlike 
the rather unipolar gains achieved by the Jordanian state and market due to 
trade in T&C goods, there seems to be more even gains with regards to trade 
in pharmaceutical products although the United States could be seen as 
gaining more. Trade levels are not very high and Jordanian exports to the US 
market account for a slightly greater share of the overall trade. Nevertheless, 
the Jordanian adherence to various international agreements and the JUSFTA 
and thus international regulatory regimes for pharmaceutical goods means that 
US actors gain to some extent in economic terms while the US government 
gains by expanding the network of (largely US inspired) international 
institutions governing these products. The impact on broader state level 
cooperation and integration in both the economic and political spheres, 
however, does not seem to be greatly impacted upon by the liberalisation of 
trade in pharmaceutical products. Some measure of economic integration and 
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political cooperation is evident within this sector but there is little evidence 
that suggests this cooperation can go beyond sector specific interests. In order 
to develop the analysis of the political economy of trade between Jordan and 
the United States and to answer the core questions it is necessary to examine 
one final form of trade relations in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bilateral Trade in Banking and Insurance 
Services  
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Introduction  
 
This third case study chapter examines the framework for and nature of trade 
in banking and insurance services between Jordan and the United States. The 
assessment and analysis presented develops the overall examination of the 
political economy of trade between the two states by looking at a ‘third form 
of trade activity’, broadly defined as services. This chapter examines and 
analyses Jordan-US trade in banking and insurance services as case studies of 
financial services trade. While the previous two chapters have presented 
analyses of trade in low value-added and high valued-added goods 
respectively, the analysis here presents yet another unique picture. Despite the 
increasing integration of, and rising trade levels between the two economies, 
the low levels of trade in banking and insurance services prevalent in the pre-
2000 period persist today. The significance of this lack of trade activity lies 
not in contemporary economic opportunities being missed but in the overall 
potential for Jordan-US trade relations.  Furthermore, this analysis offers an 
insight into the ways in which the political economy of Jordan-US trade may 
hinder rather than promote trade in banking and insurance services.  
 
This chapter also represents a discussion of how cooperation between the 
United States and Jordan over the past decade has led the latter to engage with 
a number of regulatory regimes through the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and the JUSFTA. This discussion examines the nature of 
inter-state cooperation with regards to these institutions and coupled with the 
developments in actual market interaction assesses the impacts upon state 
level interaction and cooperation. As with the previous four chapters a 
multitude of both state and non-state actors are examined and the multiple 
links between these actors and relevant issues are considered. Furthermore, 
the impact of trade liberalisation and interaction in the banking and insurance 
sectors upon the state policy interests outlined in chapters three and four is 
assessed.   
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Any study of trade in financial services is at the same time both complex and 
limited. The very nature of financial services presents a number of problems 
for the quantification and regulation of such activity even at the domestic 
level. At the international level this is even more difficult. The result is that 
studying trade in financial services can be restricted.  However, some forms of 
financial services are easier to study than others and indeed there is a great 
variation in these service sectors which need to be clearly defined. The first 
section of this chapter thus defines what is meant by financial services, what 
the various forms are and how they differ, and which forms are most 
important with regards to trade in banking and insurance services between 
Jordan and the United States. The banking and insurance service sectors are 
introduced as the sectors analysed here and by doing so the intention is also to 
clarify the rationale for the study of these services in this chapter and the 
exclusion of others. 
 
Due to the nature of financial services and their importance to economic 
activity at all levels, the international framework governing these services 
directly shapes the domestic framework. The second section of this chapter 
thus examines the international and domestic regulatory frameworks within 
which Jordan-US financial services trade takes place. Much the same as with 
trade in T&C and pharmaceutical goods, trade in financial services is 
governed by a comprehensive international framework. Through the WTO-
negotiated GATS, trade in all forms of services has been liberalised (an 
ongoing process) and governed since the mid- to late-1990s. As members of 
the WTO, both Jordan and the United States are thus members of GATS and 
the international framework for services trade. Furthermore, the JUSFTA 
includes provisions on trade in services which strengthen and advance the 
provisions of the GATS agreement.  
 
Due to the limited nature of trade in banking and insurance services between 
Jordan and the United States it is useful to examine the condition of their 
domestic financial service sectors. Section four offers a discussion of the 
Jordanian banking and insurance sectors followed by a discussion of the 
counterpart sectors in the United States in section five. An in-depth 
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assessment of all financial services trade and the relevant sectors in the 
domestic markets is not possible in this project. In order to offer as accurate 
and representative an analysis as possible of trade in financial services 
between Jordan and the United States two of the most prominent sectors are 
analysed here. The overall characteristics of the sectors and the activities of 
the most prominent non-state actors are discussed. The involvement of 
Jordanian-based financial services actors in the US financial services market 
is insignificant and so only a brief discussion is included in this section. An 
analysis of US-based corporations’ involvement in the Jordanian banking and 
insurance market is also presented. As mentioned above, quantifying and 
monitoring trade in financial services is not completely possible and so the 
scale of trade in empirical terms is not comprehensively included here. Rather 
this section offers a discussion based on the actors involved and the type of 
activities and services provided as well as the scope of activity as can best be 
presented.  
 
A final section summarises the main points and arguments presented in this 
chapter. Conclusions are offered on the complexities and limitations of trade 
in financial services between Jordan and the United States arguing that the 
political economy of Jordan-US trade coupled with market specificities limit 
trade in financial services and banking and insurance services in particular.  
 
Trade in Financial Services 
 
Financial services are in many ways the most integral element to both 
economic activity (of all forms, both official and non-official) and economies 
in general.786 In fact, all areas of modern economic activity are dependent on 
access to financial services of one kind or another. Furthermore, the modern 
global economy could not have developed without the presence of the 
diversified intermediation and risk management services supplied by the 
global financial system.787  
                                                 
786
 Kono, M., Low, P., Luanga, M., Mattoo, A., Oshikawa, M., and Schuknecht, L., Opening 
Markets in Financial Services and the Role of GATS, in WTO Special Studies, 2007, p: 1.  
787
 Ibid. 
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It is perhaps most appropriate to refer to the definition of financial services 
agreed upon during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations when the 
liberalisation of trade in financial services was ushered to the fore of 
international trade discussion. The participants at this round of negotiations 
listed a great many services broadly split into two separate categories. The 
first category is insurance and related services, while the second is banking 
and other financial services.788 The former includes the following services: 
life and non-life insurance, insurance intermediation (broking and agency 
services) and trade insurance as well as others.789 The latter includes: 
“acceptance of deposits; […] consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and 
financing of commercial transactions; financial leasing; money broking and 
settlement; [and] clearing services for financial assets.”790  
 
Trade in financial services includes a great many activities, some of which are 
officially recognised and some not. A range of different types of actors may 
be involved in financial services - as suppliers or consumers - including 
corporations, governments, individuals or groups (highlighted by Susan 
Strange in a number of her works791 as groups such as the Mafia and other 
criminal syndicates), NGOs and so on. In relation to international trade in 
financial services, the common definition is the occurrence of one actor 
residing in one state supplying a consumer in a second with a service(s) 
without the establishment of a branch or subsidiary in the said second state. 
The actor providing the financial services could be located in the state where 
it is headquartered or in a third state, and supplies a consumer of the service(s) 
in a second state.792 However, for the purposes of this study it is relevant to 
also include the activities of financial services suppliers based in one state 
(either the United States or Jordan in this case) in the second state as opposed 
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 WTO, 1997, Financial Services, in World Trade Organisation Press Brief.  
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790
 WTO, 1997.   
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Press.  
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to just for actors based in the second state. For example, this entails the study 
of operations of actors such as the American Life Insurance Corporation 
(ALICO), a US-based MNC, which has offices located in Jordan to supply 
services to the Jordanian market.  
 
A more comprehensive outline of the modes of supply of international 
financial services as described by Allan Webster and Philip Hardwick 
includes four elements. These are as follows: cross-border movements of 
financial services (as in the OECD definition above); movements of 
consumers to the importing country (including tourism, work placements and 
so on); establishment of a commercial presence in a foreign country (as with 
ALICO’s operations in Jordan); and finally temporary movement of persons 
to a foreign country to provide the service.793 In this study the approach to 
trade in financial services incorporates these four modes. 
 
Measuring trade in financial services is, unfortunately, not an easy task and 
there still exists a serious short-fall in available and reliable data on trade 
flows in financial services.794 According to Webster and Hardwick, while data 
is stronger for trade flows between the larger economic centres in the Triad of 
North America, Europe and South East Asia,795 data for intra-regional trade in 
financial services for less developed states including the MENA economies is 
relatively weak.796 Furthermore, data pertaining to trade in financial services 
between MENA economies and international markets is also weak and can be 
unreliable. However, the data for Jordanian-US trade that has been collected 
for this study is from reliable sources797 as well as being reinforced with data 
gathered during field research work in Amman, Washington and Geneva. It 
must also be noted here that in order to study trade in financial services, 
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 Webster, A., and Hardwick, P., International Trade in Financial Services, in The Service 
Industries Journal, September 2005, Vol. 25, No. 6, p: 724. 
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 Ibid, p: 721. 
795
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 See Armdt, H. W., 1986, Measuring Trade in Financial Services, Canberra: Australian 
National University Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.  
797
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Statistics Database as well as The United Nations data source UNCOM.   
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banking and insurance operations which equate to financial goods or products 
are excluded from this chapter. For example, trade in corporate and 
government bonds are not examined as these are deemed here to be financial 
products and not services. 
 
The International Framework for Financial Services 
Trade: GATS and JUSFTA 
 
Established in 1995, the GATS agreement is the only comprehensive set of 
multilateral rules and commitments pertaining to state regulation of trade in 
services.798 There are two elements to the agreement which governments must 
abide by: the first is the framework agreement which outlines the rules and 
disciplines governing trade in services; and the second element is the national 
schedules.799 This latter is the mechanism by which national governments list 
the service sectors which they wish to liberalise and allow foreign access to. 
Furthermore, these schedules outline the extent to which the chosen sectors 
will be liberalised.800 Sally Stewart has suggested that GATS has been less 
scrutinised than other multilateral trade agreements due to the relatively 
flexible nature of the schedule element.801 This is because national 
governments themselves create their individual schedules according to 
national positions and are not (at least formally) obliged under GATS to 
include all service sectors.802  
 
The agreement covers service sectors including financial services in this same 
manner, through the two elements mentioned above. There are, however, two 
broad service sectors which are excluded which are: services provided in 
support of government authority, and air transport. Furthermore, GATS 
includes all of the four modes of the supply of services outlined above, thus 
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aiming to comprehensively liberalise trade in services for WTO member 
states. Under the agreement the Jordanian and US governments included 
financial services in their respective schedules. It is worth briefly assessing 
these provisions which, while superseded by the JUSFTA in relation to US-
Jordan trade, form the basis of the FTA provisions and continue to shape their 
respective trade in financial services with other states.  
 
The GATS schedule of the United States is relatively more complex than that 
of Jordan. This is a result of the difference in size and complexity of the 
financial service sectors and overall economy of the United States in relation 
to those of Jordan and the position of the United States in the global economy 
and the subsequent intricacy of trade related financial service activities.803 
With regards to the insurance and insurance-related sub-sectors the 
complexity of provisions for market access and national treatment in the four 
modes of supply (as outlined above) originate with the fact that there are 
varying provisions for different states. Constant across the majority of states is 
that government-owned or government-controlled corporations, whether US 
or foreign, are not allowed to participate in the US insurance sector.804 
National treatment of foreign entities is for the most part equal across all 
states and equivalent to treatment given to domestic entities. There is one 
major exception to this rule pertaining to maritime insurance “[w]hen more 
than 50 percent of the value of a maritime vessel whose hull was built under 
federally guaranteed mortgage funds is insured by a non-US insurer, the 
insured must demonstrate that the risk was substantially first offered in the US 
market.”805  
 
In relation to all non-insurance related financial services, including trading of 
securities, trading in derivative products and participation in the issues of 
government debt securities, market access and national treatment are 
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liberalised under the four modes of supply. Mechanisms and provisions vary 
across US states resulting in an occasionally contradictory governing regime 
for trade in financial services in the US market. For example, some states, 
such as Tennessee, Mississippi and Missouri, do not have the mechanisms to 
register a new branch or subsidiary of a foreign firm if it is not already 
registered in another US state which does have the mechanisms in place.806 
There are also restrictions on the status of natural persons operating in the US 
market. US citizenship is required for higher level employees of insurance 
firms in many states, while residency status is required for lower level 
employees wishing to operate in a high number of states. Furthermore, 
licenses for some insurance and non-insurance related activities such as 
consultancy and risk assessment are not issued to non-residents of the United 
States in some states such as Alabama, Hawaii and Georgia.807 
 
Overall, the schedule of the United States under GATS allows for the 
liberalisation of the domestic financial services sector and international trade 
in financial services. However, there are variations in the liberalisation 
allowed under the provisions of the schedule between different states.  
 
The Jordanian schedule also allows for much liberalisation of the sector and 
related trade, however, it is much less complex and places less limits than the 
US schedule. The provisions result in a largely unbound governing regime in 
the modes of supply for insurance-related and non-insurance activities except 
for several forms of insurance activity where suppliers either have to be based 
in Jordan or have branches located in Jordan.808 Furthermore, 100 percent 
foreign ownership of firms located in Jordan is allowed. Much like the 
schedule of the United States, the Jordanian schedule places relatively strict 
limits on the presence of natural persons. For most financial services the 
presence of natural persons from abroad, either employed by a foreign or 
Jordanian entity, is restricted to high level employees or professionals with 
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skills lacking in the Jordanian workforce either in number or quality.809 
Market access under the four modes of supply for non-insurance related 
activity is limited to registered banks and financial services companies – as is 
the case in the United States. Only registered entities are permitted to operate 
in the market in areas such as the taking of deposits or other repayable 
transactions.810  
 
According to Lawrence Summers “[b]uilding a more effective international 
financial architecture that can ensure that capital flows are sustainable as well 
as strong is of profound importance around the world.”811 It is precisely this 
perception of the global financial services market that fashioned the elements 
of the JUSFTA which deal with trade in financial services. The FTA text 
incorporates all of the provisions of the GATS schedules for Jordan and the 
United States as well as the framework agreement of rules and regulations. 
The result is to further strengthen the governing regime between the United 
States and Jordan for trade in financial services.  
 
The Jordanian Banking and Insurance Sectors  
 
The Jordanian economy has traditionally been service-oriented. The wide-
ranging processes of economic and political reform discussed in chapter three 
have included liberalisation of the banking and insurance sectors in much the 
same way as in non-service sectors such as the T&C and pharmaceutical 
sectors. However, according to Dihel and Kardoosh the success of reform in 
financial service sectors has been relatively mixed and is seen as being 
limited.812 Nevertheless, the banking and insurance sectors are significant 
components of the Jordanian economy and since 2000 have seen solid growth. 
However, Jordanian banks and insurers remain small in relation to their 
counterparts in other markets, are generally not competitive in international 
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markets and as a result have failed to exploit the opportunities in the US 
market for financial services provided by the GATS agreement and JUSFTA 
provisions. 
 
Growth in the Banking and Insurance Sectors 
 
At the same time as reform and liberalisation of the insurance and banking 
sectors has not been overly robust, growth in activity in these sectors has been 
quite strong since 2000. The first ‘modern’ domestic banks were established 
in the kingdom in the early 1950s shortly after independence. As it is a 
relatively short period of time since the initial emergence of the banking 
sector in Jordan, and it is thus a relatively young sector, it is worth looking 
back at the historical data from as early as the 1960s. Through the 1960s the 
number of banks remained limited and total capital assets were perpetually 
small, even in comparison to similar markets in states such as Lebanon and 
Israel. For example, total deposits with licensed banks in 1964 were a mere 
US$68 million while by 1970 this had only risen to US$81.4 million.813 Dew, 
Wallace and Shoult argue this lack of growth was due to the small size of the 
market and its low level of maturity.814 However, with increasing economic 
activity, rising income levels and increased integration with regional capital 
markets through aid and worker remittances coming from the oil producing 
states,815 the 1970s saw significant growth in the banking sector - with 
deposits totalling US$1.14 billion by 1980.816  
 
The economic recession and crises discussed in chapter three which 
characterised the 1980s led to stagnation in the banking sector. Following the 
implementation of the economic reform policies devised in the early 1990s the 
banking sector once again began to grow in-line with the overall economy. 
The boom-bust cycles in the banking sector now seem to have been broken, or 
at least limited to minor adjustments. Since the growth of the early 1990s the 
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banking sector has remained relatively strong with growth since 2000 being 
healthy.817  
 
A number of factors have been involved in the growth witnessed since 2000. 
In the first instance, transformations in the regulation of the sector began to 
attract foreign investment and foreign exchange. Coupled with rising levels of 
international trade and overall rising levels of income, the banking sector was 
able to capitalise on greater capital flows.818 Third, the increase in and 
sustained high levels of oil and natural gas prices since 2001, while resulting 
in higher import costs for the economy as a whole, have led to a rapid increase 
in investments, savings and remittances from oil and gas producing 
markets.819 The fourth factor sustaining the current boom in Jordanian 
banking is the repatriation of petro-dollars from western markets (mainly US 
but also European) in the post-9/11 environment, and their investment in 
MENA markets. The Jordanian market is seen as stable and so has benefited 
form further investment. 
 
The development of the banking sector is apparent when conducting a brief 
quantitative study of the capital assets of licensed banks (both domestic and 
foreign) and the foreign reserves of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) - which 
is the banking sectors main regulatory body. With regards to the latter, 
through the first quarter of 2007 the CBJ held foreign currency reserves of 
US$6.318 billion - equivalent to six months worth of the kingdom’s imports 
of goods and services. This was an increase of US$216.4 or 3.5 percent on the 
end level for 2006. The CBJ’s foreign reserves stood at only US$3.56 billion 
at the end of 2002 and at US$2.268 billion in 1997.820 Furthermore, total 
deposits at licensed banks totalled over US$21.3 billion, an increase of over 
US$646 million, or 3.1 percent on the end level for 2006.821 The equivalent 
figures for 2002 and 1997 were US$13.2 billion and US$9.1 billion 
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respectively. See figure 7.2 below for a comprehensive overview of the size 
and growth of the Jordanian banking sector. 
 
Figure 7.1 Central Bank of Jordan’s Foreign Reserves, 1964-2006822 
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Expanding credit facilities are also another key quantitative indicator of the 
size and robustness of any banking sector. Credit creation and distribution has 
traditionally been the weakest element of the Jordanian banking sector and 
was a main characteristic of the sector’s lack of maturity until the 1990s. 
However, this too has seen growth since 2000. By the end of the first quarter 
2007, outstanding credit facilities extended by licensed banks totalled 
US$14.598 billion, a 3.1 percent increase on the end level for 2006, or 
US$645.9 million.823 The equivalent figures for 2002 and 1997 were 
US$7.238 billion and US$5.61 billion respectively.824 According to Sabri Al-
Khassib the banking sector has seen significant growth over the past decade 
and especially since 2000, this has been driven by Jordanian and international 
actors operating in the domestic market.825 However, Jordanian actors have 
not witnessed much growth in international markets (discussed in more detail 
below). 
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Figure 7.2 Total Deposits and Credit Facilities with Licensed Banks in 
Jordan 1964 – 2006826 
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The insurance sector has witnessed a similar process of establishment and 
expansion. According to the Jordan Insurance Federation (JIF), the main 
regulatory body for the insurance sector in Jordan, it was during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s that the insurance sector began to emerge. The initial impetus 
came as a result of the expansion of marine transport through the port of 
Aqaba and the small but growing number of cars owned.827 Growth in the 
1960s and 1970s was extremely slow as there was a limited market for 
insurance services due to the small population and low levels of income. 
However, by the 1980s the number of insurance companies had risen 
dramatically from just three at the end of the previous decade to thirty-three - 
ten of which were foreign insurance firms. This rise came as a result of the 
improved economic environment associated with the oil boom of the 1970s.  
 
Nevertheless, while strong growth had been witnessed in the early 1980s, by 
the end of the decade the economic recession and subsequent crises which so 
drastically affected the banking sector also resulted in the rapid decline of the 
insurance sector. By 1987 the total number of insurance firms had decreased 
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to just eighteen and only one of the international firms remained.828 As a 
result of new legislation introduced in 1995 (Insurance Law No. 9) repealing 
previous legislation enacted in 1984 (the Insurance Practice Monitoring Act) - 
which prevented the entrance of new insurance firms into the market - the 
number of insurance firms once again began to grow. Included in the 1995 
legislation, however, were provisions which to a certain extent acted as 
restraints on market investment. These provisions included requiring domestic 
firms to have capital assets of a minimum of US$3.5 million and US$35 
million for direct insurance and re-insurance operation respectively. 
International firms wishing to enter the market were obliged to have US$7 
million in capital assets.829  
 
The insurance sector has thus developed with some similarities to the banking 
sector. Firstly, there has been a history of uneven growth accompanied by 
periods of decline. Secondly, Jordanian insurance firms have had limited 
success in competing in international markets. Indicative of this latter point is 
that in 2005 Jordanian insurance firms witnessed a 40.1 percent decline in 
insurance premiums written outside of the kingdom on the previous year.830   
 
Again a brief quantitative assessment of the growth of the insurance sector is 
quite revealing. However, unlike an assessment of the banking sector, it is 
only fruitful to conduct this analysis from 1997 onwards, due to the extremely 
limited size of the insurance sector prior to this year. Total assets of insurance 
firms operating in the Jordanian market totalled approximately US$772 
million at the end of 2006 - equivalent to a 4.2 percent growth on 2005. At the 
end of 2002 this figure stood at only US$368.5 million and in 1997 a much 
smaller US$173 million.831 Furthermore, the insurance sector has seen strong 
growth in inward investment which by the end of 2006 amounted to US$575.8 
million, up from US$237 million in 2002 and US$81 in 1997. 832 However, 
the growth in the sector is slightly misleading. While the sector has witnessed 
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a large increase in activity, investment and total assets over the last decade 
and especially since 2000, this is in fact only a reflection of the maturation of 
the insurance sector within the Jordanian economy and not necessarily its 
profitability. Total retained earnings in the sector are quite low and in 2006 
only amounted to US$21.1 million - a drop of 78 percent on the previous year 
and only a US$2.7 million increase on the 2002 figure of US$18.4 million.833 
 
Of the seven main types of insurance offered in the Jordanian market,834 
motor insurance and medical insurance have traditionally been the strongest. 
For example, in 2006, motor insurance operations accounted for US$170.7 
million total premiums and medical insurance US$60.5 million. The total 
premiums for 2006 equalled US$365.1 million.835  
 
Figure 7.3 Total Assets and Investment with Licensed Insurance Firms in 
Jordan 2000 – 2006836 
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In this environment of increasing activity and growth but low levels of 
retained earnings, saturation of the market with a large number of small firms 
represents a key structural weakness. The Jordanian banking sector is much 
larger than the insurance sector and has witnessed even stronger sustained 
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growth since 2000. However, it too faces the structural problem of being 
relatively saturated with smaller entities. A discussion of these weaknesses 
follows a brief interlude to introduce domestic regulation of these sectors.  
 
Regulation of the Banking and Insurance Sectors in Jordan 
 
There are two regulatory bodies in the Jordanian banking sector: the CBJ and 
the Association of Banks in Jordan (ABJ). The former acts as the public 
management body while the latter acts as the private sector counterpart. The 
CBJ was established in 1964 following the 1959 Law of the Central Bank of 
Jordan with the purpose of acting as the exclusive regulatory body of the 
banking sector.837 The Law of the CBJ states that the bank’s purpose is to 
maintain monetary stability, ensure the convertibility of the JD and to promote 
sustained growth in the overall economy.838 In order to achieve these goals the 
CBJ’s functions have evolved over the past four decades to include the 
following: the issuing and regulating of bank notes and coins – the CBJ is the 
sole issuer of the JD; the maintaining and management of the kingdom’s 
reserves of gold and foreign exchange; acting as a banker and fiscal agent to 
the government of Jordan and to public institutions; acting as a banker to 
private banks and financial institutions; to maintain the safety of the banking 
system - to ensure the protection of depositors and shareholders; to act as 
advisor to the government on fiscal and economic policies; to manage 
monetary problems and participate in the management of domestic economic 
problems; and finally to regulate credit.839 The CBJ’s decision-making body is 
independent of the government, however, the bank’s capital is entirely owned 
by the government and the overall operations of the bank are coupled with 
those of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The ABJ on the other hand acts as a professional association for private banks 
and was established by the private sector in 1978. The General Assembly of 
the association is constituted of the director generals of the twenty-three banks 
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operating in the Jordanian market while the association’s capital is entirely 
supplied by the member banks.840 Through the 1970s, as mentioned above, the 
banking sector began to grow relatively rapidly. As a result there was seen to 
be a need to develop a mechanism for the coordination of policies between the 
banks as well as to improve the overall efficiency of the sector through shared 
information. Thus the ABJ was established with the following roles: to 
facilitate coordination and cooperation between member banks; to deal with 
mutual problems faced by private banks and generate solutions; to facilitate 
the exchange of information and experiences between member banks; to 
promote the development of banking methods; to standardize banking forms 
and expressions; to facilitate coordination with the CBJ; to seek to establish 
cooperative relations between Jordanian banks and international banking 
associations; and to act as a dispute settlement mechanism for member 
banks.841  
 
Like the banking sector, the insurance sector has two main regulatory bodies, 
one public and one private: the Insurance Commission (IC) and the JIF. The 
latter was established in 1956 as The Jordan Association for Insurance 
Companies but following a royal decree in 1989 was renamed. It has been 
presided over by members of the private sector and operates as an 
independent body of the private sector. Its purpose has traditionally been to 
promote the insurance sector and develop the coordination of insurance 
practices between insurance firms operating in the market.842 It also seeks to 
provide market research in order to both improve efficiency of insurance firms 
through the sharing of information, as well as to enhance customer awareness. 
 
The IC acts as the primary regulatory body having ultimate regulatory control 
over the insurance sector - including all forms of insurance operations. It was 
established in 1999 following the approval of the Insurance Supervision Act 
No. 33 and acts as an independent regulatory body. The IC is a private sector 
actor with an independent management structure constituted by a General 
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Council, Director General and Executive Staff.843 Furthermore, the IC’s 
financial budget is entirely sourced from the private sector with minimal links 
to the Jordanian government. In a similar manner to the JIF, the IC seeks to 
regulate the insurance sector to ensure the rights of insured parties as well as 
insurance firms are protected; to facilitate the efficient operation of private 
actors and act as a link between the government of Jordan and insurance 
firms.844   
 
Unlike the banking sector the insurance sector also has a third regulatory body 
which acts in one specific sub-sector - motor insurance. The Compulsory 
Unified Insurance Office (CUIO), established in 1987, carries out all work 
related to vehicular insurance in cooperation with the various government 
licensing departments at the governorate level.845 The CUIO also acts as a 
governing authority over insurance firms operating in the motor insurance 
sector, allocating market share and compulsory pricing ranges. In this sense 
the CUIO acts in a slightly more authoritative manner than the JIF and IC.  
 
These three regulatory bodies all act in much the same way as the 
organisations discussed in chapter five, such as JEDCO, JIEC and JIB. They 
have all been created or have evolved in a regulatory framework created by 
the government of Jordan in line with its macro-economic policies. 
Furthermore, they do not only act as authorities managing and serving the 
insurance sector to ensure it operates efficiently for both private insured 
parties and insurance firms, but also as a link between the insurance sector 
and the government. Through the JIF, the IC and the CUIO the government of 
Jordan is able to strengthen the sector by promoting growth and stability. 
Meanwhile, through these three regulatory bodies private actors operating in 
the insurance sector are able to exploit the opportunities presented by the 
government for support (both political and economic). The result is a mutually 
beneficial and relatively close relationship between the public and private 
spheres in the domestic insurance market.  
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Jordanian Banks and Insurers 
 
According to the Association of Banks in Jordan, the banking sector is 
currently comprised of twenty-three banks (excluding the Central Bank of 
Jordan), including eight which are branches of foreign banks and two which 
are Islamic banks.846  The largest of these banks in terms of assets assigned to 
the Jordanian market are the Arab Bank and the Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance, with asset bases of US$23.7 billion and US$4.5 billion 
respectively.847 For a small state with only a limited market due to its 
relatively small population and low overall GDP, the large number of banks 
means that the banking sector is quite saturated.848 While strong growth has 
been sustained in this sector over the past decade and is likely to continue, the 
relatively limited size in terms of deposit and credit facilities along with the 
high number of banks already operating in Jordan limits the attractiveness of 
expanding into the sector for foreign banks. Thus Jordanian banks have 
remained dominant in the Jordanian market. However, many of these banks 
have not witnessed any sustained success in international markets. None have 
penetrated the US market beyond offering Jordan-based customers access to 
funds through international financial service providers such as Visa and 
MasterCard.  
 
Likewise the insurance sector has also traditionally been over-supplied by 
insurance firms. According to the IC there are currently twenty-six firms 
operating in the insurance sector.849 Significantly twenty of these firms are 
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Jordanian (both public and private), four are joint Jordanian-foreign private 
firms (not American), one is a Yemeni firm and only one is a US-based firm - 
ALICO. The largest of these firms in terms of total assets assigned to the 
Jordanian market are Jordan Insurance with US$108 million (or 14 percent of 
the market), ALICO with US$100 million (or 13 percent of the market), and 
Middle East Insurance with US$93 million (or 12 percent of the market).850 
As highlighted in figure 7.3 above, profits in the Jordanian insurance sector 
are extremely limited, standing at only approximately US$21 million in 2006. 
When this low profit margin is coupled with the saturated nature of the 
market, it is clearly evident that for foreign insurance firms, including highly 
competitive firms such ALICO, expansion into the Jordanian insurance 
market is not attractive. This point goes some way in explaining the lack of 
international actor involvement in this sector. The effect of this structure has 
been that Jordanian insurance firms have maintained their dominance in the 
Jordanian market, but at the expense of further development and expansion 
into international markets. The lack of competition from highly developed and 
capitalised international firms has helped lead to the relative weakness of 
Jordanian firms. Thus, again like Jordanian banks, Jordanian insurance firms 
have not penetrated the US market.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth briefly examining the performance and activities of 
the leading Jordanian banks and insurers operating in the Jordanian market. 
This short analysis illustrates the lack of capability of these leading Jordanian 
actors to penetrate the US market and offer financial services there, thus 
explaining why trade in financial services between the Jordanian and the US 
markets is non-existent when the services would emanate from Jordan.  
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The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance 
 
The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance was established in 1973 as a public 
shareholding limited company with the sole purpose of providing finance for 
housing. By the late 1990s the bank had grown rapidly and evolved into a 
comprehensive bank supplying full commercial and investment banking 
services to the Jordanian market. This sustained growth has established the 
bank as the second leading Jordanian bank with total capital of over US$355 
million.851 Furthermore, the bank’s total asset base stood at US$5.78 billion 
by the end of 2006, a 28 percent increase on the 2005 figure. (For further 
financial indicators see table 7.1 below). Importantly, the yearly profit 
earnings of the bank have rapidly increased over the past five years, 
increasing from US$41.2 million in 2002 to US$183.6 million in 2006 with 
estimates of a further increase for 2007. However, despite the banks’ strong 
performance in the Jordanian market, expansion into international markets has 
been very limited. The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance has ninety-six 
branches across Jordan (the largest number of branches of any bank operating 
in Jordan), four in Palestine and one in Bahrain. A further five subsidiary bank 
branches are located in Algeria (Algiers), Syria (Damascus), Iraq (Baghdad), 
United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) and Libya (Tripoli).852 However, there 
have as of yet been no attempts by the bank to penetrate into more advanced 
banking markets in Europe, North America or South East Asia. 
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Table 7.1 Major Financial Indicators of The Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance 2002- 2006 in US$ Millions853 
Item / Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Assets 2501.9 2864 3527.3 4510.4 5780.2 
Customer’s 
Deposits 
1806.8 2154 2708 3345 3996.3 
Credit 
Facilities – 
Net 
846.6 887.3 1241.8 17817 2243 
Shareholder’s 
Equity 
379.3 413.6 447 557.4 1178 
Gross Income 111.5 126.3 146 245 287.5 
Profit Before 
Income Tax 
41.2 43.5 66.5 148.5 183.6 
Profit After 
Income Tax 
30.9 31.75 42.8 104.6 133.6 
Return on 
Average 
Assets % 
1.26 1.18 1.34 2.6 2.6 
Return on 
Average 
Equity % 
8.34 8.01 9.71 20.42 15.4 
Dividends 0.2 0.2 0.28 0.35 0.35 
Share Price 
in ASE 
3.41 6.11 11.29 28.2 9.24 
 
Arab Bank 
 
The Arab Bank represents a slightly different story. Established in 1930 in 
Jerusalem, Palestine it has grown to be the largest Middle East based bank in 
terms of total assets, annual revenues and extent of international operations. 
While the Arab Bank was established in Palestine and not Jordan by Abdul 
Hameed Shoman, following the 1967 Six Day War and the occupation of the 
West Bank the company relocated its headquarters to Amman and became a 
public shareholding company. Since this time it has remained a Jordan-based 
financial institution.854 The company now has four-hundred branches in 
operation in twenty-nine states (most in the MENA region) across five 
continents and has managed to penetrate the advanced financial markets in 
Europe and North America with branches in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich 
and New York. The Jordanian market represents the Arab Bank’s most 
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important market in terms of branch operations with seventy-nine branches 
spread across the kingdom. The Arab Bank has total assets of over US$35.5 
billion and a capital base of US$5.5 billion.855  
 
Within Jordan, the Arab Bank has total assets of US$7.76 billion and accounts 
for 24 percent of the Jordanian market occupying the largest single portion.856 
With regards to the Arab Bank’s operations in the United States and its role in 
international trade in banking services between Jordan and the United States, 
the corporation has much less significance than in the MENA region or even 
in European markets. Total assets for its operations in the US market amount 
to only a little over US$500,000 accounting for only an insignificant 
percentage of the overall market in value terms - it must be highlighted again 
that the Arab Bank only has operations in New York.857 The Arab Bank is the 
largest and arguably the most stable financial institution of its kind in the 
MENA region and will continue to post solid and sustainable growth in the 
foreseeable future. It will likely continue to dominate the Jordanian market for 
banking services and further expand its operations in the region and in 
European and South East Asian markets. However, the growth of its 
operations in the US market is less clear and it is most likely that the 
corporation will not expand its services in the US market by a significant 
extent in the near- to medium-term future. Furthermore, the Arab Bank’s role 
in international trade in banking services between Jordan and the United 
States will remain relatively limited, confined mostly to the supply of services 
to Jordanian citizens visiting the United States for short periods of time. 
 
Jordan Insurance Company 
 
The Jordan Insurance Co. was established in 1951 by a number of private 
businessmen as the first major insurance firm in the country. Within seven 
years of its founding Jordan Insurance expanded regionally and opened up 
branches in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. By the end 
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of 2006 the corporation. operated seven regional branches. Throughout its five 
decade existence the company has dominated the insurance sector offering a 
comprehensive range of insurance services. Unlike many of the insurance 
firms in the market, including ALICO, Jordan Insurance Co. supplies all the 
types of insurance services listed above. However, while the firm’s total assets 
are the largest of any Jordanian-based insurance firm as well as the assets 
dedicated to the Jordanian market of the non-Jordanian firms, totalling 
US$17.5 million at the end of 2006, its annual profits remain small.858 In 2006 
net profits after tax and fees amounted only to slightly over US$2 million. 
This does however, equate to almost 10 percent of total profits after tax and 
fees for the whole insurance sector - with twenty-five other firms competing 
for the remaining 90 percent. With this narrow profit margin it is highly 
unlikely that Jordan Insurance Co. will be able to expand internationally and 
offer insurance services in other markets, especially those outside of the 
Middle East. In fact, according to Khaldun Abuhassan, the Chairman of 
Jordan Insurance Co., there are no plans for expansion into new markets for 
the foreseeable future - and certainly not for operation in the US market.859  
 
The activities and financial particulars of The Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance, Arab Bank and the Jordan Insurance Company briefly introduced 
above are indicative of the problems facing Jordan-based banks and insurance 
firms. The actors discussed here are the largest, most competitive and 
technologically advanced corporations in their respective sectors, yet they do 
not operate in the US market or offer financial services to actors based or 
operating in the US market through the first three modes of delivery for the 
former or all four modes of delivery for the latter. The observer would 
therefore not be derided for concluding that there will likely not be any 
expansion into the US market by Jordan-based banks or insurance firms in the 
medium-term future and thus trade in financial services emanating from the 
Jordanian market to that of the US shall remain extremely limited. The story, 
however, may be slightly different for trade flows in financial services going 
in the opposite direction. It is now appropriate to turn to an assessment of the 
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US banking and insurance sectors and the flow of trade in such financial 
services from US-based actors to the Jordanian market. 
 
The US Banking and Insurance Sectors 
 
As with the previous two chapters covering the T&C and pharmaceutical 
industries, a full overview of the US banking and insurance sectors would not 
prove necessary for the purposes of this chapter. This is because any 
comprehensive study of the US economy or simply one sector within the US 
economy would require a great deal of time, research and words. Furthermore, 
while it is useful and possible to present an assessment - albeit a relatively 
brief one - of the Jordanian banking and insurance sectors, it is also necessary 
to do so in order to present the argument and main analysis of this chapter. 
One must recall that trade in financial services between the United States and 
Jordan is very small in quantitative terms and largely restricted qualitatively in 
terms of the four modes of supply. The importance of this study is to 
determine why this is in fact so. It has already been illustrated that trade in 
banking and insurance services emanating form the Jordanian market and 
being supplied in the US market is largely not possible due to the lack of 
capabilities of Jordan-based actors to provide these services. 
 
A large number of US-based actors, it is certain and will be illustrated below, 
do possess the capabilities to provide financial services to the Jordanian 
market. However, it is the Jordanian market itself that prevents this supply 
from being realised by having structural weaknesses - namely in size and 
saturated market supply. Therefore, an in-depth assessment of the US banking 
and insurance sectors would yield little in terms of furthering the analysis 
presented here. Instead attention is best placed on the US-based actors which 
are operating in the Jordanian market in order to determine how the supply of 
financial services by these actors to the Jordanian market has developed in 
light of the structural weaknesses of this market and what prospects for future 
trade in financial services exist.  
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Growth and Regulation in the US Sectors 
 
A brief introduction to the US banking and insurance sectors will, however, 
provide some useful insight as to what structural limitations and opportunities 
there are for non-US based actors to offer financial services to the US market. 
National banking in the United States began with the establishment of the 
Bank of North America in Philadelphia in 1781 which acted as the sole central 
bank of the United States, having a monopoly on currency. A decade later this 
bank was succeeded by the First Bank of the United States. However, this 
bank too expired when in 1811 the US Congress failed to renew its charter. A 
Second Bank of the United States was created in 1816 with a similar charter 
to its two predecessors but was also to expire in 1836.860 The result of this 
lack of a central banking authority led to state banks emerging independent of 
any central regulation.  
 
By 1863 this system had become known as the dual banking system as a result 
of resurgence in congressional regulation of the banking sector with the 
passing of the National Bank Act which provided for the chartering of banks 
on a national scale. This system has endured to the present era, where banks 
may operate on the state or national level, adhering to state or national 
regulations respectively.861 In terms of national regulation, following the 1913 
Federal Reserve Act the Federal Reserve System was established bringing all 
banks operating in the United States under the authority of the federal 
government. Twelve Federal Reserve Banks exist across the country and are 
supervised by the Federal Reserve Board.862 The purpose of this system is to 
control the overall money supply in the United States, to implement monetary 
policy and to financially support the banking system. 
 
Under this system the US banking sector has maintained rapid growth to 
become the world’s largest such sector. Total assets of commercial banks 
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operating in the United States totalled over US$10 trillion at the end of June 
2007 while total deposits stood at just under US$6.3 trillion at the end of the 
same period.863 The respective figures for the end of the corresponding period 
in 2006 were US$9.2 trillion and US$5.8 trillion. Significantly non-US based 
banks occupy approximately 10 percent of the market. Foreign related 
corporations accounted for slightly over US$1 trillion of the US banking 
sector’s total assets at the end of June 2006 and US$1 trillion at the end of 
June 2007. Meanwhile total deposits in these banks stood at US$652 billion 
and US$871 billion for the same periods.864  When compared with the figure 
for 2000 the growth in the US banking sector is quite extraordinary. At the 
end of June 2000, for example, total assets of all banks operating in the United 
States equalled US$5.8 trillion while total deposits amounted to US$3.6 
trillion.865 The growth of market share for foreign-related banks has remained 
constant at approximately 10 percent as total assets and deposits in non-US 
banks amounted to US$690.8 billion and US$387.4 billion at the end of June 
2000. Nevertheless, while market share has not increased - and in some 
instances has actually decreased for non-US banks, overall assets and deposits 
- as well as other indicators - have grown rapidly (see Figure 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4: Total Assets, Deposits, Loans and Market Share of Banks in 
the US Market, 2007, US$ Millions866 
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There are currently two-hundred and eleven foreign banks from sixty different 
countries operating in the United States.867 Under the complex system of dual 
banking mentioned above, foreign banks wishing to operate in the US market 
enjoy the same national treatment as US-based banks. The International 
Banking Act of 1978 underpins this ‘national treatment’ for foreign banks, 
meaning that subsequent trade agreements such as bilateral FTAs which have 
provisions for trade in banking services do not offer preferential treatment to 
actors based in the FTA partner(s). While foreign banks are given the same 
market access treatment as US banks they are also subject to the same 
regulatory measures. A range of Congressional Acts since 1990 have been 
passed, further harmonising regulation of domestic and foreign banks.868 
Access to the US banking sector for non-US banks is therefore quite 
liberalised. This ease of access is, however, offset by the high level of 
competition found in this sector and the dominance of medium and large 
banks with large total assets and capitalisation. As described above, Jordanian 
banks simply cannot compete and offer financial services in this market.  
 
The insurance sector in the United States shares similar characteristics with 
the banking sector. In short, the sector is very large in capital terms, is highly 
liberalised, is saturated with a large number of insurance service providers, 
and is dominated by medium and large sized firms with high levels of capital, 
total assets and profits. By the end of 2006 the US insurance sector had a total 
market value of US$1.2 trillion making it by far the largest single insurance 
sector in the world.869 The corresponding figure for 2001 was US$909.6 
billion. Average growth in the sector over the five year period spanning 2002-
2006 amounted to 5.9 percent and forecasts suggest that by 2010 the sector 
will have grown by over 23 percent since 2005 to total over US$1.4 trillion.870 
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The US insurance sector accounts for 36.3 percent of all premiums written 
within the global insurance market, with the EU being the closest single 
market with annual premiums representing 35.8 percent of the global market 
in 2006.871 Significantly, over the past decade non-life insurance has increased 
in importance and market share in the United States and by the end of 2006 
accounted for 54.8 percent of the insurance market in terms of premiums 
written.872  
 
Regulation of the insurance sector in the United States is unique in 
comparison to other financial services in that it is the responsibility of state 
authorities not federal authorities.873 However, according to Susan Randall, 
the content of insurance sector regulation between states does not differ 
greatly. This is due largely to the efforts of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a national private sector organisation 
comprised of insurance firms.874 This organisation was established in 1871875 
to act as a forum for private sector actors along with state insurance 
commissioners to pursue the organisation of insurance regulation – identified 
as fair pricing, protecting insurance firm solvency, preventing unfair practices 
and ensuring insurance availability.876 Over the past fifty years the role of the 
NAIC has increased significantly as the tension between state-level regulation 
of the insurance sector and the need for broader uniformity as insurance firms 
first expanded across state lines and then internationally. Furthermore, as 
insurance firms based outside of the United States have increasingly 
penetrated the US market more unified regulatory processes have been 
required.  
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As mentioned above, national treatment of non-US-based insurance firms 
operating in the United States is provided and there are few limitations to 
market access. Under the US-GATS schedule and the JUSFTA, Jordanian 
insurance firms wishing to enter the US market can do so with no limitations 
as long as they are not owned by or affiliated to the Jordanian government. It 
must be noted, however, that some states do not have the mechanisms to 
register foreign insurance firms.877 As with the banking sector (apart from the 
New York operations of The Arab Bank), there are no Jordanian insurance 
firms operating in the United States - although insurance is provided for 
Jordanian nationals entering the United States as in mode two of the supply 
modes described above. This is not due to a lack of regulatory facilitation or 
limitations on market access for Jordanian actors and firms. Rather it is due to 
a lack of ability on the part of the Jordanian insurance firms to penetrate the 
US market. The relatively small total assets of these firms, low annual profits 
and lack of competitiveness result in the opportunities for access to the US 
market being unexploited. On the other hand, the reciprocal regulatory 
treatment that US-insurance firms and banks receive in the Jordanian market 
combined with greater total assets, annual profits and overall competitiveness 
has led to US-based actors operating in the Jordanian market.  
 
US Banks and Insurers Operating in the Jordanian Market 
 
United States banks and insurance firms are amongst the largest in the world 
in their respective fields and amongst the largest MNCs of any sort. The 
largest banks such as Citibank - part of the financial services giant Citigroup - 
operate in dozens of states on all continents. The largest insurers such as 
ALICO - a member of American International Group - also operate on all 
continents in dozens of states. However, by 2008 the only US-based bank 
operating in the Jordanian market was Citibank and the only US insurance 
firm operating in Jordan was ALICO. As highlighted above, there are a 
number of reasons for the lack of interest by international firms and banks to 
enter the Jordanian market and certain factors which act as deterrents to 
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inward investment. These include, specifically for the banking and insurance 
sectors, small market size in overall capital terms and population size, over-
saturation and over-supply of actors already involved in the market and low 
levels of profit returns. Nevertheless, ALICO and Citibank have been 
operating in the Jordanian market for a number of years and it is worth 
analysing the activities of both corporations in Jordan and if there have been 
any changes in this activity since 2001, as well as the prospects for future 
activity.  
 
Citibank 
 
Citibank is the largest bank of its kind in the United States and one of the 
largest five globally. It was founded in 1812 as the City Bank of New York 
and is now the consumer and corporate banking division of Citigroup - the 
second largest corporation of its kind in the world. By 1865 the bank joined 
the newly formed national banking system in the United States and was 
renamed the National City Bank of New York and rapidly became one of the 
largest US banks. The rapid expansion continued and by 1897 it became the 
first US bank to establish operations overseas.878 In 1974 Citibank Jordan - the 
Jordanian branch of Citibank - was established as a fully licensed corporate 
and commercial bank. Since 1974, Citibank has been the only US-based bank 
to operate in the Jordanian market and is the only non-Jordanian bank 
operating in Jordan to have senior local management for the Mashreq region - 
serving as the regional headquarters for Citibank, responsible for operations in 
Syria and Palestine as well as Jordan.  
 
Despite being one of the largest global banks, Citibank has refrained to a 
certain extent from investing in Jordan and expanding operations in the 
kingdom. At the end of 2006 Citibank Jordan ranked seventeenth in the 
Jordanian market in terms of total assets which amounted to US$325 million - 
as compared to a total of US$1.1 trillion in global assets for Citibank as a 
whole. In comparison, by the end of 2006 the Arab Bank held approximate 
                                                 
878
 Citibank, 2005, Historical Background, New York: Citibank. 
 282 
total assets in the Jordanian market of US$4.6 billion and accounted for 
almost 30 percent of the banking market.879 Furthermore, despite over three 
decades of operating in the Jordanian market Citibank only has two branches 
in the kingdom, both of which are located in the affluent western areas of 
Amman. Little intention to further expand operations has been expressed since 
2001. When taking into account the total assets of Citibank in the MENA 
region, the low intensity of Citibank’s operations in Jordan are highlighted 
further. For example, in Bahrain Citibank has total assets of over US$30 
billion.880  
 
The further liberalisation of trade in financial services between Jordan and the 
United States and greater access to the Jordanian financial services market for 
US-based corporations has had little impact on the activities of Citibank. In 
terms of market share, the US bank has consistently accounted for only 1.5 
percent of the overall market in terms of total assets, total deposits and credit 
facilities. However, since 2001 there have been a number of new financial 
services launched in the Jordanian market. These include the following: the 
introduction of the first fully automated system for custody safekeeping and 
settlements, electronic banking for banks for currency management - both 
domestic and foreign - exchange forward contract systems for foreign 
exchange, electronic banking for cash and trade for banks in Palestine and the 
creation of debt swap mechanisms for the Jordanian government.881 It must be 
noted, however, that the development of services offered by Citibank Jordan 
are consistent with the competitive processes at work in any banking market 
and are not due to any substantial increase in investment or trade potential 
within the Jordanian market or between the US and Jordanian markets. 
According to Ghada Bahous, the Head of Operations for Citibank Jordan, 
there are currently no indications that Citibank will seek to further exploit 
opportunities in the Jordanian market.882  
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ALICO 
 
ALICO was established in 1921 in Shanghai, China by C. V. Starr and was 
originally named the Asian Life Insurance Company. Within ten years of its 
founding ALICO was providing a range of commercial and personal 
insurance services across South East Asia. However, following the start of 
World War Two, insurance operations in the region largely ceased. In need of 
new markets to operate in, ALICO established operations in Europe, Central 
and South America, Africa, the Caribbean and the MENA regions. By 1951 
ALICO’s name was changed to American Life Insurance Company and by 
2007 was supplying over fifty markets across five continents with life, 
accident and health insurance services. It is worth highlighting that ALICO, 
while a US-based corporation headquartered in Wilmington in the United 
States and is subject to US regulation, provides insurance services exclusively 
outside of the US market.883 International diversification has therefore been 
the key to the sustained growth of the corporation.  
 
Jordan was one of the first states in the MENA region to receive insurance 
services from ALICO which established operations in the kingdom in 1958 
and was one of the first insurance firms in Jordan. Over the first three decades 
of operations in Jordan, ALICO maintained an approximate market share of 
20 percent in life, health and accident insurance services - the firm has never 
supplied marine, transport, fire, theft or property damage insurance. However, 
in the last two decades this market share has dwindled to slightly over 6.6 
percent in 2007, down from 11.7 percent in 2000.884 This means ALICO has 
slipped from having the single largest market share for any insurance provider 
in Jordan to being the fifth largest. The decrease in overall share and paid up 
capital is indicative of decreasing market operations. In terms of paid up 
capital ALICO had only US$2.8 million invested in the Jordanian market 
(ALICO has over US$40 billion in global assets), as compared with the three 
leading insurance firms, The Jordan Insurance Company, Arab Orient and The 
Arab German Insurance Company, all of which had paid up capitals of over 
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US$7 million in 2006.885 These figures may be slightly misleading in some 
ways. For example, while ALICO does not possess the largest capital assets 
among insurance firms in Jordan, it does have the largest total of gross 
premiums in value terms - US$13 million in 2006 - and one of the smallest 
percentage shares of market claims - at 4.1 percent. Coupled with the market 
share as mentioned above, this means ALICO is the most profitable insurance 
firm in Jordan with profits reaching just under US$1 million in 2006.886  
 
Regardless of the level of profitability of ALICO in comparison to the other 
firms operating in Jordan, activity does not appear to have significantly 
increased or altered since 2001. The only measured development since the 
signing of the FTA is that ALICO has lost market share and has not in any 
significant way seen an increase in the supply of insurance services to the 
Jordanian market. Significantly ALICO has not diversified the services which 
it does offer to the Jordanian market since 2001. It seems that the market 
access already enjoyed by ALICO prior to the JUSFTA and Jordanian 
accession to the WTO and GATS was such that the further liberalisation in 
trade in financial services between Jordan and international markets means 
that any opportunities in Jordan were already being exploited. It can thus be 
predicted that ALICO will maintain a similar level of market share in the 
Jordanian insurance sector over the medium-term and will not witness 
significantly increased levels of gross premiums.  
 
Conclusions 
 
There is a relatively complex international system of institutions which 
regulate and manage trade in financial services centred on the GATS 
agreement and the WTO. The creation of the JUSFTA further strengthened 
both the management of and liberalisation of trade in banking and insurance 
services between Jordan and the United States. These are two markets with 
very different characteristics, with the US market being the largest single 
market in the world and the Jordanian market a very small one. The nature of 
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financial services and their intertwined relationship with markets overall mean 
that the nature of these services and the nature of the overall market which 
they service are interdependent. Thus the nature of banking and insurance 
services and these service markets in the United States are very different to 
those found in the Jordanian market. This large disparity in market 
characteristics manifests itself in a number of ways as highlighted in this 
chapter. 
 
In the case of Jordan the banking and insurance sectors are relatively small in 
comparison to other markets in the region and farther afield. The market while 
seeing strong relative growth in the past decade and especially in the years 
since the Jordanian government engaged further with international institutions 
in the pursuit of trade liberalisation still remains small in overall capital terms. 
Furthermore, much the same as with the pharmaceutical sector, the banking 
sector is quite saturated with domestic banks – although not with international 
banks. The capital intensive nature of this sector as opposed to say the T&C 
sector means that a market with limited size cannot carry a large number of 
suppliers. The insurance sector suffers from the same market restrictions. A 
small overall population in Jordan, limited income and a relatively immature 
insurance sector mean that insurance services in Jordan are relatively un-
profitable. These market characteristics serve as a limitation or restriction on 
greater external supply of banking and insurance services. In short the 
banking and insurance service markets in Jordan are not attractive to foreign 
actors. At the same time, Jordanian actors are generally small and limitations 
on the development of economies of scale restrict their ability to be 
competitive internationally. Thus Jordanian corporations have failed to 
penetrate or supply more advanced markets in much the same manner as 
Jordanian pharmaceutical corporations in their respective sector.  
 
The Arab Bank Corporation has managed to evolve into a large international 
banking corporation and does operate and supply services to European 
markets but has very limited involvement in the US market – almost 
insignificant in terms of the size of that market. No other Jordanian banking 
actor operates in the US market. At the same time, no Jordanian insurance 
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corporation is involved in Jordan-US trade or supply to the US market. The 
implications of trade liberalisation and engagement with international 
institutions such as the GATS dominated international regime for services has 
done little since 1999 to increase Jordanian supply of banking and insurance 
services to the US market.  
 
The US market is quite different, representing the largest banking and 
insurance sectors in the world. Many of the largest banking and insurance 
service corporations are also based or operate in the US market. These actors 
are by far more competitive than their Jordanian counterparts. However, US 
corporations have very little activity in the Jordanian market and trade 
between the two markets – while extremely difficult to measure in empirical 
terms as discussed above – can be seen as being very limited. Thus, while in 
low value-added goods such as T&C trade liberalisation has had a significant 
impact on market interaction and integration, and in high value-added goods 
sectors such as pharmaceutical products, trade liberalisation has had some 
impact on market interaction and integration, with financial services this has 
not been the case. It is the conclusion of this chapter that market 
characteristics as opposed to state level facilitation are the determining factors 
of trade between Jordan and the United States in financial services.  
 
It is difficult to develop the discussion about relative and absolute gains at 
varying levels with regards to financial services. There seem to be very 
limited gains in economic terms to both state and non-state actors as a result 
of state-level cooperation and subsequent trade liberalisation. In a sense the 
United States, as discussed in chapter four, has sought to expand the network 
of international institutions governing financial services. By helping to 
include Jordan in these institutions this network is expanded, but only on a 
very limited level. This point is discussed further in the concluding chapter to 
this thesis. For the Jordanian government there seems to be no significant 
negative impact on the banking and insurance service sectors as a result of 
trade liberalisation with the United States or broader international system as a 
result of engagement in international institutions. The sectors in fact seem to 
have grown more rapidly in the post-cooperation era and Jordanian actors 
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have not been faced with significant competition from external actors. At the 
same time, however, gains have also been limited. Market interaction with the 
United States has been negligible and market integration non-existent beyond 
the inherent levels – remember that there is in fact a global financial system 
within which national markets exist.  
 
Jordan-US state-level cooperation and integration do not seem to have been 
altered significantly when trade in banking and insurance services is 
considered. The main significance here is the initial cooperation between the 
two governments in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century in pursuing 
the creation of the JUSFTA and the US-assisted engagement of Jordan in 
international institutions which govern trade in financial services. It is stated 
in the introduction to this thesis and has been evident throughout that 
assumptions are made based upon liberal economic thought and liberal 
institutionalist theory. These assumptions hold that trade liberalisation through 
international institutions leads to greater economic interaction which in turn 
leads to economic integration. This market integration will result in greater 
state cooperation and integration. However, the limited increase in market 
interaction in the banking and insurance sectors do not provide any evidence 
that greater state-level cooperation or integration is occurring between the 
United States and Jordan. This discussion along with those in the previous 
chapters will be taken further in the following concluding chapter.  
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There are broadly speaking three types of conclusions of this thesis. The first 
type is what could be called ‘hard’ conclusions, the second type are ‘soft’ 
conclusions which are less strongly argued but are nonetheless significant, and 
the third type are reflections on the work in this thesis and the processes of 
research and writing. This concluding chapter will discuss these in order 
starting with the ‘hard’ conclusions, followed by the ‘soft’ and reflective 
conclusions.  
 
This thesis uses a critical liberal institutionalist approach to assess and analyse 
the political economy of trade relations between the United States and Jordan 
in the framework of a heterodox IPE and a re-conceptualisation of MENA and 
US foreign policy studies. The hypothesis tested is grounded in liberal 
political and economic theory and holds that trade liberalisation between the 
two states has led and will continue to lead to greater economic growth and 
integration between the markets and subsequently an increase in inter-state 
cooperation. Throughout this research project four key research questions 
have been discussed. The first question asked if bilateral trade liberalisation 
through the creation of and engagement with international institutions has in 
fact led to greater levels of bilateral trade between Jordan and the United 
States. The second core question asked if greater levels of bilateral trade have 
led to greater levels of market integration. A third question has asked whether 
or not greater state-level political cooperation between the two states has 
followed. The final research question considered in this thesis has sought to 
ask what the interests of Jordan and the United States as state actors have 
been, why they engaged with international institutions in order to facilitate 
trade and if their goals have been met through this.  
 
In order to answer the four core research questions and test the hypothesis the 
theoretical approach used has been defined in chapter two as a critical version 
of liberal institutionalism. The key concepts of the theory employed in this 
study include the belief that the international system is to a great extent 
anarchic and there is no overall form of global governance which regulates 
actor behaviour in this system. Secondly, international institutions include 
both tangible IOs and non-tangible regimes and together these institutions are 
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formed in order to manage relations in the anarchic system. A third 
assumption is that there are many types of actors in international political 
economy including: states, MNCs, NGOs, IGOs and individuals and no single 
type of actor can be seen as primary at all times and in all regions. 
Furthermore, these actors all have interests which they pursue, but these 
interests and the actions taken to pursue them may not be the result of rational 
calculation under conditions of perfect information. Issue linkage and 
interdependence at multiple levels of analysis is also a key assumption of the 
theoretical approach used here. A further key assumption is that cooperation 
in international relations through international institutions is overall a 
positive-sum game where all actors involved can achieve absolute gains. 
However, within these positive-sum games there exist zero-sum and positive-
sum games and indeterminate outcomes at different levels and between 
different actors. Finally, the conception of liberal institutionalist theory 
employed throughout this thesis claims that engagement in international 
institutions can lead to trade liberalisation which results in greater economic 
growth and market integration will in turn lead to economic and political 
cooperation at the state level through interdependence.  
 
In the introduction a statement was made about the role of informal 
institutions in bilateral trade between Jordan and the United States and the 
extent to which this type of institution would be included in this thesis. It is 
worth re-visiting this point to highlight the fact that this research project has 
been aimed primarily at the roles and impact of formal institutions in bilateral 
trade. Due to requirements and limitations such as the orientation of the 
hypothesis and research questions along with access to information, this thesis 
set out to study formal institutions more than informal ones. Furthermore, a 
key element of this study is the discussion and analysis of how the United 
States and Jordan as state actors as well as non-state actors such as MNCs 
have engaged with formal institutions and how these in turn impact upon 
behaviour.  
 
Throughout this study the roles played by the US and Jordanian governments 
in facilitating bilateral trade have been discussed. These analyses are based on 
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literature studies as well as field research in Jordan, the United States and 
Geneva, Switzerland, which included a number of individual interviews with 
members of government, IGOs and the private sector. The conclusion of these 
analyses is that both governments have constructed a bilateral framework 
within which trade can take place in a wholly liberalised manner through the 
JUSFTA. Both state actors have engaged in multilateral and bilateral IOs and 
trade regimes in order to pursue respective national interests which are 
defined by changing domestic and international environments. Nevertheless, 
the discussions in chapters three and four identify different interests and 
relatively overlapping policy decisions taken in pursuit of these interests. In 
bilateral relations the differing national interests and foreign and economic 
policies taken in the past decade or so have converged to a great extent. The 
result has been the mutual engagement with international institutions and 
creation of a trade facilitating bilateral regime.  
 
In the case of Jordan, domestic and international demands and constraints 
which emerged in the late 1980s resulted in macroeconomic structural 
adjustment throughout the 1990s and broader political and economic reform at 
the domestic level. By 1999 and the ascension to the throne of King Abdullah 
II political reform in the kingdom had halted but economic reform continued 
apace. The subsequent post-1999 governments in Jordan have maintained and 
accelerated processes of economic reform in pursuit of the newly primary 
interests of economic growth and stability. Traditional national interests 
which revolved around security and regime survival have been replaced over 
the last decade by economic concerns and domestic governance. It seems that 
the identification by the Jordanian government of economic interests as the 
primary interests of the state in the early twenty-first century have resulted in 
a number of policies. Many of the major domestic and foreign policies taken 
by Jordan since the mid-1990s and discussed in chapter three have revolved 
around reform at home, integration at the international level and involve 
cooperation through international institutions.  
 
Accession to the WTO in 1999, the JEUAA, various MENA initiatives such 
as the GAFTA and MAFTA, and bilateral FTAs such as the JUSFTA all 
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represent significant elements of Jordanian involvement in international 
institutions related to trade. Taken together these policy directions signify an 
overall move towards facilitating international trade as a means to increase 
economic growth and stability and by extension attend to various security 
concerns – largely pertaining to regime survival. The JUSFTA in particular is 
a key element of Jordanian facilitation of trade due to the importance and size 
of the United States as both state and market. However, the relationship with 
the United States with regards to trade and economic interaction that has 
developed since 1997 should not be seen as independent from the policies 
taken in the broader facilitation of trade with the international economy. In 
short, Jordanian trade policy towards the United States and engagement with 
the United States in international institutions is aimed primarily at increasing 
economic growth through trade liberalisation and not necessarily at increasing 
state-level cooperation and interdependence with the United States.  
 
In the case of the United States, the analysis in chapter four introduced a 
reinterpretation of US interests with regards to the MENA region and Jordan 
in particular. Some of these interests were of an economic nature much the 
same as the main Jordanian interests and some were political or security 
oriented. For the United States, a stable and friendly MENA region is not only 
a key policy goal in itself but is also pivotal in order for the United States to 
pursue its other traditional policy goals in the region. These include secure 
and sustainable access to the region’s natural resources which are 
indispensable to the US and global economies and to maintaining the United 
States’ position in international relations. The second main traditional interest 
has been access to the region’s markets for goods and services both in terms 
of markets to export to and import from. A final traditional policy interest in 
the region is the encouragement of cooperation with states in the region in a 
relationship characterised by US leadership or hegemony. The reinterpretation 
of traditional interests in the MENA region presented in this thesis has led to 
one main conclusion. This conclusion is that the United States is pursuing 
economic cooperation and market integration with states in the region and the 
encouragement of economic growth there as the primary method through 
which the United States wishes to achieve its main interests. Thus US 
 293 
engagement with Jordan in international institutions in order to liberalise 
bilateral trade has been pursued in order to promote bilateral market 
integration in order to increase state-level cooperation.  
 
The analyses of state interests and resultant facilitation of trade demonstrate 
little by way of answering the first three core research questions. However, 
chapters three and four define what state-led trade liberalisation is thus 
enabling the study to progress towards analysing the actual trade that takes 
place and which actors are involved in this trade. 
 
For the purpose of completing a broad enough study in the context of a PhD 
thesis three chapters have been dedicated to analysing the nature and 
characteristics of as well as the change in bilateral trade in three economic 
sectors. The sectors chosen allow for the study of trade in three very different 
sectors allowing as representative a study as is possible. The first sector 
studied was thus trade in textiles and clothing, a low value-added, labour 
intensive manufacturing sector. The analysis of this sector in chapter five 
concludes that bilateral trade in T&C goods is dominated by Jordanian exports 
to the US market, has grown rapidly since the implementation of the JUSFTA 
and displays signs of limited asymmetric market integration. Furthermore, the 
growth of this sector in the Jordanian economy has had significant effects on 
overall economic growth. The sector developed largely after 1997 and the 
creation of the QIZs as a new element in the bilateral trade regime between 
the United States and Jordan and has since grown largely due to exports to the 
US market following the implementation of the JUSFTA in 2001. A complex 
relationship between public and private sector actors has served to promote 
the sector both within the Jordanian economy and in terms of market access 
abroad.  
 
A comparison between Jordanian exports of T&C goods to the EU market and 
exports to the US market reveals a stark contrast. Even with the JEUAA in 
place and adherence to the post-MFA governance of trade in T&C goods, 
Jordanian exports to the EU are very limited. At the same time exponential 
growth to average levels of over US$1 billion is seen in exports to the US 
 294 
market. Furthermore, comparison between the success of Jordanian exports to 
the US market with more well established and larger T&C export sectors in 
the MENA region also is dramatic. Compared to Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, 
Jordan exports far more to the US even though its T&C sector is much smaller 
and younger than its regional counterparts. The indications are that the 
increase in trade in T&C along with the overall growth of the sector in Jordan 
have led to, and will likely maintain, a greater level of importance of the 
sector in Jordan and bilateral market integration for the medium-term future.  
 
The second economic sector studied in this thesis was pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, a high value-added, capital intensive manufacturing sector 
which differs from the T&C sector. This analysis concluded that bilateral 
trade in this sector is far more limited than in the previous sector studied and 
is characterised by more equal trade levels. Here US-based private actors 
operate in the Jordanian market on a small scale as does one Jordanian-based 
actor in the US market. However, of importance here is that this market 
interaction and integration has largely developed in the few years since the 
implementation of the JUSFTA. This sector has many different characteristics 
to the T&C industry and both the institutional framework governing trade in 
pharmaceutical products and the actors involved in the sector vary greatly 
from those of the T&C sector. While there may only be small levels of trade 
in actual products there has been some measure of market integration through 
the activity of US-based actors in the Jordanian market. This activity is 
centred on collaborative projects related to research and development of new 
products. Without Jordanian cooperation in the international institutions 
governing pharmaceutical production and trade this activity would not be 
possible.  
 
Nevertheless, the overall conclusion of the analysis of this sector is that trade 
liberalisation has had only a small impact on economic growth in Jordan and 
no real impact on economic growth in the United States. Furthermore, the 
indications are that there are significant market characteristics which will 
prevent market integration and actor cooperation in the pharmaceutical sectors 
in Jordan and the United States in the future. Concrete gains from trade 
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liberalisation in pharmaceutical products are limited for both states. For the 
United States the inclusion of Jordan in regulatory institutions further expands 
this network – which is a key US interest with regards to issues such as IPRs 
and so on. Jordan also has achieved some gains through this process. These 
include the restructuring of Jordanian pharmaceutical producers and their 
adherence to cGMPs which will make them more competitive in both the 
domestic and international markets in the long run. Overall though, the gains 
are limited and bilateral trade in pharmaceutical products has not and likely 
will not add to greater bilateral economic and political integration in the short- 
to medium-term future. 
 
In order to complete the study of trade relations as thoroughly as possible the 
third sector studied was financial services in the form of banking and 
insurance services, which are capital intensive service sectors. These sectors 
again differ greatly in characteristics to the sectors studied in chapters five and 
six. The analysis in chapter seven produced an interesting set of conclusions, 
the first being that historically there has been very little bilateral trade in 
financial services between the two markets and this has not significantly 
changed in the liberalised trade era. Furthermore, the lack of market 
integration is a result of two factors. Firstly, the small size and saturated 
nature of the Jordanian financial services market does not present profitable 
opportunities for US-based private sector actors thus not attracting activity, 
even in the context of liberalised trade. Secondly, Jordanian-based actors are 
ill-equipped to compete in the US financial services market. Again even with 
the added benefit of unfettered access granted as a result of the JUSFTA.  
 
The final conclusion drawn here is that there will not likely be a significant 
change in bilateral trade in banking and insurance services and in fact possibly 
other high value-added services in the near- to medium-term future. 
Therefore, once again, trade liberalisation between the United States and 
Jordan has not led to greater economic growth, increased market integration 
or political and economic cooperation at the state level. Furthermore, neither 
state actor has significantly gained from trade liberalisation in these forms of 
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service trade nor achieved their main interests of economic growth and inter-
state cooperation.  
 
The overall conclusions drawn from this study provide answers to the four 
core research questions and test the hypothesis presented in the introduction. 
With regards to the supposition that bilateral trade liberalisation leads to 
greater bilateral trade, this thesis shows that this is not necessarily the case for 
every economic sector. State-facilitation of bilateral trade through trade 
liberalisation and engagement with international institutions simply 
establishes a framework within which trade can take place. However, Jordan 
and the United States as state actors are not involved to any great extent in the 
trade which actually takes place. Rather it is non-state actors, sometimes 
public sector or government-affiliated actors, but mostly private sector actors, 
which are actually involved in trade between the markets. Thus it is these non-
state actors and the market characteristics which determine levels of bilateral 
trade. The framework within which bilateral trade takes place is merely 
complementary. The difference in the levels and nature of trade in the three 
sectors studied here demonstrate this to great effect.  
 
Because the answer to the first research question is rather complicated and at 
any rate is not a simple ‘yes’, the answer to the second question is also 
complicated. The second research question asked whether or not increased 
trade levels have led to increased economic growth and market integration. 
The evidence in this thesis does not suggest that a definite answer can be 
given either way. The study of trade in T&C goods suggests that increased 
integration has been witnessed albeit in a slightly asymmetric manner with the 
Jordanian market being more dependent on the US market for exports. 
However, the small levels of trade in pharmaceutical goods and banking and 
insurance services as assessed in chapters six and seven do not suggest that 
these sectors are becoming more integrated across the markets. The overall 
answer to this question must therefore be that increased trade can lead to 
increased market integration under some circumstances but only in some 
sectors. As stated in the introduction, however, there is much scope for the 
further study of bilateral trade between Jordan and the United States in 
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different economic sectors and as the framework for trade established through 
international institutions further solidifies.  
 
In conclusion to the third research question regarding the impacts of market 
integration on state-level cooperation the discussions in chapters five through 
seven must again be drawn upon. Overall, the limited levels of increase in 
trade levels and subsequent limited levels of market interaction and 
integration do not suggest that there is greater state-level integration or 
cooperation. Certainly increased trade in T&C goods has led to increased 
bilateral economic interests on the part of Jordanian actors. However, the 
asymmetric nature of this integration reflects a form of relationship closer to 
dependence than interdependence. Furthermore, the low levels of market 
integration in pharmaceutical products, banking and insurance services 
suggest that there has been little increase in shared interests with regards to 
these sectors and little by way of growth in interdependence. In short the 
markets have remained relatively independent of each other and so state-level 
interests have not converged to a great extent thus limiting the need for 
cooperation. On the other hand, Jordanian involvement in IOs such as the 
WTO and WIPO along with the United States as well as adherence to various 
regimes governing IPRs and services such as TRIPs and GATS does 
constitute a significant form of cooperation with the United States at the state 
level. Furthermore, the cooperation between Jordan and the United States with 
regards to formulating the TRIPs-Plus provisions within the JUSFTA is also 
significant. Again, here the significant difference between TRIPs and TRIPs-
Plus provisions must be noted. However, this cooperation is sector specific 
and confined to unique issues and so does not represent a major paradigmatic 
shift towards greater inter-state cooperation on non-related issues.  
 
The fourth question addressed by this thesis considered what the main 
national interests for the United States and Jordan have been over the past 
decade or so in relation to their bilateral relations and if these are being met as 
a result of the policies taken to liberalise trade between them. As discussed 
above, both states have engaged with bilateral trade liberalisation through 
international institutions in pursuit of various national interests. In the case of 
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Jordan these interests revolve around economic growth and stability. For the 
United States these interests revolve around greater cooperation and 
integration with the MENA region as a whole using Jordan as an initial step in 
a much broader project. For both states no simple conclusion can be drawn 
about whether or not these interests have been met.  
 
Jordanian exports to the US market have increased since bilateral trade 
liberalisation began and overall economic growth in Jordan has been 
impacted. Furthermore, the successful reorientation of the bilateral trade 
relationship with the United States has further solidified Jordanian efforts to 
liberalise trade and economically integrate at the international level. The 
United States certainly has become a more important economic market for the 
Jordanian market and thus state and as such has been able to increase its 
integration with Jordan. It is possible to venture the conclusion, although it 
cannot be argued from a position of absolute authority, that the increasing 
importance of the United States to Jordan should result in greater cooperation. 
However, asymmetric market integration and issue-specific cooperation in 
IOs and trade regimes do not necessarily equate to greater inter-state 
cooperation on other issues. Perhaps this fourth research question was too 
bold and ambitious and cannot be answered through this thesis on its own, but 
instead requires further study of market interactions and bilateral state 
relations. 
 
 
The hypothesis tested in this thesis is thus proven to be incorrect in the form 
outlined in the introduction. The conclusions of this thesis demonstrate that 
trade liberalisation between Jordan and the United States through engagement 
with international institutions has not led to significantly greater levels of 
trade, economic growth and market integration. Instead some increases in 
bilateral trade, economic growth and market integration has occurred in some 
sectors but not others. Market characteristics and the activity of non-state 
actors are the keys to determining levels of trade, economic growth and 
market integration and unfortunately as demonstrated in this thesis these at 
present seem to restrict greater market interaction and integration between 
Jordan and the United States in some sectors. Furthermore, even if these 
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conditions are met there is only limited proof that suggests that inter-state 
cooperation and stable relations between Jordan and the United States will 
necessarily follow, even if trade liberalisation does encourage greater 
economic growth and market integration. 
 
A further set of conclusions must be made regarding the theoretical 
framework employed in this thesis. By examining the development of the 
liberal institutionalist approach, and how it has been adapted and defended by 
various scholars in response to criticisms it was possible to define a clear 
conception of theory. The approach in this thesis has used a number of key 
principles found within instititutionalist theory used to study international 
political economy. A number of refinements of some key principles were also 
adopted. The resulting version of liberal institutionalism employed in this 
research project has thus been characterised as a critical version. As stated in 
the introduction this thesis acts as a study of the political economy of trade 
between the United States and Jordan, answering a number of key questions, 
and as an initial test for a critical liberal instititutionalist theory.  
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates a number of things with regards to the 
utility and explanatory power of this theory. With regards to the principles of 
an anarchic international system and the use of international institutions to 
govern relations in this system positive and negative conclusions have 
emerged. The assumption of anarchy has not been undermined in the analysis 
of this thesis and so is sound. The belief in the utility of institutions to 
facilitate trade, economic growth and cooperation on the behalf of actors has 
also been demonstrated in chapters three and four as being accurate and so is 
also sound. The principle of multi-level, positive-sum games and the absolute 
gains achieved through trade liberalisation as well as the sub-level zero-sum 
games and indeterminate gains of actors have been demonstrated in this 
thesis. Here, it has been shown that Jordan-US engagement in institutions has 
led to absolute gains for both state and non-state actors, however, these gains 
fall short of the desired gains of the state actors.    
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The analyses of chapters five through seven have included both state and non-
state actors and have shown the importance of non-state actor agency in 
determining economic activity. It has also been shown that not placing 
primacy on any single form of actor, for example, the state or MNC, has not 
hindered the preceding analysis and in fact has strengthened it. The linkage of 
issues at different levels of analysis has also proven to be a solid principle. 
Especially in chapters three and four but also in the latter chapters, the 
interdependence of issues at the domestic and international levels of analysis 
has been seen to be significant.  
 
As briefly discussed in the introduction and in greater length in chapter two, 
the analysis of the role of non-state actors does form a key element of this 
project. However, at times during this research project state actors have been 
concentrated on in slightly more detail than non-state actors. It is worth 
emphasising again that this is not due to any inherent state-centricity in the 
approach to this thesis, instead this fact merely represents the limitations in 
scope of non-state actor agency in Jordan-US trade.  
 
The final conclusion with regards to the explanatory use of this theory, 
however, rests on whether or not international institutions create greater 
economic integration through trade and result in greater cooperation through 
interdependence. Here, only a preliminary conclusion can be made. This is 
that engagement with international institutions in the pursuit of integration 
and cooperation is not enough to ensure these goals. Rather, non-state actor 
agency needs to be taken into account. If integration and cooperation are to be 
achieved then non-state actors will need to act in a manner which utilises the 
opportunities presented by international institutions.  So, this theory has 
helped to make sense of the structures, processes and policies involved in US-
Jordan trade relations. However, some weakness lies in the role of non-state 
actor agency in determining actual patterns of trade. In short, perhaps more 
emphasis needs to be placed on the agency of non-state actors and their 
relationship to institutions in a manner which allows for the analysis of the 
role of these actors in integration and cooperation and acknowledges the 
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limitations of the ability of institutions to meet these goals. This concept could 
be further developed in future studies. 
 
There are obvious limitations to this study which could be addressed in future 
work. Any analysis of the political economy of Jordan-US trade will be 
limited by scope to a certain extent. Here, analyses of state interests and 
subsequent policies have been presented to establish the framework within 
which bilateral trade takes place and broader state-actor involvement. 
However, only three economic sectors have been included in the study of 
trade relations. Here the nature of market interaction and non-state actor 
agency has been studied in these sectors and various conclusions drawn. 
While the sectors covered differ greatly from each other and represent three 
different types of trade, there are many other types of trade and actual sectors 
which could be studied. Perhaps future work could be carried out which 
analyses Jordan-US trade in other sectors. Furthermore, as the preceding 
analysis has shown the current regulatory framework governing bilateral trade 
is relatively young. It would be beneficial to engage in future studies which 
could analyse how the relationship develops over a longer period of time.  
 
Critical reflections on the processes involved in completeing this thesis, 
including the research interviews and writing must also be included here. 
Throughout this thesis the subjective nature of social science research and the 
inability to carry out entirely objective research has been acknowledged. Both 
what has been studied here and how the research was conducted are of prime 
importance. Furthermore, the interpretation of the information gathered during 
the research phases of this project must also be discussed. By acknowledging 
that the topic studied here and how it has been approached have been 
impacted upon by inherent values and ‘common-sense’ it is hoped that this 
thesis will not be viewed as claiming to be a tautological analysis of the 
political economy of US-Jordan trade relations. Furthermore, the conclusions 
presented here should not be viewed as claiming to be ultimate truth. On the 
contrary, this study from the outset was presented as just one analysis – albeit, 
an attempt at the best analysis possible at this time – where other competing 
analyses may also be possible. This thesis has to a large extent been based on 
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the interpretation as well as the description and presentation of information. 
While subjective opinion has been minimised where it is not appropriate the 
possibility that some opinions are expressed or have shaped the analysis here 
must be conceded – although it is believed these will not have impacted the 
overall analysis of this thesis to a great extent. 
 
The information gathered during the research phases of this project presents 
some questions. In the first instance much of the information which has been 
analysed here was collected on field research trips of which interviews were a 
key component. Approximately thirty individual interviews were carried out, 
some with fixed questions and some rolling discussions. Both methods of 
interviewing present the possibility that some relevant information will not be 
collected. However, preparation for the interviews through prior research led 
to the designing of a range of questions upon which to draw. The result was 
that as best as can be guaranteed accurate and relevant information was 
collected with a minimum amount missed. The rolling discussions were very 
useful in exploring the experiences and thoughts of individuals directly 
involved in what was being studied. The use of snow-balling to gather 
candidates for interview was also effective but did lead to the possibility that 
some sources were ignored in favour of others. It must be acknowledged here 
that while the best efforts were made to conduct interviews and literature-
based research, there are practical limitations which cannot be avoided. These 
include financial, time and access limitations. Thus the possibility that there 
may have been some information not gathered must be accepted.  
 
A final set of conclusions must be made here to re-emphasise where the 
claims to originality in this thesis lie. In one sense this project contributes to 
the body of IPE literature which considers the MENA region. This literature 
as a whole is rather limited in terms of what actors and issues are studied as 
well as being western-centric in nature. Furthermore, Jordan has largely been 
excluded from this literature and so this study attempts to bring Jordan in to 
IPE discussion. At the same time this is a study which remains free from the 
constraints of the Trans-Atlantic divide in IPE and instead examines the topic 
at hand without the distraction of trying to reinforce one of the main schools.  
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This research project is also original in the sense that it examines issues of 
high and low politics and how they relate to each other in the US-Jordan 
relationship. Most studies which have examined US-Jordan relations have 
focused either on high or low politics with little attempt to combine their 
study. While this thesis does not claim to entirely re-interpret US and 
Jordanian national interests, there is the claim to originality in the analysis of 
how these interests are being pursued through international institutions, trade 
liberalisation and market integration. Thus critical conclusions have been 
made about the utility of this form of contemporary policy direction on future 
Jordan-US relations. Furthermore, the preceding study has adapted an existing 
theoretical approach. There has been no claim to total originality in the use of 
theory as many of the principles of the liberal institutionalist approach used 
here have been applied elsewhere. However, the selection and adaptation of 
some of these principles in a critical form as applied to this analysis is unique.  
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